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THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF HUGH FIRST VISCOUNT GOUGH FIELD-MARSHAL

'HE HAS HIMSELF AFFORDED THE BRIGHTEST EXAMPLE OF THE HIGHEST QUALITIES OF THE BRITISH SOLDIER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE GLORIOUS SUCCESSES WHICH HAVE ATTENDED THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER HIS COMMAND.'

The Duke of Wellington.

HUGH, FIRST VISCOUNT GOUGH

THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF HUGH FIRST VISCOUNT GOUGH FIELD-MARSHAL

BY

ROBERT S. RAIT

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD

WITH MAPS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS

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IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I

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PREFACE

More than thirty years have elapsed since the death of Field-Marshal Viscount Gough, and more than fifty since he commanded, for the last time, an army in the field. His services to his country, rendered in the Peninsula, in China, and in India, give him a claim to remembrance among the distinguished soldiers who have added large tracts of country to the dominions of the British Crown, and, but for one important consideration, a Life of Lord Gough would have been published long ere now. The delay has been due to the fact that the years of Lord Gough's Indian command were marked by a series of controversies with other eminent representatives of the British power in India, and more especially (as is almost invariable in the case of a Commander-in-Chief) with successive Governors-General. Viscount Gough himself decided that it was inadvisable, in his own lifetime, to reveal the differences of opinion that existed between the military and the civil authorities, and he preferred to permit his whole military policy to be misunderstood by the press and the public rather than to defend himself by embarking upon an embittered personal controversy. This attitude was maintained by his family after his

death, and statements which are demonstrably unfair to Lord Gough have passed unquestioned, in numberless works relating to India, or to military history. After these many years, the time seemed to have arrived when the discussion might be reopened, without any indiscretion, and the present work is an attempt to present at once a record of Lord Gough's career, and a vindication of his military policy from the charges which are most frequently brought against it.

The fact that these charges, originally unsubstantiated and never proved, have been permitted to remain so long unchallenged, explains the distinctly controversial character of this book. When, in the summer of 1901, the present Viscount Gough placed at my disposal the whole of the voluminous correspondence of his Grandfather, my first intention was to prepare a simple statement of fact, without reference to definite accusations against Lord Gough's generalship made by particular individuals. This scheme soon proved impossible to carry out, partly because of the difficulty involved in establishing the truth of any controverted statement without reference to the contrary view expressed elsewhere, and partly because any unwillingness to meet, freely and fully, the charges of those who have subjected Lord Gough's reputation to the severest censure, might seem to amount to an acceptance of the adverse verdict

upon his career. It became, therefore, necessary to refer to a number of works on Indian or military history, and it was equally necessary to deal frankly with the disagreements between Lord Gough, Lord Hardinge, and Lord Dalhousie, and to place the reader in a position to form a clear judgement on the subject. Contradictions on points of detail have, as a rule, been relegated to footnotes, and every effort has been made to avoid attaching undue importance to side issues; but it must be admitted that the book is, throughout the section dealing with India, a contribution to a military controversy. It is only right that I should add, in this connexion, that, while the Viscount Gough has afforded me every facility in the preparation of this work, neither he nor any other member of his family has in any way interfered with my freedom of action, or influenced the shape which the work has taken. The responsibility for every statement made and every view expressed in these pages rests solely with myself, and if I have written a defence of the General whose life I have attempted to tell, it is because my materials made such a defence the only possible form that a biography of Lord Gough could take.

The nature of my subject, connected with so many different periods and countries, has led me to crave help in many quarters, and it is a pleasant

duty to acknowledge much indebtedness of various kinds. I have to thank the Viscount Gough and numerous members of the Gough family for entrusting to my care many valuable records, and for rendering me ever willing aid. I am especially indebted to MS. collections left by the late Colonel the Hon. G. H. Gough, who had devoted much attention to the subject. My debt to him relates more particularly to the period of the Peninsular War. By the courtesy of the representatives of the late Marquis of Dalhousie I have been permitted to quote from his correspondence, and I have received help from Sir William Lee Warner, whose forthcoming biography of Lord Dalhousie will throw additional light upon many topics discussed here. Sir Henry Lawrence, Bt., has been good enough to afford me access to the manuscripts of his distinguished grandfather, and Mrs. Rivington kindly lent me some letters of her late father, General Sir John Littler. I have had the privilege of consulting several distinguished soldiers who were themselves present at one or other of Lord Gough's battles, and, in this connexion, I cannot omit the names of General Sir Frederick Goldsmid, K.C.S.I., who served in the First China War, General Sir J. Luther Vaughan, K.C.B., who fought under General Littler at Maharajpore, General Sir James Fraser Tytler, K.C.B., who was A.D.C. to Lord Gough in the First Sikh War, and the late General Colin Cookworthy,

who was in Christie's Troop of Horse Artillery at Chillianwalla. Two obligations of this nature are so great that they cannot be incidentally mentioned. Field-Marshal Sir Frederick Haines, G.C.B., who was Lord Gough's military secretary, has been good enough to discuss with me, on many occasions, the two Sikh campaigns, and I owe much to his wonderful memory which scarcely required the corroboration afforded by the Diary which he kept throughout the wars. I have fully availed myself of the generous kindness with which he placed his recollections at my service; he has saved me from many errors, and has explained the real importance of many incidents which have generally been misunderstood. No words of mine can render thanks for such a tribute of affection and respect for the memory of his Chief. I have been, throughout the preparation of the work, in constant communication with another survivor of the Punjab campaign, General Sir Charles Gough, G.C.B., V.C., the co-author of *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, a book which is indispensable for a thorough study of the subject. Sir Charles Gough's intimate acquaintance with the Indian history of the period has been of great value to me, and, like Sir Frederick Haines, he has been good enough to read the book in proof-sheet. Field-Marshal the Viscount Wolseley and Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief on the China Station, have honoured me with criticisms

and suggestions on portions of the book: Lord Wolseley on the Sikh Wars and Sir Cyprian Bridge on the China War. Even at the cost of swelling a list of acknowledgements already very large, I must gratefully thank a number of personal friends, including Professor York Powell, Professor Oman (who read the portion relating to the Peninsular War), Mr. H. A. L. Fisher of New College, Mr. R. P. Dunn-Pattison of Magdalen College, and Mr. John S. C. Bridge of Lincoln's Inn, to all of whom I owe helpful criticism of proof-sheets. The classification and calendaring of the manuscripts on which the work is based, has been performed by two of my former pupils, Mr. R. G. Pidcock and Mr. H. E. Bowman, and by Mr. R. W. Jeffery of Brasenose College, to the careful labours of all of whom is due the completion of the volume within two years. The other friends and colleagues whom I have consulted on various points will be good enough to believe that my gratitude is none the less sincere that it is unrecorded in a Preface which is already so personal that I must plead, once more, the nature of my subject as my excuse for contracting so many obligations.

ROBERT S. RAIT.

NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD.
September, 1903.

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Acknowledgements are due to General Sir Charles Gough for permission to reproduce several maps from his work, *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*; and to Mr. R. P. Dunn-Pattison, Lecturer of Magdalen College, who was good enough to draw three of the Indian maps.

INTRODUCTORY

PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE

INTRODUCTORY

PARENTAGE AND EARLY LIFE

READERS of *Diana of the Crossways* will remember that the opening scene of that great book is laid in Dublin. 'In the Assembly Rooms of the capital city of the Sister Island there was a public ball, to celebrate the return to Erin of a British hero of Irish blood, after his victorious Indian campaign; a mighty struggle splendidly ended.' Mr. Meredith drew from the life his portrait of that 'fine old warrior, tall, straight, grey-haired, martial in his aspect and decorations,' for he had seen him after his return from the East, old in years, but 'with his uniform and his height and his grey head, like a glorious October day just before the brown leaves fall.' The 'Lord Larrian' of *Diana* was intended to represent Hugh, first Viscount Gough, who had added the Punjab to the Queen's dominions in India. This last achievement was but the culminating point of a life spent in the service of the Empire. The old soldier who unbuckled his sword after his crowning victory of Gujerat, had put on his armour fifty-six years before, and during that long period he had faced his country's enemies in every quarter of the globe. His apprenticeship to the art of war was served in South Africa and the West Indies; he won his early reputation in Wellington's Peninsular

army; and he commanded in sixteen separate actions in China and in India. It is the story of this strenuous and devoted life that we propose here to tell.

About the middle of the reign of James I, three brothers, Robert, Francis, and Hugh Gough, made their way from England to Ireland. They were the sons of Hugh Gough, Rector of All Cannings, Wiltshire, and grandsons of John Gough of Stratford, in the same county. All three were graduates of the University of Oxford, and all alike were in holy orders. Their father was also a member of that University; he appears as a clerk of Magdalen College in 1560, and he was Rector of Little Cheverell before being presented to All Cannings in 1593. He married a lady of Devonshire birth, Jane Clifford of Clifford Hall, and, in due course, five of their sons were matriculated in the University. The brothers, as was not unusual in those days, went up to Oxford in couples; the two eldest, Robert and William, entered Balliol College in 1603, aged nineteen and seventeen respectively; ten years later, another pair, Francis, aged eighteen, and Edward, aged seventeen, became members of St. Edmund Hall; and finally, they were followed by Hugh, who matriculated from New College in 1617. The family included at least two other children, for Hugh is described as the seventh son; but of the others nothing is known. Of the two sons who remained in England, the elder, William, left the University without taking a degree, and

became steward to the Earl of Warwick; the younger, Edward, became successively Rector of Great Cheverell, in Wiltshire, and of Over Moigne, in Dorset, besides holding, from 1629, the dignity of a canon of Salisbury. The founder of the family fortunes in Ireland was the eldest brother, Robert Gough, who became, in 1615, precentor of Limerick Cathedral, and in 1628, Archdeacon of Ardfert. Francis, the most distinguished of the five, left St. Edmund Hall, before taking his B.A. degree, in order to become a clerk of New College, but he had returned to the Hall before proceeding to his Master's degree in 1618. In the same year, he followed his brother to Ireland, and was made Chancellor of Limerick Cathedral. In 1626, he was appointed to the see of Limerick, which he held till 1634, when he died, leaving a family of eight children. The seventh son, Hugh, the bearer of the family name, also found what Anthony à Wood describes as 'a just opportunity of going into Ireland,' and in 1626 he succeeded his brother as Chancellor of Limerick, in which cathedral he likewise held a prebend[1]. This Wiltshire family of Goughs, who sided with Church and King in the Civil Wars, must be distinguished from another branch which produced a distinguished Puritan divine and a Cromwellian officer, who was one of the regicides.

[1] Our information about these brothers is derived from Foster's *Alumni Oxonienses*, Clark's *Register of the University of Oxford*, and Wood's *Athenae Oxonienses*.

There is some dubiety[1] as to whether the family of Gough of Woodsdown, co. Limerick, to which the subject of this memoir belonged, take their descent from Francis Gough, Bishop of Limerick, or from his brother, Hugh; a persistent family tradition, which can be traced back to the middle of the eighteenth century, asserts that George Gough of Woodsdown, who was born in 1751, was seventh in descent from the Bishop. The Goughs had, in the interval, remained faithful to Ireland, and had intermarried with families who, like them-

[1] The difficulty arises from a question regarding the date of the death of Hugh Gough, the Bishop's younger brother, who, as we have said, succeeded him as Chancellor of Limerick in 1626. A Hugh Gough, Chancellor of Limerick, made his will in 1682, and died in 1684. From this Hugh Gough the first Viscount was unquestionably descended, and, if he was the Chancellor of 1626, then the family traces its origin not to the Bishop but to his brother. But it seems probable that the testator of 1682 and the Chancellor of 1626 are in fact different persons, for, according to Cotton's *Fasti*, (1) in 1662 Hugh Gough, Chancellor of Limerick, petitioned to be excused part of his duties on the ground of 'great age and infirmity,' and (2) in 1670 his office was vacated. It is not likely that such an office was vacated except by death, and the fact that the testator of 1682 leaves his wife sole executrix seems to suggest that he was a younger man than the Chancellor who was very old in 1662. The family tradition is that Hugh Gough, the Bishop's brother, died in 1670 at the age of seventy-one (a very old age for those days), and that the Hugh Gough who died in 1684 was his nephew and successor, a son of the Bishop. This tradition is supported by a statement made by the Ulster King of Arms in 1816 to the effect that neither of the Bishop's brothers, Robert and Hugh, left

selves, were of English birth, but resident in Ireland—the Millers of Ballicasey, co. Clare, and the Wallers of Castle Waller, co. Tipperary. George Gough of Woodsdown (1751–1836) married, in January, 1775, Letitia Bunbury, the daughter of Thomas Bunbury of Lisnevagh and Moyle, co. Clare, and their descendants added new and greater glories to the traditional distinction which the name of Gough had acquired in the seventeenth century.

George Gough himself had won military laurels in the memorable 'ninety-eight.' He first appears, nine years before his marriage, as Cornet 'to that Troop, whereof the Earl of Ancrum is Captain, in the fourth Regiment of Horse[1].' He was, in this respect, following an example set by his father (who

any issue. If we accept the view here stated, the descent of the family is as follows:—

Francis Gough, Bishop of Limerick.
|
Hugh Gough, Rector of Rathkeale, and Chancellor of Limerick Cathedral, *d.* 1684.
|
George Gough, Rector of Rathkeale.
|
Hugh Gough, of Kilfinning.
|
Hugh Gough, of Garrane.
|
George Gough, of Woodsdown.
|
George Gough, of Woodsdown, father of F.-M. Viscount Gough.

[1] The Commission is dated August 30, 1768, and is signed by George III and Lord Shelburne.

GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE FAMILY OF GOUGH,

TO ILLUSTRATE THE *LIFE OF VISCOUNT GOUGH.*


GEORGE GOUGH, of Woodsdown, co. Limerick (1751–1836), Lt.-Col. City of Limerick Militia, m. Letitia, dau. of Thomas Bunbury, of Lisnevagh.
George, Capt. 28th Foot.
Thomas Bunbury, Dean of Derry.
William, Major, 68th Regt.
Hugh, 1st Viscount, m. Frances, dau. of Gen. Stephens.
Jane, m. Lt.-Col. Lloyd.
Elizabeth, m. Benjamin Frend.
George Gough, of Rathronan, E.I.C.S.
Sir John Bloomfield Gough (China, Gwalior, and Sikh Campaigns).
Colonel Frend (A.D.C. in Gwalior Campaign).
Edward, 1810–1813.
George Stephens, 2nd Viscount, m. Jane, dau. of George Arbuthnot, of Elderslie, Surrey.
Letitia Mary, m. Edward Supple (afterwards Collis).
Gertrude Sophia, m. A. Arbuthnot, Esq.
Jane Eliza Mona, m. Lt.-Col. Gregory Haines.
Frances Maria, m. F.-M. Sir Patrick Grant (Gwalior and Sikh Campaigns).
Sir Charles Gough, K.C.B., V.C. (2nd Sikh War).
Sir Hugh Gough, K.C.B., V.C.
Hugh, 3rd Viscount.
George, Col. 14th Hussars.

had been appointed, in 1756, Cornet, and in 1762, Captain in a troop of Militia Dragoons). How long he remained under Ancrum is not clear; he makes his next appearance on the stage of history at the outbreak of the troubles in Ireland in 1793. In April of that year he was made Deputy-Governor of the city of Limerick[1]. A paper of instructions sent to him on his appointment to this office throws some light on the measures taken by the Government to suppress the growing discontent. The qualification was a property one; the duties consisted in assisting the Mayor in the Militia Ballot, and in aiding him 'to enforce the Act against such as are subject to it in respect of serving.' The document closes with this sentence: 'Their [the Deputy-Governor's] office, in short, may be termed Militia Magistrates; within their own jurisdiction therefore, they are as much favoured as any magistrate can be in the Execution of his Duty, for if any person should be inclined to Question their Acts, the defence is made as easy as possible to them; it cannot be decided on by any other than a Limerick Jury, and treble costs are to be given against the party complaining.'

A month later, the Deputy-Governor was made Captain in an infantry Regiment of Militia; shortly afterwards, he was promoted to a majority, and, in

[1] The family had been continuously resident near Limerick; e. g. the freedom of Limerick was conferred in 1726 on Hugh Gough of Garrane, the grandfather of the George Gough of whom we are speaking.

1797, he became Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel of the Limerick Regiment. He held this office at the date of the rebellion of 1798, and, in July of that year, commanded in a small action, of which a record in his own handwriting has been preserved. A force of about 4,000 rebels had gathered in King's County and were laying waste the country in the neighbourhood of Edenderry. Colonel Gough, with 400 of his own Limerick regiment, thirty dragoons, and thirty-five yeomen (cavalry), met them at Johnstown, and completely defeated them, capturing their leaders. His small force lost two men killed and nine wounded. His own horse was hit through the neck, and a shot went through both the cocks of his hat. His conduct received the enthusiastic approbation of one of his commanding officers, and it may be said that his success freed King's County from the insurgents.

'This,' he says, 'was the second time I saved Edenderry from being burned, as, but that day month before, I got an express sent over to Phillips Town, where I was quartered and commanded the Garrison, that a large Rebel Army had taken possession of Lord Harberton's House, and was Encamped on his Demesne. I imediately Ordered out my division of the Limerick, marched out, and before Daylight, Arrived at Lord Harbertons, shot and destroyed all their advanced Guard, drove them out of the House, and from their camp, killed 14 of them, and took all their Stores, which I next day carted into Edenderry, and shared to all my little party, nineteen Stockings[1] a piece. This victory

[1] The booty on the second occasion included two stands of

[i. e. the success at Johnstown in July] saved Edenderry a second time being burned. I march'd back next day, with the blessing of all the inhabitants, who will as long [as] they live remember Col. Gough and his gallant Garryaon Boys[1]—a braver or more loyal, or a more divoted set of fellows to their Officers never carried Firelocks.'

Connaught had taken but little part in the rebellion itself, but it was the scene of the abortive French attempt, made after the suppression of the rebels. In August, 1798, a French adventurer, by name Humbert, landed at Killala, with about a thousand soldiers, trained and disciplined in the Revolutionary wars. It is to the lasting credit of these invaders that they showed to the Irish Protestants and Loyalists the most courteous consideration; and, weary and ill-fed as they were, they fought bravely against overwhelming numbers. They had expected to be received by a united Irish peasantry; but they found no enthusiasm for their cause and were joined by very few recruits. At Castlebar, on August 26, Humbert easily defeated General Lake, whose army, composed of Irish militia, made no effort to stand against the charge

colours and a telescope, which were retained by the Colonel, and '900 pounds in Cattle, Horses, New Linnen and Spirits,' which he shared with his officers and men; a piece of fine linen which fell to his lot 'I presented,' he says, 'to a very beautiful Quaker Lady, at whose house I was that night Billited.'

[1] It is an interesting coincidence that this song of Garry Owen is associated with his son's Peninsular exploits. Cf. *infra*, pp. 84–85.

of the French. The near approach of Cornwallis, with the royal army, rendered Castlebar unsafe for the invader, and, on September 4, General Humbert commenced a swift march towards Sligo, with the double intention of awaiting reinforcements from France and of gaining Irish recruits in a new district. The garrison at Sligo consisted of militia troops under Colonel Vereker, whom Colonel Gough had succeeded in the command of the Limerick regiment, which formed part of the Sligo garrison. Vereker seems to have been under the impression that only an advance guard of the French was approaching the town, and, putting himself at the head of 300 men of his old regiment, he marched out to meet them, on the morning of September 5. He had also with him thirty light dragoons and two curricle guns. They met Humbert at Colooney, five miles from Sligo, and maintained a gallant resistance, although the French were many times their number. Finally, they were compelled to abandon their two guns; but Humbert had found their resistance so formidable that, like Vereker, he decided that the enemy must be an advance guard, and he gave up his intention of marching on Sligo (which really lay at his mercy). From Colooney he made his way to Cloone to combine with the rebels at Granard, but he was unable to take all his artillery with him. At Ballinamuck, he found himself surrounded by the armies of Lake and Cornwallis, and, after some resistance, surrendered.

The brevity of the six weeks' campaign in Connaught was largely due to Vereker's defence of Sligo, for if the French had reached the mountains, the resistance would certainly have been prolonged. For his services, Vereker received the thanks of Parliament, and medals were conferred upon the troops engaged. The casualties of the Limerick regiment amounted to thirty-five, and among the wounded was Colonel Gough, who had accompanied his gallant 300 at Colooney. The regiment was disbanded at the Peace of Amiens in 1801, and the historian of Limerick[1] has preserved a record of the scene when the city welcomed back the warriors who had maintained its honour, and when, on the lawn in front of Woodsdown, Colonel Gough bade farewell to his comrades.

The family of Colonel George Gough consisted of four sons and two daughters. The eldest, George, followed his father's footsteps in the Limerick City Militia, in which he received a majority in 1797. It is probable, though there is no evidence on the point, that Major Gough served under his father in the actions we have just described. He afterwards joined the regular forces and served in Egypt and in the Peninsular War as a Captain in the 28th Foot. He died in 1841. Thomas Bunbury Gough, the

[1] *The History of the County and City of Limerick*, by the Rev. P. FitzGerald and J. J. McGregor, 1827. Other authorities are Maxwell's *History of the Rebellion of 1798*, and Mr. Lecky's *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*.

second brother, entered the Church, and attained the dignity of Dean of Derry. The name of his son, General Sir John Bloomfield Gough, will meet us at a later stage of our narrative; another son, Thomas Bunbury, rose to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and was killed in the attack on the Redan in 1855; and the martial fame of the family has, in modern times, been worthily maintained by several of the Dean's grandchildren, among whom the most conspicuous are General Sir Charles Gough and his brother, General Sir Hugh Gough, who received together the Victoria Cross for valour displayed in the Indian Mutiny; while still more recent campaigns in South Africa and in Somaliland have proved that a later generation is not neglectful of its family traditions. The third son of Colonel George Gough of Woodsdown was Major William Gough, of the 68th Regiment, who served in the Peninsula and in Canada, and who was drowned off Kinsale Head in 1822. Our hero, Hugh Gough, was the fourth son. Of the two daughters, the elder, Jane, married Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd, who was killed at Bayonne in 1813, and the younger, Elizabeth, married Benjamin Frend, of Boskell, co. Limerick. Her son, afterwards Colonel Frend, was, like his cousin Sir J. B. Gough, on the staff of his uncle during his Indian campaigns. Mrs. Frend was the favourite sister of the future Field-Marshal, and to the end of their long lives they entertained for each other the most affectionate regard.

Hugh Gough was born at Woodsdown, on November 3, 1779. Of his childhood, there is nothing to tell, for nothing is known. Family tradition relates that his birth was a disappointment to his parents, who had already three sons, and who had hoped for a daughter; and that the boy was, in consequence, somewhat neglected. He was himself accustomed, in later years, to say that his only education consisted of what he could pick up from listening to the tutor who was teaching his two elder brothers. The real influence of his childhood was, doubtless, the military atmosphere in which he was nurtured, and so powerful was its effect that, at the age of thirteen, he was already wearing the King's uniform. His earliest appointment was in his father's militia corps, whence he passed, almost immediately, to the Hon. Robert Ward's corps, in which he was gazetted Ensign on August 7, 1794. Two months later, he was promoted to a Lieutenancy in the 119th Foot, a regiment raised under Colonel Rochford. He was Adjutant of this regiment at the age of fifteen, and there is a tradition that he was reported upon as a specially capable officer.

On June 3, 1795, he was gazetted, by transfer from the 119th Foot, to the 2nd Battalion of the 78th Highlanders, or Ross-shire Buffs (now known as the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders).

Almost seventy years after he had joined the 78th Highlanders, the Lieutenant of 1795, now a Field-Marshal, had occasion to write to his son-in-law, who had been appointed Colonel of the

regiment: 'Let me warmly and from the heart congratulate you,' he said, 'on your obtaining the Colonelcy of my own old (and first corps of the line) the Ross-shire Buffs. I made my début in them at the Cape when but a boy. . . . How these little incidents recall our memories to days long passed, days of youthful enjoyment, when the participators of them have passed away, and we are standing in hopeful anticipation of rejoining them never to part[1].'

These sentences, written at a time of deep domestic affliction, constitute the only reference to Lord Gough's connexion with the Seaforths, and it is, therefore, impossible to give any personal details of the boy's share in the actions which resulted in the capture of Cape Town. It may, however, be of some interest to narrate briefly the course of the war, and to indicate the part played by the regiment[2].

The first conquest of Cape Colony by Great Britain was an incident in the Revolutionary Wars. In 1794, the French, having defeated the Duke of York near Dunkirk, had Holland in their power, forced the Dutch to renounce their allegiance to the Prince of Orange and to become the allies of the French Republic, and, with the warm support of the democratic party in Holland, founded the Batavian

[1] F.-M. Lord Gough to Sir Patrick Grant, November 17, 1863.

[2] Our knowledge of the circumstances is derived from a letter quoted in Colonel Hugh Davidson's excellent *History of the 78th Highlanders.*

Republic. The Dutch fleet was now at the command of the French Republic, and if the Dutch colonies fell into their hands, the dangers to the British government would be greatly increased. Two Dutch possessions, in particular, offered a serious menace to Great Britain—the island of Ceylon, from its proximity to our Indian possessions, and the Cape of Good Hope, which was on the road to India. Expeditions were, therefore, sent to take possession of these two colonies in the name of the Stadtholder, who had taken refuge in England.

In the month of June, 1795, a British force, which included the 2nd Battalion of the 78th Highlanders, arrived off the Cape, and anchored in Simon's Bay. The fleet was under the command of Admiral Elphinstone, and General Craig was in charge of the military forces. Their first step was to ask for an interview, on board ship, with Commissioner Sluysken, the Dutch Governor, and Colonel Gordon, a Scotsman[1], who was in command of the Dutch forces. This was declined, and the burghers immediately took up a position at Muizenburg, about six miles south of Capetown, which commanded the road from Simonstown. A deputation, which included Colonel Mackenzie of the 78th, then landed and proceeded to call upon Sluysken, showing him an order from the Prince of Orange, to receive the troops of his ally, King George. Such a mandate was unconstitutional, and

[1] He was Dutch on his mother's side, and his father had been in the Dutch service.

Sluysken and his Council adopted a policy of procrastination. General Craig, in person, explained that the desire of the British was simply to protect the Colony, and that there would be no interference with their laws or with any department of their government; but the Council answered that they could defend themselves, and would accept of no such help. The British commanders therefore issued a proclamation to the people of the colony, setting forth the dangers of French tyranny and the benefits of His Majesty's protection[1]. This proclamation was regarded as an unfriendly act by the Dutch Council, who forbade the supply of provisions to the fleet and reinforced the garrison at Muizenburg. Gordon was an adherent of the Orange party and was disposed to be friendly if he was satisfied that the British intended only to hold the Colony for the Stadtholder; but the people were, on the whole, inclined to democratic views, and they welcomed the prospect of hostilities. When it became known in the Colony that the French had respected the separate existence of Holland, and that the States-General had freed the colonists from their allegiance to the Stadtholder, this feeling increased in intensity.

On July 14, the 78th Regiment (450 strong), accompanied by 350 marines, landed and took possession of Simonstown, and they were soon strengthened by the addition of 800 seamen.

[1] For a full account of this subject cf. Theal's *History of South Africa.*

General Craig had thus a force of 1,600 men, but he was absolutely devoid of field-guns. The Dutch had less than a thousand men and eleven pieces of artillery, and they occupied a strong position. The British leaders found, in their ships of war, a compensation for their lack of field-guns. On the morning of August 7, the vessels in the Bay opened a heavy fire upon the Dutch. The effect was so great that they were driven from their position, but, as the cannonade prevented the near approach of the British infantry, the enemy succeeded in saving some of their guns. Their two cannon they spiked and abandoned. The Dutch infantry and artillerymen made a stand on a rocky height, out of range of the fire of the ships, and from this they were driven by a charge of the 78th, in which one of their officers (Captain Hercules Scott) and six or seven rank and file were wounded. This was Gough's first experience of hand-to-hand fighting, and possibly the first occasion on which he was under fire. Next morning, there was a further skirmish in which the two Dutch cannon, which had been made fit for use by Craig's orders, were employed against their former owners.

The British now repeated their offers, which were again declined, and they could take no further steps till the arrival of reinforcements. An insignificant action took place on September 1, when the Grenadiers of the 78th silenced an attacking party of the enemy; but there was no decisive step for another fortnight. By the middle of the month, the British

forces had been increased to between four and five thousand men. The Dutch were defending Wynberg, on the way to Capetown, and the British attacked on September 14. The enemy were badly led and hopelessly outnumbered, and they made little resistance. Next day, Capetown surrendered, and the Colony passed into the hands of the British; to be restored at the Peace of Amiens in 1802, recaptured four years later, and finally to pass under the British crown by the Treaty of Paris.

This was Gough's sole action with the 78th Highlanders. An Irish, not a Scottish, regiment, was his fitting place, and, in December, 1795, he obtained a transfer to the regiment which is most generally associated with his name—the 87th Foot or the Prince of Wales's Irish Regiment. It consisted of one battalion, and had been raised two years previously, largely through the efforts of its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel (afterwards General Sir John) Doyle. It had first seen service in the Duke of York's campaign in the Netherlands, in 1784, and had won a slight distinction in that unlucky enterprise, by repulsing a cavalry attack at Alost. Its next two appearances were not so successful. In 1795 it was stationed at Bergen-op-Zoom, where the desertion of our Dutch allies to the French left it alone in an enemy's country. It was forced to capitulate, and almost the whole regiment became prisoners of war. Its commander did not share its fate, as he was in England, recovering from a wound received at Alost. By his active

interest the empty ranks of the regiment were again filled, and in 1796 it was ordered on an expedition to the North Sea, to aid the troops in the fleet under Lord Duncan; but stress of weather prevented the scheme from being carried into effect. Its destination was now altered, in consequence of an event which startled diplomatic Europe in the summer of 1796. On August 19, Spain, which had long been weary of the struggle with France, and had made peace in the previous year, entered into an offensive alliance with the Republic against Great Britain—an unnatural union which was ere long to meet with fitting punishment. The real importance of Spain, like that of Holland, lay in its naval power, and, to some extent, in its foreign possessions. It was therefore necessary to attack the Spanish, as it had proved necessary to attack the Dutch, colonies, and, in October, 1796, the 87th Regiment sailed for the West Indies.

At what stage Gough joined his new regiment is not clear. A statement of his services, in his own handwriting, dated 1831, mentions that he was present at the capture of the Dutch fleet in Saldanha Bay. This squadron arrived at the Cape in August, 1796, and General Craig, with a force which included the 78th, made a forced march to Saldanha Bay to oppose the landing of any Dutch troops: a march in which considerable suffering was caused by lack of water. There was no fighting, for the Dutch fleet was outnumbered by that under Elphinstone, and surrendered without making any

resistance. It will be remembered that the incident was the occasion of an important lawsuit to decide whether the Army could claim a share in the spoil, along with the Navy. It is not absolutely certain that Gough accompanied the 78th in their march, as he had been gazetted to the 87th nearly a year before; the only clearly ascertained fact is that he witnessed the surrender. Shortly afterwards he proceeded to join the 87th.

The first engagement in which Gough served with his new regiment was the attempt on Porto Rico, in the spring of 1797—not an auspicious commencement of a connexion which was destined to bring honour both to the 87th and to himself. In the beginning of April the fleet sailed from Martinique, and, on the 18th day of that month, a landing was effected on the island of Porto Rico. The troops were under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby, whose intention was to attack the capital—San Juan—a fortified town defended by some thousands of Spaniards and a body of French troops. It was necessary to force a passage over a lagoon which was strongly held by the Spaniards, and the General soon found that the men under his command formed a force quite inadequate for the purpose. After some days, he determined to abandon the attempt, and ordered the troops to reembark. He had lost 230 out of his 3,000 men, and was satisfied with the conduct of his army, which he described as 'patient under labour, regular and orderly in their conduct and spirited when an

opportunity to show it occurred[1].' Abercromby himself was in bad health and returned to England, and his departure was followed by a complete cessation of hostilities in the West Indies. During this period, the 87th was in garrison at St. Lucia, where it remained till the autumn of 1799. In August of that year, an expedition, commanded by General Trigge and Admiral Lord Henry Seymour, was sent against Dutch Guiana. The force, which included the 87th Foot, proceeded to Surinam, but the Dutch made only a slight resistance, and soon surrendered the town of Paramaribo. From this date, we are without any definite knowledge of Gough's movements. His regiment remained in the West Indies till the summer of 1804, but the statement of his services, to which we have already referred, shows that he did not accompany it. He speaks of his service in the West Indies as extending over three and a half years, from which we gather that he returned home in 1800; but there is no trace of his doings till June, 1803, when he was promoted to a captaincy. His health suffered considerably from the climate of the West Indies, and he doubtless required some time to recruit. His brother George was engaged in the Egyptian campaign of 1801, and earned a tribute from Sir John Moore for his services at the battle of Alexandria; but we have no

[1] Quoted in the history of the 87th Regiment (Cannon's *Historical Record of the British Army*), 1853. To this book I am indebted for an account of the embodiment and early services of the 87th.

evidence of Gough's own presence in any field of action between Surinam and the outbreak of the war in the Peninsula.

The peace which was secured by the Treaty of Amiens, in March, 1802, came to an end in May of the following year. The declaration of war was followed by the assembling of Napoleon's army for the invasion of England, and the threat was answered by the volunteer movement. In addition to nearly 200,000 regulars and militia, a force of 347,000 volunteers was raised in the summer of 1803. Such a force as this required a large amount of training, and we find Captain Gough employed on this task, while his regiment was still in garrison abroad. In June, 1803, he became Superintending Officer of the Army of Defence for the counties of Oxford and Buckingham, and he discharged the same duties in connexion with the Army Reserve. In a letter written many years afterwards[1], he speaks of having gone to the West Indies in the course of this period, and it is possible that he went out in 1804 and returned with his regiment, which landed at Southampton in September of that year. A month later, he accompanied it to Guernsey, and was appointed Brigade-Major to the troops serving in that island, a post which he held till his succession to a majority. This rank he obtained in August, 1805, owing to the 'almost brotherly kindness' of a comrade, Major Blakeney, 'who sold out

[1] Lord Gough to Mr. E. Blakeney, October 27, 1859.

earlier than he otherwise would have done, in order that I might get his majority [1].'

A second battalion of the 87th had been formed in the preceding year, as a part of the reinforcement of the army necessitated by the Napoleonic wars. An Act of Parliament, dated July, 1804, sanctioned the addition of a 2nd battalion to be raised in the counties of Tipperary, Galway, and Clare, and to consist of 600 rank and file, a number which was successively increased to 800 and 1,000, in 1805 and in 1807 respectively. The battalion assembled at Frome, Somerset, in the end of 1804, and in March, 1805, it sailed from Bristol for Ireland. Gough joined this 2nd Battalion at some period in the year 1805; he says, in the statement from which this account is drawn, that he remained at Guernsey till his appointment to his majority in August, and that, thereafter, he served in England, Ireland, and Guernsey. We are probably right in inferring that, when the 1st Battalion proceeded to Portsmouth in November, 1805, Major Gough did not accompany them, but was attached to the 2nd Battalion which was being trained and recruited in Ireland. It returned to England in October, 1806 (when the 1st battalion had sailed for South America) and was stationed at Plymouth. Henceforward it is with the 2nd Battalion that the name of Gough is connected.

At Plymouth, Major Gough was fortunate enough

[1] Lord Gough to Mr. E. Blakeney, October 27, 1859.

to meet the lady who was to prove a noble and devoted wife through the joys and sorrows of more than fifty years. Of their first meeting there is a well authenticated story which may bear repetition here. The lady, Miss Frances Maria Stephens, whose father, General Edward Stephens, R.A., was in garrison at Plymouth, was looking forward to a military ball. Before it took place, she told her father that she had seen, in a dream, the man whose wife she was to become, and that he wore the green facings of the uniform of the 87th. On the night of the ball, she was standing beside her father when Major Gough entered the room, in company with two other officers of the 87th. 'That,' she said, indicating Gough, 'is the man I saw in my dream.' They danced together twice, and the meeting proved the beginning of an acquaintance which quickly ripened into courtship. In April, 1807, the regiment left Plymouth for Guernsey, but, in July, Major Gough returned to claim his bride. Their eldest daughter, Letitia, was born in August of the following year, four months before Major Gough sailed for the Peninsula.

Meanwhile, the newly-raised battalion had been undergoing a course of training under Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle and Major Gough. It was carefully inspected in the month of June, 1807, and reported fit for active service, to which Napoleon's interference in the affairs of Spain promised soon to call it. In June, 1808, the 87th left Guernsey, and, after a period of training at Danbury Camp, em-

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barked at Ramsgate. The Colonel-in-Chief at this time was General Sir John Doyle, whose nephew, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Doyle, had been actually in command of the battalion, but was now employed as a Military Commissioner in Spain. The command of the regiment, therefore, devolved upon Major Gough, whose fortunes in the Peninsula we proceed to follow. This can be done in considerably greater detail than has been possible up to the present point, both because the sources of information become more abundant, and because the personal share of Major Gough in the deeds of his regiment now begins to be important.

BOOK I

SPAIN: THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA

1. Talavera and Barrosa
2. Cadiz and Tarifa
3. The Close of the Campaign in Andalusia
4. Vittoria and Nivelle

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I

TALAVERA AND BARROSA

THE 'Continental System' by which Napoleon attempted to crush the commercial power of Great Britain was directly responsible for his first interference in the affairs of the Peninsula, for it was the hesitation of the Prince Regent to carry out the Berlin Decrees that brought about the famous decision that 'The House of Braganza has ceased to reign,' and the consequent occupation of Lisbon by the French under Junot. Within a year the Spanish House of Bourbon had also been deposed, and the Government of George III found that they were now in a position to resist Napoleon's schemes in Portugal, and in Europe generally, with the co-operation of their old enemies, the Spanish nation. With the initial campaign of 1808 we are not in any way concerned. It resulted in the evacuation of Portugal by Junot and in the supersession of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Arthur Wellesley, in view of the popular indignation caused by the Convention of Cintra. While Wellesley was in England, defending his conduct, and Napoleon was leading the 'Grande Armée' to Madrid to reestablish his amiable but incompetent brother, Joseph, on the Spanish throne, Sir John Moore was in command of the British Army in Portugal. He

had succeeded in making good his retreat into Galicia, and in enticing Napoleon to follow him, when the revolt of Austria recalled the Emperor from the Peninsula, leaving Marshal Soult to prevent, if he could, the escape of the British forces by sea from Corunna. The victory of Corunna secured Moore's main object—the loss of some months to the French in their conquest of Spain; he had wasted their time in a fruitless pursuit, and his own army embarked in safety. The death of Moore left Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose reputation had emerged unsullied from the investigation, the only possible British commander. The ministry of the Duke of Portland numbered among its members Canning as Foreign Secretary, and Castlereagh as Secretary of State for War. Divergent as were the characters and ultimately the aims of these two statesmen, they were united in a common attachment to Wellesley, and in a common belief in his powers, and it should be recorded to the credit of Castlereagh that, through good and evil report, he continued to give a loyal support to his general.

The battle of Corunna was fought on the 16th of January, 1809; and about two months later Wellesley arrived in Lisbon and advanced against Soult in the district of the Douro. Among the 30,000 troops which were soon at Wellesley's disposal for the summer campaign was the 2nd Battalion of the 87th, under the command of Major Gough, acting for Lieut.-Colonel Charles Doyle, whose services

were required elsewhere. A few months before embarking, when he took sole command of the battalion at Danbury, he had been compelled to employ strong measures to improve its discipline. This task had been largely accomplished when the battalion sailed in December, 1808, forming part of the force which Sherbrooke unsuccessfully attempted to land at Cadiz in February, and, owing to the opposition of the Spaniards, had to take back to Lisbon, where it was disembarked in March. The battalion was attached to Tilson's Brigade and it took part in Wellesley's first operations, which, by the passage of the Douro and the capture of Oporto (May 12, 1809), resulted in the expulsion of Soult from Portugal. For this period of the campaign none of Gough's letters to his wife have been preserved, but there is an extant letter addressed to his father from Guarda on the 23rd of June, 1809. It gives an account of the tiresome and difficult march in which the battalion was engaged. Unfortunately, it is in a very bad state of preservation, and there are considerable gaps which can only be filled by conjecture:—

Bishop's Palace, Guarda: *June 23rd*, 1809.

My Dear Father,—As I am persuaded you feel much interested in the Movements of the 87th Rt., I shall detail them to you, as far as my Recollection will carry me, from our leaving Quimbra. In my letter of the 4th May from that town, I believe I mentioned to you, that the 5th Bat. of the 60th, the 87th, and 88th Regts., under Major General Tilson, and a Squadron of the 14th and some

German Lt. Dragoons, under Colonel Talbot, were destined to Act with the Portuguese Army, the whole under Genl. Beresford. To our Brigade was attached a Regt. of Portuguese Grenadiers, and a Regt. of Native Cavalry was placed under Colonel Talbot. The Intention was to have forced the passage of the Douro at Lamego, and Attack a French Division of 4,000 men that had occupied the strong position of Amaranthe under Genls. Labord and L'Ouisson [Loison], while the Army, under Sir Arthur, Invaded the town of Oporto. We marched on the 6th from Quimbra, and crossed the Douro without the [slightest trouble] on the 12th, altho' the Enemy occupied the hills, which completely commanded the passage. The Brigade halted that night at Rigoa [Pero de Ragoa]. (The Depot for all the Wine made on the North side of the Douro—the best in Portugal, and where it is shipped for Oporto, 10 Leagues distant.) The next Morning at daylight we marched for Amaranthe. Within a League of this once beautiful town, we found the Cavalry and some Portugueeze Regts. had halted for us. As it was Reported, the Enemy were determined to maintain the position, the 87th were honored in being ordered to lead the Attack on the town and Bridge. As we advanced, we had to pass through various villages, which were invariably found smoking in their ruins. This so enraged the Men that it was with difficulty they could be kept back. I never witnessed so much Enthusiasm as was shewn by the Men. The advance, therefore, was a perfect trot. But the British were destined to be disappointed, as on our arrival we found the Enemy had fled, and this once Beautiful town one undistinguished Ruin. I never was a witness to such a scene of Misery and horror as here presented itself. Every house and public Building of every description with the Exception of a Monastery, that covered the passage of the

Bridge, a Chapel and about 5 detached houses, were burnt to the ground, with hundreds of its late Inhabitants lying dead in the Streets. The reason of the hasty Retreat of the French that Morning was the Battle of Oporto—if Battle it could be called, which took place the preceding day. Otherwise, they might have made a very desperate stand, as the position was wonderfully strong. We left this scene of Misery on the 15th, having the Evening before recd. Orders to proceed to Chaves by forced Marches. Within a League of the town we had to ford the Tarmagar [Tamega], a small River in dry Weather. It was the turn of the 87th, unfortunately, to be the Rear Regt. of the Column this day. The 60th crossed with the loss of one Man. The 88th took so long a time to ford it, that when the 87th Grenadiers came to cross, the River presented a most formidable Appearance. In short, the River rose so fast, from the dreadful rain of the preceding evening, and that Morning, that the Men were above their middles in a flooded Mountain River, in which the current was wonderfully rapid. One officer and 14 Privates were carried down by the Stream, but were providentially saved by the Exertions of the Mounted Officers. Two Companies were unable to pass. Here the misfortunes of the Brigade commenced. The whole of the Men's Bread, which was made of Indian Corn, got wet and was destroyed. Several thousand Rounds of Ammunition were rendred unserviceable, without a possibility of replacing it. A Number of Firelocks, Caps and Shoes were lost. The Business of crossing the River took the Brigade 4 hours. The Evening set in with a most dreadful fall of Rain, which continued all Night and the [next three] days and nights . . . [On the first day we] had three leagues, upwards of fourteen Miles, to March, altho' we left Amaranthe at 4 in the Morning. Our Road lay over almost impas-

sible Mountains, made more so by the dreadful Rain that swelled the Mountain Rivulets into Rivers. The Night turned out as Dark as it was possible. The Men were obliged to move in Indian files, and actually grope their way—no torches being provided, and the Rain preventing lighted Straw from being of Service. As there was no Road, many Men lost the Column, several fell into pits, excavated by the falling of the Waters, Numbers lay down in the River from fatigue and hunger, and the greater part of the Brigade lost their shoes. At length, after groaping in the dark, totally un[con]scious whether we were right or wrong, from 8 until 9 o'clock, the Brigade arrived at a stragling Village. Some got shelter, others did not. I was fortunate in meeting an Inhabitant with a light, and getting shelter for all of the Regt. that were able to come up. At 5 Next Morning we pursued our March, but without provisions, as we only recd. two days' Bread, and one day's Meat, the Evening before we left Amaranthe, and the Bread was either destroyed in the River, or by the rain. This day proved as wet as the two preceding. At 10 o'clock at Night we reached a wretched little Village on the Mountains [quite] incapable of housing a Company. We pursued our Melancholy March at 5 o'clock next Morning, the Men nearly fainting with hunger. We, however, most fortunately at 12 that day fell in with some cars of Bread belonging to a Portuguese Division. Genl. Tilson immediately pressed it for the Men, which, with some Wine, Enabled us to proceed, and we that night at 12 o'clock got to Chaves, the most Northern frontier town in Portugal, after a forced March of three days—with only twelve hours' halt—over almost impassable Mountains, the men without a Shoe to their feet, and some hundreds of the Brigade fallen out from fatigue and hunger. The

Officers Commanding Regts. were ordered to Assemble Next Morning at 10 o'clock at Genl. Beresford's, when we were told that the Enemy had fled from Oporto, and then were within some Leagues of us, that it would be necessary for the Brigade to March at 1 o'clock. We, however, did not march until three—and Even then the Men's Meat was uncooked from the lateness of the issue, and not a single pair of Shoes could be got in town. We slept on the Spanish Mountains that night. The next day, when within two miles of the Village of Ginco in Spain, the advance came up with a party of the Enemy. We were again ordered to lead the Attack, and altho' the Men were but the minute before apparently incapable of marching a league, this news had the power of reanimating them, and we past through the Portuguese as if the Men had not gone a Mile. The British were here again destined to be disappointed, as the En[emy consisted] mostly of cavalry and fresh. They retreated much faster than we could advance. Their exact amount could not be ascertained, but Talbot, who was within a few hundred yards of them, took them to be about 400. They joined Soult a league and a half to our left, and the whole proceeded in their Retreat, Amounting to 9,000, out of 22,000 he brought into Portugal but a short time before. Here the pursuit was given up as fruitless, we having taken 45 poor wretches. The Brigade was nearly anihilated [by the fatigues] on the Road—and I was by far the most fortunate Regt. I had [still . . . men. The 88th], out of 700 they joined us with, did not bring 150 into . . . part of the Officers and almost all the Men I brought up, had not a [shoe to] their feet, which were actually cut to the bone. We halted a day and returned by Chaves to Lumago, and from thence here. All our sick, with very few exceptions, we picked up on the Road.

But we have since suffered much from sickness. Nine Officers and 47 Men have been Attacked by some fever in Lumago, and while in this town several have died from the fatigue. I have been unfortunate, as I was attacked by a most violent fever on my Arrival here, which, with two slight Relapses, [kept me idle for a] Month. [Out of this] . . . time I kept my bed for a fortnight. I am, however, so wonderfully recovered that I set off in two days to join the Regt. at Castile Branco, 14 leagues distant, to which they Marched on the 12th, leaving me in bed. I have now, my Dr. Father, given you a long, and I apprehend you will consider, a very tedious detail of the operations of the British Brigade. But as there has been some misunderstanding between our Genl. Tilson and the senior Officer, Beresford, who, unfortunately, had to report on the Conduct of the Brigade, altho' he never saw them—which Report I apprehend from Genl. Tilson resigning and going home to England, has not been favourable, and may come to a public investigation, which I ardently hope may be the case for Tilson's sake—I am anxious to put you in possession of all our movements. I had flattered myself the Name of the 87th Regt. would have appeared in the Papers. But the occurrences of the few last weeks have fully proved to me that War is but a Lottery, and those who least deserve may be those who get most Credit. I have not had a line since the 9th Apl.

Believe me, My Dr. Father,
Ever Yours Affectionately,
H. Gough.

P.S. I understand General Tilson's parting Orders to the Brigade are very flattering. I shall send a Copy to Frances when I get to Castle Branco.

In June, the army was formed into Divisions, and the battalion was given a place in the 2nd Brigade of the Third Division, under Donkin, who was appointed to succeed Tilson, now in command of a Brigade of Hill's Division. Under Donkin's leadership, the 87th accompanied Wellesley's advance into Spain, and took a distinguished part in the campaign of Talavera. The British army found their task more difficult on Spanish than on Portuguese soil, and Wellesley had to secure the co-operation of the Spanish general Cuesta, so it was not till the end of July that he found himself face to face with Marshal Victor near Talavera.

Into the details of the battle it would be wandering too far from our subject to enter, nor is there any need to repeat the oft-told tale. The battle of Talavera was fought on the 28th of July. On the preceding evening, an attack was made on the Casa de Salinas, a hill on the left of the British position. It was, in Napier's opinion, the key to the position, and it was held by Donkin's Brigade. The sudden assault of Ruffin and Villatte took the British by surprise, and the French gained for a time the summit of the hill. In the severe fighting which followed, Donkin's Brigade were, with the help of reinforcements, ultimately able to maintain their ground, but not without considerable loss. In the action of the following day, Gough was severely wounded by a cannon shot on his right side, accompanied with fracture of one of the lower ribs. Twenty-seven other officers of the battalion

were also wounded, and so great were the losses in rank and file, that it was sent into garrison when Wellesley retreated into Portugal. 'Reduced as the Battalion now is,' wrote Donkin to Gough on the 15th of September, 'chiefly by its losses on that occasion [Talavera], it is evidently no longer a Corps effective for Field operations, and on this occasion you are going into Garrison. The cause, therefore, of your retiring from the Field carries with it its consolation, and I trust that the re-inforcements you seem to expect from England will enable you soon to join us again.' Donkin took the opportunity of conferring the highest praise upon Gough and his men, and two months later, when leaving for England, he added to his words of farewell—'Permit me on this occasion, too, to repeat the assurance of the high sense I entertain of your personal exertions and Gallantry at Talavera, until the moment when I was deprived of your assistance by your being wounded and taken off the field.' The battalion was sent to Lisbon, where it remained in garrison while the Commander-in-Chief (now Viscount Wellington of Talavera) was preparing the lines of Torres Vedras for the ensuing campaign against Massena. Gough was with his regiment as late as November 26, when he wrote to his wife from Lisbon; but his wound was giving him considerable trouble, and he was allowed a short visit to England, in which to recruit. The date of this visit is uncertain. There is a pause in the correspondence from November to June, and during part of this

time he must have been at home. In February, his regiment was transferred from Lisbon to Cadiz, and his next letter to Mrs. Gough is dated from the Isla de Leon on June 3. At Cadiz it was not purely garrison work that occupied the attention of the troops. The progress of the French operations in Andalusia, which Soult had invaded in the beginning of 1810, led to a blockade of Cadiz by Marshal Victor, which was destined to continue until the withdrawal of Soult's army from Andalusia in the autumn of 1812. By the end of the month of February, 1810, the French had obtained complete possession of Andalusia, with the exceptions of Gibraltar and Cadiz, and it was more by good fortune than by good management that Cadiz did not fall into the hands of Victor in the course of his first attempt. Cadiz was saved by the British command of the sea, which allowed Wellington to throw into the beleaguered town a fresh garrison, including the 2nd Battalion of the 87th.

When General William Stewart arrived at Cadiz in February, 1810, the garrison of Cadiz consisted of some 3,000 British troops, and about 14,000 Spaniards, along with a number of Portuguese. Stewart's most important service was the recovery of a fort called the Matagorda (cf. p. 44) which had been unwisely abandoned. In the end of March a new commander arrived—General Graham (afterwards Lord Lynedoch). He had entered the army late in life, and had but little military experience. It is interesting to recall the fact that,

in boyhood, he had possessed (in common with the father of Sir Charles Napier) no less distinguished a tutor than David Hume. When Graham took charge, he found that the defences were in a most miserable condition, and their improvement required a considerable addition to his available forces. Reinforcements arrived, and Graham, in spite of some difficulties with the Spaniards, carried out an important scheme of fortification, interrupted by violent assaults upon Matagorda. In July, the numbers of the garrison were still further increased to 30,000 allied troops. Thus the summer and autumn passed, the French unable to capture the place, but maintaining a strict blockade and rendering it impossible for the garrison at Cadiz to be transferred to another part of Andalusia. The loss of Cadiz would have been second in importance only to that of Gibraltar, and would have made it impossible for the allies to continue to hold any part of the south-west of Spain. No incident of the blockade calls for our attention until we reach the memorable battle of Barrosa.

From the date of the battle of Barrosa (March 5, 1811) onwards, almost to the close of the War, our information regarding Gough's personal share in the campaigns becomes much more complete, as the letters of this period have been preserved along with various documents, relating to the military operations in which the battalion was engaged. We left the 87th at Cadiz, forced to remain inactive, while the fate of Southern Europe was depending

upon the success of Wellington's great defence of the lines of Torres Vedras. Occasional attempts upon French outposts at Moguer and Huelva varied the monotony of garrison life, but of these Gough's correspondence says nothing, and the efforts to reduce these defences of the main French position at Seville were unavailing. In September, 1810, a meeting of the Spanish Cortes (the first since 1808) was held at Cadiz, and it exercised considerable influence upon the course of the War. One of the fashionable constitutions of the time was drawn up, based upon a democratic principle which would have proved impossible of realization in any European country, and which was peculiarly unsuited to the traditions and the circumstances of Spain. The resistance to Napoleon had not been merely the natural opposition to a gratuitous war of conquest, nor was it merely against the pride of an ancient race, with traditions of imperial sway, that the French had offended. The shock of the French Revolution had come with special force upon a haughty nobility, accustomed to receive a deference which seemed to be founded upon the immutable laws of nature; upon a clergy whose influence had remained undisturbed by the religious revolution of the sixteenth century; and upon a people which had been wont to render unquestioning obedience to its leaders. The principles of the pre-Revolution philosophers had not spread from France into Spain, as they had spread into England and America. The rise of a military despotism, and the overthrow of

the ancient constitutions of Europe had increased the horror with which the tenets of democracy were regarded by the larger portion of the Spanish people, and the war was waged against the Revolution, and all that the Revolution stood for, as much as against the Emperor and Joseph Bonaparte. This national feeling, which had given point to the famous remark of Sheridan that Napoleon had 'yet to learn what it is to combat a nation animated by one spirit against him,' was outraged by a Cortes which claimed for itself the title of Majesty, and allowed to the Regents for the ancient monarchy only that of Highness. With an amount of folly for which it is difficult to make due allowance, the Cortes proceeded to outline a number of proposals which could not but divide the national resistance still further, and along more definite lines. An attack upon the privileges of noble blood alienated the aristocracy; a suggested interference with the powers and functions of the Inquisition made the clergy doubt if things would be worse under the rule of the French. The Spanish colonies, which had not been backward in contributing aid to the mother-country, were treated with a contempt worthy of the despotic rule of Philip II, and the Cortes entered upon a course which finally provoked the revolt of the colonies, and the serious complications which that rebellion involved. From the month of September, 1810, Spanish feeling ceased to be unanimous, and the sympathy between the British and the Spanish peoples, of which this

is the first instance in history, now reached its period of decline, as the main aims and objects of the allies began to diverge.

The immediate effect of the meeting of the Cortes was a change in the *personnel* of the Spanish Generals. Andalusia was placed under the charge of Manuel La Peña, and he was also entrusted with the command of the Spanish forces which guarded the Isla de Leon. It had been intended that La Romana should join La Peña at Cadiz, but at the instance of Wellington, he was retained in his command in the army which was facing Massena, and General Graham was left to concert with La Peña a scheme of defence against the renewed attack upon Cadiz, for which the enemy had been busily preparing. To appreciate the situation which led up to the battle of Barrosa, it will be necessary to give some account of the fortifications of Cadiz, and of its topography, as far as concerns our story.

Cadiz is situated upon a small rocky peninsula at the end of a narrow isthmus, about five miles long, known as the Isthmus of Cadiz. This isthmus projects from a flat triangular marsh, broken by a central ridge, on which stands the town of Isla. Beyond this marsh (the famous Isla de Leon) is the Channel of Santi Petri, extending round two sides of the triangle formed by the Isla, and separating it from the mainland. The French had invested Cadiz from the mainland, by means of a chain of forts, stretching from the mouth of the river Guadalquivir, some twenty miles north of Cadiz, to a point about

five miles south of the Santi Petri. The main positions in this line were Puerto Santa Maria, at the mouth of the Guadelete; Puerto Real, at the root of a tongue of land projecting, for a distance of four miles, towards the Isthmus of Cadiz; and Chiclana, a strong position almost opposite the southern mouth of the Santi Petri channel. The tongue of land projecting from Puerto Real is intersected by a canal known as the Trocadero; and at its southern extremities, facing the Isthmus, were the fort of Matagorda, on the north of the canal, and the fortified village of Trocadero on the south. To the north of Puerto Real, the French held the coast towns of Rota and San Lucar. The defences of Cadiz consisted, in the last resort, of the communication between the town and the Isthmus, which would probably have rendered the place really impregnable had any of the French attacks penetrated so far. The Isthmus itself was divided almost at right angles, by a creek called the Cortadura, at the top of which was an unfurnished fort called Fernando. A battery at Puntales, on the Isthmus and opposite to the village of Trocadero, commanded the approach to the north end of the Santi Petri. Close to the junction of the Isthmus of Cadiz with the Isla de Leon, was the Torre Gordo, which offered another point of vantage for the defence. Finally, the Spaniards held the Santi Petri Channel, by means of an island at each end. The only communication between the Isla de Leon and the mainland was by a bridge at Zuazo, which

crossed the Santi Petri at a point near its centre, whence a road led directly to the town of Isla and thence to Cadiz. This bridge had been broken down, and each side had protected itself by a battery on its own side of the channel. The Spanish command of the Santi Petri was, however, more apparent than real, because the coast line consisted, on the mainland, of a marsh, from one to three miles broad, intersected by navigable channels and creeks of considerable size.

On the 31st of October, 1810, the French succeeded, by an ingenious stratagem, in adding considerably to their numbers and resources. Part of their available force was at San Lucar, watched by a hostile fleet, in spite of which thirty pinnaces and gunboats managed to escape, and reached the town of Rota, whence they made their way to Puerto Santa Maria. So strong was the battery at Puntales that they did not risk an attempt to get into the Trocadero canal by sea, but conveyed their ships on rollers overland. This accession to the strength of the enemy at the Trocadero batteries was intended to threaten Puntales, and ultimately to open the Santi Petri to the French fleet, thus giving them the command of the Isla de Leon, and reducing the allied forces in Cadiz to their last line of defence. Reinforcements were immediately sent from Gibraltar, and Graham devised a scheme for strengthening the defences, which the Spaniards were too busy to carry out. Fortunately, the attack which Soult is supposed to have meditated upon the fort of Puntales and the de-

fence of the Cortadura, was prevented by the course of events in another portion of the area of warfare. The strategy of Wellington at Torres Vedras led Napoleon to send instructions to Soult to go to the assistance of Massena, and in the end of December he left Cadiz to reduce the fortresses of Olivenza and Badajos, as a preliminary to carrying out the Emperor's orders. The French army at Cadiz were left under the command of Marshal Victor, and General Graham felt himself strong enough to make an effort to raise the siege.

Graham's plan was to combine with the troops stationed at Tarifa, under Lieut.-Col. Brown, and with a body of Spaniards under Beguines, in an attempt upon the rear of the French lines; but as he was prevented, by stress of weather, from either carrying out his own part of the movement, or communicating with the other commanders, the scheme had meanwhile to be abandoned. The result was considerable delay in making the great effort, and it was not till February 22, that Graham actually set sail from Cadiz, and landed at Algesiras, ready to resume his operations for a rear attack upon the enemy who were threatening Cadiz. 'On the 24th,' says Gough[1], 'we marched to Tarifa, where we were joined by six or eight thousand Spaniards. We had about 4,000 men. The object of the expedition' he adds, 'I hardly know.' The British troops under Graham's command, when the

[1] Letter of March 6, 1811.

army left Tarifa, consisted of a detachment, numbering about two hundred, of the 2nd German Hussars under Major Busch; about three hundred and fifty Royal Artillery and Royal Artillery drivers under Major Duncan; of two brigades, commanded respectively, by Brigadier-General Dilkes and Colonel Wheatley; and of two detached light battalions under Lieut.-Col. Brown, and Lieut.-Col. Barnard. The first of the two brigades included the 2nd Battalions of the 1st and 3rd Guards, and of the Coldstream Guards, with a detachment of the 2nd Battalion of the 95th; the second, the 1st Battalion of the 28th and the 2nd Battalions of the 67th and 87th; Brown had the flank companies of the 1st Battalions of the 9th and 28th Foot; and of the 2nd Battalions of the 82nd and 47th Foot; while Barnard commanded a detachment of the 3rd Battalion of the 95th Foot, and a company of the Royal Staff Corps. Wheatley's division also contained the flank companies of the 20th Portuguese.

Of the Spanish forces, a portion had been left under General Zayas, to protect the Isla de Leon, and to construct a bridge over the Santi Petri, near the castle of the same name. The 7,000 to whom Gough refers as joining Graham at Tarifa, were under the direct command of La Peña, who asserted his claim to take charge of the whole operation. Graham gracefully yielded this point, and the march was commenced, towards Chiclana, where about 11,000 French awaited them. On the 2nd of March, La Peña's vanguard took the fort of

Casa Vieja. On the 4th, the army marched out of the Casa. The story of how the British force, designed to attack the French rear, were themselves attacked in rear, how they countermarched, and how they defeated the enemy is familiar to all who are acquainted with the campaigns in the Peninsula, but Major Gough's correspondence throws some fresh light on the narrative. The events which led up to the battle of Barrosa may best be described in the words of Graham's dispatch :—

After a night's march of sixteen hours, we arrived, on the morning of the 5th, on the low ridge of Barrosa, about four miles to the Southward of the Santi Petri river. This height extends inland about a mile and a half, continuing on the North the extensive heathy plain of Chiclana. A great Pine Forest skirts the plain, and circles round the height at some distance, terminating down to Santi Petri; the intermediate space between the north side of the height and the Forest being uneven and broken.

A well-conducted and successful attack on the rear of the Enemy's lines near Santi Petri, by the vanguard of the Spanish Army under Brigadier-General Lardizabal, having opened the communication with the Isla de Leon, I received General La Peña's directions to move down from the position of Barosa to that of the Torre Bermeja, about halfway to the Santi Petri river, in order to secure the communication across the river, over which a bridge had been lately established. This latter position occupies a narrow woody ridge, the right on the sea-cliff, the left falling down to the Almanza Creek on the edge of the Marsh. A sandy beach gives an easy communication between the western points of these two positions.

On receiving La Peña's orders, Graham sent out cavalry patrols to discover if the enemy were moving from their lines at Chiclana. They failed to report any such movement, and Graham, about the hour of noon, set out through the pinewood in front of the height of Barrosa, to effect a junction with La Peña at Bermeja. The idea of a junction at Bermeja did not meet with Graham's approval. He mentions in his dispatch that he considered Barrosa to be the key to the position of Santi Petri, and that an attack by the French upon the Spaniards at Bermeja would have exposed their flank to the British forces on Barrosa. He therefore left a rearguard on the top of the hill, under Brown. The march to Bermeja was only two miles, but before it was completed, Graham was informed that the enemy, whom his patrols had not succeeded in locating, had emerged from the wood and were marching in force over the plain, towards the ridge of Barrosa, and were therefore threatening his rear. Unwilling to abandon Barrosa and the small force he had left on the hill, Graham immediately gave orders to countermarch, in the hope of reinforcing Brown; but before he emerged from the wood, Marshal Victor had succeeded in driving Brown off, though in good order.

When Graham reached the open plain, the situation he had to face was critical and almost desperate. The right wing of the enemy, under Laval, was close upon him; the left, consisting of Ruffin's

men, led on by Victor himself, were in possession of Barrosa; it had proved impossible, in such intricate ground, to preserve complete order in his own columns, 'and,' he adds, 'there never was time to restore it entirely.' He looked in vain for his Spanish allies. La Peña, who was responsible for the situation, made no attempt to come to the assistance of the British, or to retake Barrosa, but Graham showed no sign of hesitation. To Brown's request for orders, he had returned the single word 'Fight,' and in this spirit he determined to act, although deprived of the help on which he had relied when he began his countermarch. Retreat was, indeed, impossible, for the enemy's right wing could have intercepted them by the sea-beach, and would probably have destroyed the whole force in the confusion that must have ensued. 'Trusting to the known heroism of British troops,' says Graham, 'regardless of the numbers and position of the Enemy, an immediate attack was determined upon.'

Graham's plan of battle was well conceived, and the trust he placed in his troops was amply justified. While the infantry were being formed, the artillery, under Major Duncan, opened upon the enemy a battery of ten guns. Under cover of these, the right wing was formed of the Brigade of Guards, Lieut.-Col. Brown's flank battalion of the 28th, two companies of the 2nd Rifle Corps, and a stray portion of the 67th Foot. The left was composed of Wheatley's Brigade, with three stray companies of

the Coldstreams, and Barnard's flank company. This accomplished, the advance was resumed, still under cover of the artillery, and the right wing with Dilkes in command proceeded to the assistance of Brown and the rearguard, who were in action with Ruffin at the foot of the Barrosa ridge. After a fierce and prolonged struggle, they succeeded in putting Victor's force to flight, and remained in possession of Barrosa. It is with the left wing that we are more immediately concerned. Gough and the 87th had emerged from the wood in good order, owing to a fortunate accident. A staff officer of artillery, while taking a message to another part of the field, happened to pass the battalion, and gave its commander the information that the enemy were close at hand. Gough seized an opportunity of withdrawing his regiment to a comparatively open space, where he drew it up. On coming out of the wood, he took advantage of a chance of deploying, and was able to form in line, and to throw out his flank in view of the enemy's advance. For some time the regiment remained inactive and exposed to a galling fire, while Barnard's light troops were skirmishing in front. While thus waiting, with ordered arms, the 87th lost a major, a captain, two lieutenants, and more than fifty men. At last, the light troops were withdrawn, and the fortunes of the day depended upon one of the hand-to-hand encounters which were so frequent at this period. The 87th advanced and proceeded to charge the 8th French Regiment. The nature of the fighting is

thus described by Gough, in a letter written to his wife, on the morrow of the battle:—

We proudly bring with us a trophy that will long record the result of two successive charges, against two Regiments, the 8th and the 47th. The former came into the field, 1,600 Grenadiers, the finest looking men I ever saw, and from the centre of their Column we took their Eagles [1]. . . The

[1] The memoirs of the Colonel of the 8th French Regiment (Vigo-Roussillon) have been published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, July–August, 1891. He states that, just before his regiment was charged by the 87th, he had an opportunity of slaying General Graham. He was not aware of Graham's identity, but he refrained, owing to his venerable appearance and natural dignity. 'Son sang-froid, un grand air de calme et de dignité, avaient arrêté mon bras.' Almost immediately he was himself wounded, and it was while he was wounded that the 87th routed his regiment and captured the eagle. 'Les restes de mon bataillon, se voyant sur le point d'être entourés, reculèrent, et une charge vigoureuse, faite, de nouveau, par le 87e régiment anglais, acheva de les rompre . . . Dans la dernière charge le porte-aigle du 1er bataillon ayant été tué, les Anglais s'étaient emparés de cette aigle. Bien des braves se dévouèrent pour la reprendre et trouvèrent ainsi une mort glorieuse. Cette aigle coûta cher aux Anglais, beaucoup de leurs officiers payèrent de leur vie l'honneur de la conserver, mais enfin, elle leur resta.' Vigo-Roussillon describes how he surrendered to an officer, who saved him from the attack of a sergeant; the latter not perceiving his wounded condition. This incident is probably the origin of the legend that Gough decapitated the colonel of a French regiment at Barrosa. Writing many years later, with reference to newspaper tales, Lord Gough said, 'I was once the white-headed boy who cut off the head of the French Colonel at Barosa, who was at the very time of his decapitation quietly amusing

scene in this charge was even distressing to my feelings. The French waited until we came within about 25 paces of them, before they broke, and as they were in column when they did, they could not get away. It was therefore a scene of most dreadful carnage. I will own to you my weakness. As of course I was in front of the regiment, therefore in the middle of them, I could not, confused and flying as they were, cut down an one, althought I might have twenty, they seemed so confounded and so frightened. They made, while we were amongst them (about Quarter of an hour), little or no opposition. We could have taken or destroyed the whole regiment, but at this moment the 47th French regiment came down on our right, and General Graham, who was, during the whole of the action, in the midst of it, pointed them out and begged I would call off my men (I will not say 'Halt' as we were in the midst of the French). With the greatest difficulty by almost cutting them down, I got the right wing collected, with which we charged the 47th, but after firing until we came to within about 50 paces of them, they (for us, fortunately) broke and fled, for had they done their duty, fatigued as my men were, at the moment, they must have cut us to pieces. We were therefore, after they broke, unable to follow them, but took the Howitzer attached to them. I have ended this glorious action after two and a half hours' roar of cannon and Musketry. I was fortunate in losing only one officer, four sergeants, and forty-one rank and file killed; Major Maclaine severely, Captain Somersall severely, Lts. Barton and Fennell both severely, six sergeants and 121 rank and file, wounded.

himself at Paris.' He seems to have been in error in imagining that Vigo-Roussillon was not on the field—unless, indeed, the myth has a different origin altogether.

The charge of the 87th, aided by the three companies of Guards, who shared in the honour of the onslaught, and supported by the remainder of the wing, decided the fate of Laval's troops. No serious attempt to rally was made by the French wings, and Graham was left in possession of the field[1].

The battle had unquestionably been gained by the courage of the British troops, and in spite of the culpable negligence of the Spaniards, to whose disgraceful conduct Byron alluded in the well-known lines:—

> Bear witness, bright Barrosa, thou canst tell
> Whose were the sons that bravely fought and fell.

Graham, however, does full justice to such assistance as the allies actually rendered. The junction with Zayas was effected by Lardizabal only after some hard fighting; two Spanish battalions, which had been left on the hill, ignoring La Peña's order to retire, returned to strengthen the right wing of the British; and General Whittingham, an Englishman, in command of the Spanish cavalry, while not taking advantage of the opportunity of making a flank attack on Ruffin, did keep in check a corps of infantry and cavalry which endeavoured to turn the position of the Barrosa height, by means of the beach road. Busch and his hussars also made a gallant charge and routed a squadron of French dragoons.

[1] There is an interesting account of the battle of Barrosa in *A Boy in the Peninsular War*, edited by Julian Sturgis.

BATTLE OF BARROSA, MARCH 5, 1811.



Darbishire & Standford, Lth. The Oxford Geogl Institute.

A Hill of Barosa.
B Graham's Division on its march to join La Peña, when the news of the enemy's approach was received.
C Position of La Peña.
D French post taken by Ladrizabal.
E Plain on which the enemy made its appearance.

Nothing, indeed, can be urged in extenuation of the conduct of La Peña. He did not inform Graham of his intention to abandon Barrosa, and betake himself, by the beach, to Santi Petri; but even if Graham had understood this, it could not palliate La Peña's desertion of his allies when the French attacked. Nor did his supineness end here. The British troops, which had been under arms for over twenty-four hours, were too much exhausted by the fighting to be able to follow up their victory with an onslaught upon the retreating French army. La Peña, with more than twelve thousand fresh troops, maintained his attitude of cowardly inactivity, and Graham could do nothing but withdraw the greater portion of his army to the Isla de Leon [1].

The desertion of La Peña, while it diminished the effect of the victory, could not but add to its

[1] Where the account of the battle of Barrosa, as given above, differs from the description in Napier's *Peninsular War* (bk. xi. chap. 2), it is based upon Gough MSS. and upon Graham's dispatches. Napier seems to have overstated the disorder of Graham's force, when he wrote of the troops under Wheatley and Dilkes as forming 'two masses, without any attention to regiments or brigades.' Some statements in Napier's first edition which were clearly erroneous were modified in subsequent editions, in deference to a protest made by Gough on the appearance of Napier's book. Napier's inaccurate statements, with regard to Barrosa, and afterwards in connexion with the siege of Tarifa (cf. pp. 85–86), are probably responsible for the error sometimes made of attaching the soubriquet, 'Faugh-a-Ballaghs' (Clear the ways), to the 88th or the 89th instead of to the 87th Regiment, to which alone it is historically applicable.

glory. What might easily have been a disaster of great moment had been converted into an overwhelming victory. An eagle and six pieces of cannon were among the spoils of the day. Ruffin was a prisoner, and the French loss in killed and wounded was very great. When the news of Graham's gallant and successful attack, against an enemy of such superior numbers and possessed of the key of the position, reached Great Britain, it was received with an enthusiasm which was out of proportion to the intrinsic importance of the incident, though amply deserved by the heroism of Graham and his men. Lord Liverpool, in his dispatch to General Graham, gave utterance to the public feeling when he wrote :—

The memory of those who conquered and of those who fell in the hour of victory upon the Height of Barrosa will be ever cherished by the British nation, and their names will hold a conspicuous rank amongst the bravest and worthiest of our heroes.

The thanks of both Houses of Parliament were conveyed to General Graham and his army, and newspaper columns overflowed with tributes in prose and verse, while audiences at the London theatres sang :—

They tell us that Eagles can stare at the sun,
Whose beams nor annoy nor dismay 'em;
But French Eagles fly and French Game Chickens
run,
From the glory of General Graham.

The 87th had its due share of the glory, as it had its share of the fighting. The Eagle which they had captured was the first taken in the war, and further interest attached to it from the fact that the laurel wreath which surmounted it was the gift of Napoleon himself, and that Napoleon's confidence in the 8th Regiment was so great that, by his special orders, the Eagle was not attached to the standard in the ordinary way. There was some curiosity about it in England, and Gough gave the following description of it, in answer to a query of his wife: 'It is brass, well gilt; the wreath is pure gold. The Eagle was on a Poll, something stronger, but very similar to the Poll of a sergeant's halbert. It is much heavier than the Colours of a regiment, and from the weight being all at the top, is very unwieldy.'

Graham was fully conscious of the importance of the two great charges made by the 87th. He mentioned them with special commendation in his dispatch, and wrote to the Colonel, Sir John Doyle: 'Your Regiment has covered itself with glory. Recommend it, and its commander, to their illustrious patron, the Prince Regent; too much cannot be done for it.' The result of these recommendations was that the 87th was honoured by the Prince Regent with the title of the Prince of Wales's Own Irish Regiment; and it was allowed to bear 'as a Badge of Honour upon the Regimental Colours and appointments an Eagle with a Wreath of Laurel above the Harp, in addition to the Arms of His

Royal Highness.' Gough had been particularly mentioned in Graham's dispatch and 'earnestly recommended' for promotion, and he immediately received the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. On the recommendation of the Duke of Wellington, the brevet rank was, as we shall see, subsequently antedated from Barrosa to the date of Wellington's dispatches relative to the battle of Talavera. This is the first instance, in the history of the British army, of the conferment of brevet rank upon an officer for the conduct of a regiment in action.

The captured Eagle was conveyed to England, and presented to the Prince Regent[1], and its arrival caused fresh public interest in the Prince's Own, which for the time occupied the position of the popular regiment. Its health was proposed by the Lord Mayor at a City of London banquet, at which Doyle modestly disclaimed for his regiment anything but 'superior good fortune in retaining the trophies they had won.' The regimental songs of the period are full of the new honours conferred upon the regiment, and express appropriate devotion to the Prince Regent:—

And life, that's a debt paid to nature by others,
We brought a free gift to the Prince we obey[2].

[1] The Eagle was placed in the Chapel of Chelsea Hospital, where it remained till the 16th April, 1852, when it was stolen. The staff was sawn through, and the Eagle removed—whether by a patriotic Frenchman or by a thief who thought the eagle was made of gold, has never been discovered. A facsimile is now in Chelsea Hospital.

[2] Some claim to the honour of capturing the Eagle was

Brilliant as was the victory, the battle of Barrosa is more properly regarded as an escape from a terrible disaster than as an important turning-point in a campaign. Graham's intention was, as we have pointed out, to raise the siege of Cadiz. Had he been enthusiastically or even decently supported by the Spaniards, his purpose would probably have been accomplished. As it was he inflicted a grave blow, physical and moral, upon the French, and saved himself and La Peña from a crushing defeat, if not, indeed, from a massacre. But the siege of Cadiz was renewed; and the main object of Graham's bold move had not been attained.

La Peña's misconduct was not confined to cowardice. He had the effrontery to claim the credit of the victory for himself, and an angry controversy ensued, which rendered it impossible for Graham to continue to act with the Spanish

made by another Corps, and elicited a protest from Gough, who says: 'Ensign Keogh was killed in the act of grasping at it, and the French Officer who held it was run through by Sergeant Masterson in the midst of our Officers and men. This Sergeant never let it out of his hand until he delivered it to me, and afterwards carried it the remainder of the day between our Colours.' The claim of the 87th was undeniable, and the slight difficulty that arose was caused by the fact that three Companies of the Guards, under Colonel Jackson, charged on the left of the 87th, and in the confusion of the onslaught spectators did not distinguish between the different Corps. A leaf of the laurel wreath round the neck of the Eagle, which was loose when it was captured, was sent by Gough to his wife, and is still preserved, with other relics of the campaign, at Lough Cutra Castle.

commander, and led, ultimately, to the transference of his services to another portion of the field. From the Cortes, which had appointed La Peña, and which retained him in his command, Graham refused to accept any honour.

So slight had been the effect of the victory of Barrosa upon the course of the blockade, that Victor's operations seem never to have been interrupted. On the 24th of March, Gough writes: 'We are all getting on here as you might expect. The Spaniards have all run away, and the bridge over the Santi Petri is broken down. There was a most heavy Cannonade last night. I have not as yet heard the result. The last one of this sort, when upwards of forty shells were thrown into Cadiz, it is now ascertained, actually killed a Cat. Whether any of that species of Spaniard suffered last night, I know not.' The continued shelling of Cadiz may have been alarming to the shipping in the harbour, but it did not arrest the flow of spirits among the British troops in the Isla, who celebrated the arrival of dispatches from home, dealing with the battle of Barrosa, by feasts and merriment. 'I was obliged to give all the officers a let-off,' says Gough[1], 'several friends dined with me, and a hundred and four bottles of wine were drunk.' The 87th remained in the Isla from the date of Barrosa till the end of May, when they were sent into garrison at Cadiz. For about six months, the battalion is almost always

[1] Letter of April 24, 1811.

TOPOGRAPHY OF CADIZ.



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in one or other of these two positions. In June we find Gough back again in the Isla, in July he is in Cadiz, in August there is a slight change to San Roque, and so on, until the month of October, when a more serious movement fell to his lot.

II

CADIZ AND TARIFA

THE six months which intervened between the battle of Barrosa and the beginning of the siege of Tarifa (the next incident in the war which concerns us closely) were full of notable events in other regions of the Peninsula. The construction of the lines of Torres Vedras, in the winter of 1809–10, had, in the ensuing summer, kept Massena at bay, and, by the date of Barrosa, had resulted in his retreat from Portugal. He was followed by Wellington, whose army had now received sufficient reinforcements to enable him to adopt offensive measures. In May, Wellington defeated Massena at Fuentes d'Onoro, and a few days later the troops under Beresford were successful at Albuera. Meanwhile, there fell to the lot of the garrison at Cadiz only such domestic incidents as relieve the monotony of life in a blockaded town. The blockade continued throughout the summer and autumn, and not even the defeat of Albuera compelled Soult to withdraw his troops from Cadiz. To the conduct of Soult during the summer campaign of 1811, Napier pays a well-deserved tribute; 'When unexpectedly assailed by Beresford from the north, by the Murcians on the east, by Ballesteros on the west, by Graham and La Peña in the south, he

found means to repel three of those attacks, to continue the blockade of Cadiz, and to keep Seville tranquil, while he marched against the fourth.' The command of the sea, retained by the British, saved the blockaded troops from any of the real hardships of a siege, and they seem to have suffered chiefly from tedium. Gough's correspondence is full of the usual gossip of the messroom. 'Reports here,' he says, 'are so numerous, and in general so ill-founded, that it is impossible to give credit to anything you hear.' When he has a real piece of news to record, it is not always of a pleasant nature. 'Our revered General,' he writes, on June the 29th, 'leaves us tomorrow for Portugal, as second in command. This distressing piece of news reached us the day before yesterday. I immediately waited on him to say the whole Corps entreated he would take a farewell dinner with us. With tears in his eyes (I own I could not avoid shedding some), he fixed on this day, although he said he had made a resolution not to dine out. He has refused every other person and Corps. Never did I see such universal regret, even the rascally Spaniards seem to feel the loss they will have in Graham. He takes all his staff with him. Major General Cooke succeeds.' Gough's love for Graham led him to entertain the hope of obtaining permission to accompany him to Portugal, although he had just received the command of a Brigade at Cadiz; but he had to dismiss the idea as quite out of the question while the blockade lasted. The weariness of enforced idleness led him

to make various plans for the future. The warmth of his home affections suggested schemes for obtaining leave. 'If nothing is to be done here, and I vow I see not the slightest chance of it, I propose in November getting nine months leave.' Again he thinks he would be better in active work at home than idle at Cadiz, and speculates on the chance of being made Adjutant-General at Limerick or at Athlone. In a letter[1] from Cadiz he gives a description of his monotonous day. 'I get up at five, walk about two miles to the sea to bathe; after returning, I have just time to dress for my Parade at eight, which I dismiss at ten, breakfast, and read till twelve, from which hour to one I give up to the interior of the Regiment, at my desk. I now lie down for an hour and a half, get up and dress for dinner at three. I generally take the first allowance, a pint, which, with chatting to, I believe, an attached set of brother officers, brings me to five, at which hour my horse is at the door, and from which I ride until half-past seven. It is by this time getting dark. I then devote one hour to contemplation, strolling on an eminence near my quarters. You may well conceive where my thoughts wander. I transport myself to Plymouth, and almost in idea then feel all the joys I should there experience. From nine to ten I read, when I look round to see everything quiet, and retire to a solitary bed—my only wish either to forget I am in it or to

[1] Letter of August 9, 1811.

sleep for the purpose of dreaming of all my soul holds most dear. In this account of one day and night, you nearly perceive how I pass my time.' A month later, it is the same story:—'I wish of all things to go to Portugal. . . . I am sick to death of this town. . . . Anything is better than this dull, stupid place and way of spending one's time.'

There was certainly no special reason for loving Cadiz or its people. The dispute between Graham and the Spanish Government about the responsibility for the failure at Barrosa added to the indignation felt against La Peña, and reports[1] from Cadiz in the course of the summer are full of the jealousy which subsisted between the allied forces, and of the weakness and misrule of the Spanish Regency. 'The temper of the public mind at Cadiz is very bad, the press has lately teemed with publications filled with reproaches of the English. . . . The Regency and Cortes have lost all influence everywhere . . . the Spanish generals have been quarrelling.' Six weeks before leaving Cadiz, Graham wrote:—'The government here supported by the Cortes seemed to be determined to adhere with blind obstinacy and pride to a system that has nearly brought the cause to ruin, and notwithstanding Lord Wellington's great efforts they are playing Buonaparte's game so positively that I despair of any great good.' A report written on the last day of July sums up the situation:—'Nothing can be more wretched than the

[1] Quoted in Napier (App. to Vol. III).

state of affairs here; the regents are held in universal contempt, and such is the want of talent, I can hardly hope that a change will make any improvement: the treasury is empty, and no probability of the arrival of any money from America, so that affairs are really in a worse state than they have been at any time since the commencement of the war.'

October brought a welcome relief. After the battle of Barrosa, Brown had returned to Tarifa, and remained in command of the garrison till the end of June, when he left, with the 28th Regiment, to join Wellington. He was succeeded by Major King, of the 82nd, who, in spite of the complete quiet which had persisted through the summer, insisted upon the improvement of the defences. In the middle of August, some alarm was caused by the siege of the neighbouring castle of Alcala by a French army, and General Beguines represented that Tarifa was the real object of attack. Lieutenant-General Campbell prepared a plan for the defence, which was carried out under King. In the beginning of September, the aspect of affairs became more threatening. Soult, who seems to have aimed at using Tarifa as a dépôt for the army at Cadiz, drove Ballesteros to seek shelter under the guns of Gibraltar, but want of provisions caused him to withdraw, and Ballesteros escaped. On the 22nd, the garrison of Alcala surrendered, and although Ballesteros won a small victory three days later, the British commandant at Tarifa decided

that reinforcements must immediately be obtained. The jealousy of the general in command of the Spanish troops (Don Manuel Daban) caused some opposition, but the wisdom of King's demand was justified when Ballesteros was again driven back upon Gibraltar, by the enemy's occupation of San Roque. In answer to King's request, it was decided to send twelve hundred men to Tarifa, and among the troops selected for this purpose was the 2nd Battalion of the 87th, whose commander thus describes their start:—

OFF TARIFA: *Oct. 12th,* 1811.

It seemed the enemy threatened the Spanish General Ballesteros, and General Cooke has thought it advisable to send a force to Tarifa to attract their attention to that quarter, thereby to save this last hope of the Spanish cause, the aforementioned Spanish General. But I believe, indeed I am certain, that Colonel Skerrett, of the 47th, who has got the command, has likewise the most positive orders not to attempt anything offensive, and to fall back immediately the object will be gained by drawing the French force towards the North, where we are to act. Indeed, when I mention our force, it will prove to you that we have not been sent to fight, as it only consists of a light brigade of artillery, under Captain Hughes, eight companies of the 47th regiment (550) under Major Broad, eight companies of the 87th (525), and one company of the 95th under Capt. Jenkins (75)—in all no more than 1,200 men. Colonel Skerrett 1st in command with Lieutenant Colonel Lord Proby of the guards, 2nd, your humble servant, the next senior officer. I cannot tell you the delight this little temporary move has given us all, anything for a change to

a soldier. . . . We only got the first intimation of such a thing going forward while I was at dinner on the 9th, and at ten next morning I marched down to the Malle and embarked the whole of the men and baggage in three minutes, to the astonishment of every person present. The Captain-of-the-Navy Bruce, who, by the bye, tells me he knows you very well, said at a public dinner that day, before the commanding officers of the other corps, that, since he came into the Navy, he never saw a regiment embark in the enthusiastic stile the 87th did, which by the bye was true, as I never saw such a set of fellows, it really is a pity that they will be disappointed in not meeting the enemy, and will you excuse me for adding that I regret it also! If, however, that time will arrive, whether they succeed or otherwise, they will do themselves honour and their Country service. It really is a sin they are not in Portugal and not employed in this dirty little pedling warfare. Captain Dickson commands the naval part of the expedition, who I will forward my letters through. You must still continue to direct to me at Cadiz; we will be back long ere this reaches you. Let me entreat you not to mind what you may see in the papers about us, your know there is no dependence to be placed on their reports. As we will not march more than a league or two from Tarifa (which bye the bye you know is a small walled town at the entrance of the Straights of Gibraltar) you may always depend on hearing everything from me. You know my promise to tell you nothing but truth, which I shall be the more determined in, from my knowledge that your good sense would convince you that, was I even in what is called danger, that a hair of my head cannot fall to the ground without the consent and will of the great Disposer of events. . . . We are now beating about in the mouth of the Gut of Gibraltar, but as

the wind is from the Eastward we shall not arrive at all events before tomorrow morning.

TARIFA: *October* 16*th*.

After six days most boisterous passage, we reached this place last night and landed this morning—with the exception of a part of my Lt. Company under Thompson, and half number 8 under Waller, who, together with our brigade of guns, are missing. We cannot conjecture what has become of them. We have everything here quiet, but the French about 8,000, have driven Ballesteros under the guns of Gibraltar, and have taken up their position at Saint Roque. There are none in our neighbourhood and we have advanced reconnoitring parties to Algesiras. Since we were here last [cf. p. 46] they have strengthened this place much, and I much apprehend after the enemy have eaten up all the provisions of the neighbourhood they will retire. Indeed it can be no object for them to remain where they are—their stay will, however, protract the time of our returning. We have found a British force here of 400 men from Gibraltar.

The general course of events may be gathered from the following passages, selected from Colonel Gough's letters of the period:—

TARIFA: 18*th* [*October*].

We yesterday made a reconnaissance towards Algesiras, where we found the enemy had evacuated that town and fallen back on their force at Saint Roque. We today move a few miles in the other direction, to drive back a small division of five or six hundred men they have about three leagues from this for the purpose of watching our movements. Or at least I presume this is our intention. I wish Colonel Skerrett would leave the business to

the Prince's Own. But as a married man I shall never volunteer this, much as I may wish little affairs of this kind. As I flatter myself, tho' little as my loss would be to others, there is one dear friend in England who, as she is everything to me, I am equally the world to her. We will therefore act, I presume, as it was said of the King of France who had fifty thousand men, 'marched them up the hill and down again.'

TARIFA: 19*th* [*October*].

We have been moving up the Hill, and down again these two days, without doing anything but fagging the Men. Had we had good information yesterday, and a little dash, we could have done a very pretty thing. . . . Oh! for a Graham—this is the Country for such Characters. . . .

TARIFA: *22nd* [*October*].

I am most happy to announce that the object of our expedition is accomplished, and that we only now wait the Return of a vessel from Cadiz to go back. The day before yesterday, we marched out to a position 15 miles from this, close to 2,000 of the Enemy: a plain divided us. We formed and offered them Battle, which they declined, and we returned that night after a most distressing March. The Enemy, on our evacuating the position, took it up; but yesterday morning their whole force retired to their former position towards Ronda. . . . I will own I hardly expected so fortunate a result, from the smallness of our force, and other causes. The Enemy must have been much deceived, or they have had some other motive than dread from us.

By the end of October, Gough considered that their work was done. 'The enemy,' he writes, 'have evacuated this part of the country. We only

await letters from General Cooke to return.' But he was fated to see considerably more of the 'most wretched little village in Europe.'

TARIFA: *November 11th*, 1811.

When I sent off my last journal (the 2nd ultimo) I then expected we should have been long ere this period at Cadiz, but circumstances, principally foul winds and the different movements of the Spanish Armies in this part of the kingdom, have, and probably will, detain us for some time. We have had some severe marches to favour the movements of Ballesteros, who hangs on the rear of the enemy before Cadiz. On the sixth we marched 42 miles and took, without bloodshed, Vejer, a town situated on the summit of an almost perpendicular mountain. The enemy had about 250 men who, after firing a few long (very long indeed) shots at the Spaniards, fell back to Chiclana. Every man should have been taken and the relief that came to their assistance (of the same strength) but for the stupidity, or any other worse name you may please to call it, of the Spanish General (Copons) who commanded. We returned to this town to refresh the men two days back. I should have been very sick of the whole business, had I not had an opportunity of going over on the 1st of November to Tangiers for twenty four hours. We were only three hours crossing over and five coming back. I was most pleasingly undeceived with regard to the Moors. They are an uncommon fine race of men (the ladies are not visible), and in my humble opinion deserve the name of savages quite as little as the lower order of Spaniards, or I will add, my own countrymen.

I was very fortunate in seeing everything worth seeing in the place. Nothing was ever so cheap as are all articles in Tangiers; my whole days expense

was for eating and drinking a dollar and a half, including port wine, &c.

In the middle of November, the enemy unexpectedly reappeared, and a fruitless expedition followed, of which Gough wrote an account to his wife on the 23rd:—

'Your most kind letter of the 17th October reached me most opportunely the 18th . . . after being most disappointed the day previous, when we had an opportunity of reacting the scene of Barrosa, and when, had we had but a Graham, another day glorious to the British arms would have taken place. We marched from this on the 12th for the purpose of making a diversion in favour of Ballesteros, and for three days hurried in rear of the enemy before Cadiz, one day threatening this, another that, point of their defence. On the 17th, when at Vejer, the Enemy most unexpectedly made his appearance; our look-out was so bad and our reconnoitring so infamous that their Columns came within gunshot before it was even known they were in the neighbourhood. I, fortunately, returning from the town of Vejer . . . perceived some of the Enemy's dragoons, and not having the highest opinion of those with whom I was acting, after I gave directions for the men to be ready to fall in at a moment's notice, proceeded to a hill from which I could perceive any body of men advancing. I had nearly reached the summit when I saw the enemy on a hill within a mile and a half, who had by this time evidently made their dispositions of attack and were pushing forward with all the French vivacity of Attack. Bright was with me. I ordered him down the Hill to put the Brigade under arms, while I waited to reconnoitre their movements. A few minutes decided their evident point of attack. . . . They

advanced in three Columns, in all consisting of apparently, to me, 2,000 (we have since ascertained 2,250), three hundred of whom were cavalry, and 2 field-pieces. We had 1,030 Infantry, 49 cavalry, and 4 field-pieces, with good management a very strong position; there could not for a moment be a doubt of what should be done. On joining the Brigade, I found myself senior officer, Colonel Skerret and Lord Proby being absent. I immediately proceeded to put in execution (or, rather was going, as the whole of the men were not under arms, when I joined them) that plan, not of defence, but of attack, that appeared from their movements almost certain of success (and which the senior officer of Engineers has since told me would be the plan he would and did advise), but at this moment our Commander made his appearance, and ordered me to march. . . . We formed on a hill in the rear, until the Lt. Company which was in the town, and who were sharply engaged with the two strongest Columns, but were obliged for want of support to fall back with the remainder of the Light Companies, rejoined us. Somersal was so hard pushed that he was forced to leave all his knapsacks. One Sergeant could not be got to fall back, and was taken, and one more wounded. The whole Brigade fell back to the position of Vacinos that evening, and two days back returned to this town. To do Colonel Skerret justice, I believe he had orders not to fight superior numbers, and Vejer is within a few hours march of the lines at Cadiz, where the Enemy have 14,000 men; but if a man does not venture, he will never win. We would have beaten them with very little loss, and we could then have fallen back. Those who wish to vindicate the propriety of not fighting say: What object would you have gained? My answer and I think the answer of every British Soldier would be: We would have supported the character

of the British Arms, which by falling back before a force but double our numbers is in a measure injured.

The incident was trivial, but the letter is of some interest, not merely as throwing light on the character of the writer, but as indicating the courage and confidence with which Wellington had inspired the British forces in the Peninsula. Gough expected to return immediately to Cadiz; but, as will be seen from the letter which follows, it was decided to form a junction with Ballesteros, and the brigade was sent to Gibraltar. The enemy took advantage of their absence to menace Tarifa, and the design had to be given up.

TARIFA: *December* 10*th*, 1811.

Your affectionately kind letter of the 3rd November I received on the 4th, but so fagged have we been since marching, that I really am half dead. Since my last we have been at Gibraltar; indeed there are few places many leagues from this that we have not visited.

The enemy have again driven Ballesteros under the guns of Gibraltar. We marched to Algesiras, and crossed over by night for the purpose of attacking their position at Saint Rosque together with 5,000 Spaniards, but that morning Suchet[1] joined the enemy with 3,000, making in all 12,000, and the project was immediately given up, as we had but a 1,000 British, and the Spaniards were a most wretched rabble. The enemy had menaced this place and have marched to Vacinos, twelve miles off, 2,300 men and a few pieces of ordnance. Two

[1] This is probably a slip of the pen for Soult, as Suchet was near Valencia at this time.

days back they pushed forward some men within sight of the town which so frightened the natives that a sight most melancholy, though ludicrous, occurred; women and children running through the streets with as much of their property as they could carry for the purpose of embarking for Ceuta. But on finding the enemy had retired several have again come on shore. I am fully persuaded they never for a moment seriously thought of attacking this place. I am equally certain their object is to detain us here until they find an opportunity of attacking either Ballesteros or Blake. Their force is so totally inadequate even to resisting us in the Field. We have been however hourly, day and night, employed in strengthening the place, fagging the men and officers to death. . . . They must either advance or retire in a day or two.

13th. The Enemy, with the exception of a few men, have retired to Vejer, so all apprehension of an attack on this place is over for the winter; indeed the weather has been so dreadful that it was impossible for them to have remained; the inhabitants have therefore all again returned to the Town. I therefore hope we shall shortly go back.

The words with which this letter closes should, probably, not be taken too seriously as expressing the real views of the writer, for the obvious intention is to avoid alarming Mrs. Gough; but it is, at the same time, evident that the next movement of the enemy was a surprise to the garrison. On the 16th, a general order was issued, warning the forces that an attack was imminent, and on the 18th there was actually a cavalry skirmish. It is not necessary to follow the series of skirmishes which followed, nor to trace the French manœuvres in detail, as

they drew their lines closer round the town. At this stage of the blockade, there could scarcely be any doubt as to the real intention of the French, and the anonymous 'British Officer in Garrison,' who wrote *Anecdotes of British and Spanish Heroism at Tarifa, in Spain* (Lond., 1812), on which we largely rely for details of the fighting, states that a French sergeant, captured on the 22nd, reported that the French were determined to take the town. '"Tis a positive order from Napoleon, our emperor, that we should do so; and he generally provides means adequate to the end.' In two letters written home, on the 23rd and the 29th, Gough continues to hide from his wife the real danger of the situation. 'The Enemy,' he says, 'finding they can get no good of Ballesteros, have given up keeping him under the guns of Gibraltar, and have come before us to play the same game, they have been doing these last two years at Cadiz. They yesterday advanced and invested the town in form, they have brought nothing but a few light guns. Their object, I am persuaded, is merely to get Ballesteros away from Gibraltar. Here they cannot long remain, and even should they, it is as good to be shut up in one town as in another. I much fear as this is a new thing, they will frighten you with newspaper accounts, as they first did about Cadiz.'

Before these words were written (on the 29th), Gough had already taken his part in the momentous decision as to the defence of the town, which led to one of the most honourable episodes in the

Peninsular War. At this point, it is essential for the proper appreciation of the work done by the 87th, to turn to an account of the situation and defences of the fortress of Tarifa.

Situated almost in the centre of the Spanish side of the Straits of Gibraltar, Tarifa is naturally a place of considerable importance, and has a long history. It takes its name from a Saracen soldier, Tarif, and its associations with the struggle between the Cross and the Crescent are further increased by 'the tower of the Guzmans,' to which we shall have to make reference, and which recalls a famous siege in 1294, when the Spanish governor, Guzman, saved Tarifa from the Moors. In later history, Tarifa acquired an unenviable reputation as a home of pirates, and during the wars between Great Britain and Spain, in the eighteenth century, it was the scene of numerous privateering attacks upon British shipping. At the beginning of the Peninsular War, it was thought undesirable to attempt to hold Tarifa, and the town was in the occasional occupation of the enemy, who used it as a base for cattle-snatching expeditions. In May, 1809, General Colin Campbell[1], who was in command at Gibraltar, sent to Tarifa a detachment, which, by subsequent additions, grew into the garrison (under Brown) of which we have already spoken in connexion with the battle of Barrosa. At the date of the attack which it is

[1] Not the future Lord Clyde, who was at this date a lieutenant, and in that capacity fought both at Barrosa and at Tarifa.

now our duty to relate, the strength of Colonel Skerrett's garrison amounted to about 2,500 (including 600 Spanish infantry and 100 horse), and the enemy numbered probably about 5,000 men [1].

Tarifa itself was a small town of about six thousand inhabitants. It was surrounded by a narrow wall, too weak to form any defence against artillery, but broken by a series of towers, of which the most important were the tower and castle of the Guzmans, and the Portcullis. These stand at opposite ends of the bed of a periodical torrent, which bisected the town, passing from east to south-west. What may, for convenience' sake, be termed the Portcullis, stood at the entrance of this bed, and consisted of a tower defended by a portcullis and by a series of palisades. The tower of the Guzmans was at the south-west corner of the town, near the egress of the torrent, and the castle of the Guzmans to the east of the tower, forming part of the south wall of the town. The bed of the torrent, after passing out of the town near the south-west corner, is continued, in a westerly direction, to the sea, leaving a small neck of land between itself and the straits. On the Catalina, a small sandhill on this neck of land, was a 12-pounder, covering a short causeway which led to the island of Juniana. On

[1] The numbers of the French are very variously stated (cf. Napier's Appendix on the siege of Tarifa). The number we have taken is that given by Wellington in his Dispatch. The evidence is conflicting on a number of points in connexion with the siege.

this small island, which extends into the Straits, were four 24-pounders, and some other pieces of artillery, but they were not all mounted in time to be of use in the siege.

On the east and north, the town was commanded by some hills, of which the enemy were in possession, and which the garrison could not hope to hold. The plan of the defence, as devised by the engineers to whom Campbell had entrusted the task, was to concentrate the fighting upon the east side. The enemy might be naturally supposed to be likely to make an attempt on the east, because the hills at that point came nearer to the walls than elsewhere. The apparent advantage thus given was more than counterbalanced by other considerations. In the first place, the ridges themselves made a natural glacis at such an angle as to expose the assault to the full effect of the fire from the defenders' musketry. Secondly, the walls and towers were stronger at that side, and, at the same time, because of the natural features of the town, presented an appearance of weakness. The bed of the torrent almost bisected the east side of the wall, and from the Portcullis there stretched into the town a series of houses rising from both sides of the bed at an inclined plane. The existence of the torrent rendered the inner side of the wall much higher than the outer, and the houses formed a barricade on each side. If the enemy should succeed in effecting an entrance at this point, they would, accordingly, find themselves shut up in the bed of

the torrent and exposed not merely to fire from the houses by which they were enclosed, but also from the tower of the Guzmans at the opposite end of the town. This tower, further, offered a point for the final resistance, and from it the garrison could, if necessary, make their way to the island.

The steps taken to induce the French to make their attack at this seemingly favourable position were, like the scheme itself, the work of Captain Smith and his engineers. The western front was strengthened so as to produce an appearance of great difficulty. Should the enemy make an effort there, they would find an outwork in the shape of a convent about a hundred yards from the north-west angle of the town. To the south were the tower of the Guzmans and the Catalina, and in the channel were a ship of the line, a frigate, and some gunboats.

The real attack commenced on the 19th of December, when the enemy took possession of the hills surrounding Tarifa. Next day, the garrison made a sally and drew the enemy towards the eastern wall of the town. Before nightfall the town was closely invested, but the enemy had suffered considerably, especially from the two 10-inch mortars on the island. On the 22nd there took place a skirmish of considerable importance. A French piquet had taken up a position to the west of the town, from which it was necessary to dislodge them. A light company of the 11th accomplished this, but under their leader, Captain Wren, were forced to retire



COLONEL SKERRETT'S NOTE TO GOUGH

(*Cf. opposite page*)

by a part of the right wing of the French, which advanced close to the convent. The artillery, not only of the garrison, but also of some gunboats in the harbour, was directed against them; but it was also desirable to charge them, and Skerrett sent the following message to Gough: 'Dear Gough, The Enemy have sent a large force in front of the convent. Be prepared for an attack on that side.' The little scrap of paper, torn off a sheet, has been preserved through all the years that have intervened since the siege of Tarifa, and it is reproduced in this book, as a relic of a famous siege.

Gough's reply to the note was a charge with a flank company of the 87th, which forced the French to abandon their position, and relieved the garrison from the danger of allowing a hill on the west of the town to pass into the possession of the enemy.

By the morning of the 24th it was clear that the enemy had decided to attack on the east, as Smith had anticipated. At daybreak, they had pushed their advance to within 400 yards of the north-east tower. But here Colonel Skerrett lost heart. The enemy greatly outnumbered the men at his disposal, and they were determined, at all hazards, to storm the town. Neither he nor his commander, General Cooke, was responsible for the attempt to hold the place; the original occupation, and the defence, were alike the conception of the governor of the neighbouring fortress of Gibraltar. Skerrett had always been doubtful of the possibility of holding out, and had applied to Cooke for orders. In

reply, he received, on the 24th, instructions to embark his brigade and return to Cadiz. That night a council of war was held; Colonel Skerrett strongly advocated the abandonment of Tarifa, and found some support for his view. It is only due to Skerrett to admit that he had considerable ground for his hesitation. Wellington, writing after the successful defence, remarked: 'We have a right to expect that his Majesty's officers and troops will perform their duty upon every occasion; but we have no right to expect that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in every direction, and unprovided with artillery, and the walls scarcely cannon-proof.' The three officers who most strongly opposed the withdrawal were Smith, King, and Gough. The strength of their argument lay in Smith's knowledge of the defences, for which he was responsible. 'I do not hesitate to declare,' he said, 'that I place the utmost reliance on the resources of the place, and consider them such as ought to make a good and ultimately successful defence.' Any compromise, involving the defence of the island alone, he regarded as impossible, on the ground that 'till the island is more independent in itself, there is a necessity of fairly defending the town as an outwork.' Gough satisfied himself with expressing the opinion that a withdrawal 'at the present state of forwardness of the Enemy's operations' would be contrary to 'the spirit of Lt.-General Campbell's Instructions.' It

was finally decided to continue the resistance, apparently against Skerrett's desire. Part of the difficulty doubtless arose from the fact that, while Skerrett and his Brigade were acting under the instructions of Cooke, the portion of the garrison under King, who came from the forces at Gibraltar, took their orders from Campbell. Cooke, influenced probably by Skerrett's reports, remained adverse to the continued occupation, while Campbell would not hear of withdrawal.

A few days passed in slight skirmishes, but, on the 29th, the French artillery succeeded not only in temporarily silencing the 16-pounder on Guzman's tower, but in effecting a breach in the wall to the right of the Portcullis tower. Skerrett now definitely decided to abandon the place and to withdraw his brigade, but King communicated the intention to Campbell, who ordered the transports to return to Gibraltar without taking a single soldier on board. Next day, the French General, Laval, sent in a summons to surrender, to which Camp Marshal Copons returned the following remarkable reply: 'When you propose to the governor of this fortress to admit a capitulation, because the breach will shortly be practicable, you certainly do not know that I am here. When the breach shall be absolutely practicable, you will find me upon it, at the head of my troops, to defend it; then we will negotiate. . . . Be pleased not to send any more flags of truce.' The Spanish boast about the defence of the breach was just as well founded as the confidence of the

French in its practicability. They saw a wide breach in the wall, but they could not tell that the front of the breach was the least practicable part. Instead of leading them straight into the town, it would conduct them, should they succeed in forcing it, to a precipitous descent of fourteen feet towards a narrow street, defended on three sides, and barricaded with iron gratings, taken from the balconies of the houses[1]. The defence of the breach was entrusted, not to Copons, but to Gough and the 87th, who flanked it from north to south. A company of the 47th under Captain Levesey, were posted on the east tower. No attack took place on the night of the 30th, but at eight o'clock next morning a general advance was made by the enemy, and about 2,000 grenadiers moved up to the breach. Gough, who had instructed his men that 'wherever there is opportunity, the bayonet must be used,' drew his sword, and ordered the band to strike up an Irish air, 'Garry-Owen.' So furious was the fire that the enemy, finding the breach less practicable than Laval had anticipated, diverted their onslaught to the Portcullis. Here, too, Gough and the 87th were ready to receive them, and to the music of 'St. Patrick's Day' prepared to meet the advancing foe. The French could not stand the attack of the Faugh-a-Ballaghs; their leader fell outside the bars of the portcullis, close to where Gough stood in

[1] The strength of this barricade was increased by the device of turning up every alternate bar of the gratings.

person at the head of his men; and the wounded Frenchman gave up his sword to Gough, in token of surrender. Gough received it through the bars of the portcullis. The main difficulty now was to restrain the impetuosity of the 87th. 'Colonel,' pleaded one of the regiment, as his commander forbade him to pursue, 'Colonel, I only want to tache 'em what it is to attack the aiglers.' But not even the appeal to the glories of Barrosa could win the desired permission, and he had to be content with the hope that 'next time they come, we'll give them *Garry-Owen to glory* again.' At this point, a field-piece from the north-east tower swept the masses of the besiegers, and they were compelled to withdraw to their camp, leaving Tarifa to the possession of the gallant little band which had defended so well the honour of the British arms. 'On our side,' wrote Colonel Skerrett, in general orders issued that evening, 'all behaved nobly, but the conduct of Lieut.-Col. Gough, and the 87th, whose good fortune it was to defend the breach, surpasses all praise.' Four days later, General Campbell requested Gough and the officers and men of the 87th to accept his thanks for 'the eminent services of that distinguished corps on this day,... when the bravery and discipline of the 87th regiment was so conspicuously displayed in the defence of the breach[1].'

[1] In the first edition of his *History of the War in the Peninsula*, Napier gave the credit of defending the breach at Tarifa to the 47th Regiment, and referred to the 87th as occupying the portcullis tower. In the communication from

Lord Proby warmly congratulated the regiment on seeing them, 'under their truly gallant and able commander, complete the splendid military reputation they have acquired at Barrosa, by gaining fresh laurels of a description not recently worn by the British Arms, by showing, in a breach opposed to the most formidable assaults, the same invincible courage with which they carried dismay into the ranks of the enemy.'

Colonel Gough himself, writing to his wife four days after the assault, gave the following description of the fighting :—

TARIFA: *January 4th*, 1812.

My letter concluding on the second will have announced the glorious result of a storm, made by the enemy the last day of the last (to me most fortunate) year, in which your husband and his most gallant corps shone most conspicuous. How pro-

which we have already quoted with reference to the battle of Barrosa, Colonel Gough drew the historian's attention to the facts that 'the whole of the east wall, in front of which the enemies' lines were, and in the centre of which was the breach, was entrusted to the 87th, from the commencement to the termination of the siege, that the 87th occupied the breach as well as the portcullis tower, which was merely a small Moorish turret, not capable of holding above twenty men and situated within ten paces of the breach.' Napier corrected the error in later editions. Gough also mentions, in the same letter, that, 'at the council of war held on the 24th Dec., most, if not all, of the officers in command of Regiments and Departments, gave it as their opinion that the town should not be evacuated, and subsequently recorded their opinion in writing when called on by Colonel Skerrett.'

ductive of fortunate events was the last year to me; I can hardly hope that this will, or indeed can, be equally so, and the conclusion, if properly stated in the Despatches, will add lustre to the British arms by the conduct of our Corps; not a man of any other having any share in the defence of the Breach which was solely entrusted to me. Indeed such a degree of respect are we now in, that I, in fact, command, as no one is allowed to interfere with any orders or arrangements of mine, not alone with regard to my own gallant corps, but likewise the 95th, and the Detachments, together with the whole line of defence. The enemy are deserting by hundreds, and we hourly expect them to take themselves off. I will own I shall not be sorry, as everything being left to me, my mind and body are night and day on the alert.

TARIFA: *January 5th*, 1812.

The main body of the enemy took themselves off last night, and their rear guard this morning. I have been through all their camp and lines and Batteries. This glorious result to our labours I will own was rather unexpected, the more so as Marshal Victor received positive orders from the Emperor to take this place, and therefore brought with him 10,000 men and a heavy battering train of artillery, with which he has almost levelled the wall and a great part of the town. It fell to the good fortune of your husband to be appointed to the command of the whole line opposed to the enemy, all arrangements for the Defences of which were solely left to him. Therefore the Breach was defended by the Prince's Own in the assault on it by 2,200 picked men covered by the fire of all their guns, and 1,200 men from the lines. The enemy were beaten with immense loss, while mine was only two killed, two sergeants two officers and eighteen men wounded—

which, at least, proves that my arrangements were not bad, and on which I assure you I feel more real pride and self congratulation than on any other circumstance in my life. Don't be frightened now when I tell you I had rather a narrow escape, which indeed in such an hour of all kinds of balls and splinters was impossible to be otherwise, a small splinter of shell having given me the merest cut in the eyebrow and a splinter of a stone rather a nasty cut in the finger. Indeed my position in the Breach frequently enveloped me in mortar. I merely tell you this to prove that an all gracious power guards the life of him dear to so good a Christian. The scene was awfully grand; every officer and man seemed to outvie one another in acts of heroism, and never while life is left me can I forget their expressions and looks . . . at seeing me bleed, which from exertion (being in a great heat) my temple did very freely, although at the moment and ever since I have scarcely felt I was cut. My finger, from the cold, has festered and is annoying, which you will not be surprized at when I tell you that since the Breach became practicable, now six nights back, I have never left the wall, except the night before last, when I was totally exhausted. In truth I volunteered the defence of the Breach, and I could not in honour leave it as the enemy were within 270 paces of it. My boys were in a large church in the rear with their arms in their hands. Poor fellows, they never (nor did an individual) murmur, although half were always on the walls in one continued pour of Rain. From the appearance of the Trenches, the Enemy must have been almost swimming. . . . They have certainly buried 3 more 18-pounders and have taken off their light guns. They seem from the Quantity of raw meat now about the camp to have been in no want of that article. But as to Bread, they all say they have had none for 7 days. How glorious is all this, after all our grumbling;

never did British courage and discipline overcome more difficulties, a garrison of less than one thousand firelocks to drive off with disgrace ten times their numbers, from a Town the walls of which were breached in 6 hours, and which is commanded from all the heights round it, in several places within 50 yards. . . . If nothing happens, I propose going home in April or May; Moore says he will come to Cadiz certainly, and accompany me. . . . We expect to go to Cadiz as soon as vessels come round for us. I own I wish it, as I am not a little knocked up, and so are my poor fellows. Indeed, I think Sir John [Doyle] should get us all to England, as we are out now over our full term of duty. From what I have said about the little scratches I have got, I only obey you in telling nothing but the truth. . . . So very trifling are they, that I would not put myself down wounded.

The valour displayed by Gough, in the defence of Tarifa, was recognized not only, as we shall see, by Wellington, but also by the Spanish authorities. There was conferred upon him the Grand Cross of the Order of Charles III of Spain [1], which had been instituted in 1771. At the close of the war, Colonel Gough was permitted to associate the name of Tarifa with his own, by an augmentation of his coat of arms, an honour to be described in due course.

[1] There are four classes in the Order, of which the Grand Cross is the highest. The badge of the Order is a star of eight points, enamelled white, edged with gold; over the two upper points, the regal crown of Spain, chased in gold; on the centre of the star, the image of the Virgin Mary, enamelled in proper colours, vestments white and blue; on the reverse, the letters C. C. in cipher, with the number three in the centre, and this motto—*Virtuti et Merito.*

III

THE CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ANDALUSIA

From Tarifa, Gough and his victorious regiment returned to Cadiz in the end of January, being somewhat ignominiously driven into Gibraltar on the way, owing to the breaking of a cable. At Cadiz, they were received with great enthusiasm, and Gough was able to report to Doyle and Cooke upon the courage and discipline of the Prince's Own. The regiment remained at Cadiz till the end of April. It numbered at this date 730 'effective firelocks, after having lost upwards of 700 men in the country.' Its discipline received the highest commendations from General Ross, who inspected it and gave it a report, which, says Gough, 'will do us as much good at the Commander-in-Chief's office as if we had gained another victory.' The report was specially welcome, as the regiment was said by hostile critics to be weak in discipline, and useful only for a wild onslaught in an hour of excitement. Its commander had also at this time the pleasure of receiving his medals for Talavera and Barrosa. In the end of March, General Cooke recognized Gough's services at Tarifa by appointing him commander of that place, and the beginning of May found him once again at 'the important fortress,' which, a year

before had been 'the most wretched little village in Europe.' At his earnest request, a large proportion of the 87th accompanied him back to the scene of their triumph. In addition to 470 of his own regiment, the garrison numbered 300 of a German battalion and 50 artillery. Tarifa was Colonel Gough's first separate command, and the fame of the recent siege gave it an added importance, and associated it still further with his name. Its proximity to Gibraltar, and its position as a British garrison in the furthest extremity of Spain, combined with the memories of the siege to make Tarifa a place which all military men visited as occasion offered. Upon the commanding officer there fell, accordingly, a considerable burden in the way of entertainment, but he was in this way brought into contact with men qualified to report to the Commander-in-Chief upon his capabilities as a soldier. In spite of occasional visits and still more occasional attacks, life at Tarifa proved not less tedious than at Cadiz. 'It is stupid to a degree,' Gough writes; 'still, however, I feel glad I was appointed to the Command, for it is an honourable mark of approbation. . . . I shall become quite a philosopher; this situation is quite adapted to contemplation.'

Among Gough's distinguished visitors was General Cooke, and the visit had a somewhat narrow escape of acquiring an unenviable notoriety:—

THE IMPORTANT FORTRESS OF TARIFA: *May 28th*, 1812.

I fear some accounts may go home on the subject of the Enemies' late movements before this place.

I will own I at one time expected I should have had another dust with them. Soult came to Vejer, and sent on two regiments of infantry and cavalry to within nine miles of this. I was that day out with General Cooke who came to see this place, showing him Vacinos, where the enemy most unexpectedly arrived three hours after. What a glorious kick-up it would have made had they taken the whole squad of us! After reconnoitring and taking all the cattle they could find, they returned to Vejer, where Marshall Soult, after treating the municipality with the utmost contempt, levied a contribution of 5,000 dollars, threatening, if not paid within two hours, he would give up the place to plunder, marched off with his booty, taking with him all his own men and leaving me in quiet possession of my government, which I trust in three months more may defy any attempt the enemy may make on it. At present I would not much have relished an attack. You may set your heart at rest on the subject of the siege of Cadiz being raised; even was it, I apprehend they would leave me quietly where I am, first as the regiments are divided, and secondly as they now see the importance of this port, almost for the salvation of Spain. I was most fortunate in having adopted measures which highly pleased General Cooke, and, what is rather more difficult, General Campbell, his opponent. Nothing can get on better. I cannot avoid mentioning a circumstance that at the moment nearly gave me as much satisfaction as I ever before derived even from the conduct of my regiment in the field of battle. From the enemy's having last winter, when before this place, burned all the poor people's houses in the neighbourhood, and the present high price of bread, the lower orders of the people in this town are actually starving. My glorious set of fellows (for which I shall ever feel truly proud of

my country) sent their non-commissioned officers to me, to say if it would meet with my approval, to subscribe a day's pay per man for the relief of the poor of the town. This I declare was never even suggested by an officer to them; it was their spontaneous good feelings. Fellows like these, fighting as they have done, and feeling as they do, what is there not to be expected from them? I may abolish a Guard Room, and talk of the Cat of Nine Tails as an obsolete term. With such men as those you may safely confide your husband, when that husband (I feel proud to say it) is almost adored by them. . . . I feel determined that no want or even wish of my soldiers, while within bounds, shall remain unsatisfied. They have better bread and meat than any soldiers even in England, I make my Commissary answerable for that. They have, 'tis true, very severe duty, but they all see the necessity of it, and I am persuaded there is not a soldier who would wish to see one man less mount guard. I am also a great favourite as yet with the Spaniards. Ballesteros I have no opinion of; had I had but two of his Regiments I would have taken the whole French advance the other day, while he remained looking at them, with an Army that ought to have eaten them. Take my word for it, notwithstanding all his lies, that he never will do a glorious action. He may be a good smuggler[1], but he is no General. . . . I understand the Enemy have opened again on Cadiz and the forts. You may therefore rejoice that I am not there, as every shell came over, always right over my head room, which was not Bomb-proof . . . my Casa just happened to be in the gangway between the Enemies' Battery and the town. I am not a little glad you did not know this before.

[1] Ballesteros had, before the war, been employed in coast-guard work.

The incident to which the letter refers occurred on the 13th of May, when Marshal Soult suddenly appeared at Vejer, and, leaving some sixty men outside the town, himself marched towards Tarifa and Vacinos, plundering as he went along. He demanded a ransom of 100,000 reals, and kept the municipal authorities imprisoned until that sum was paid. So the summer passed slowly on, with such an occasional alarm to enliven the dullness of weeks occupied with garrison duty, varied by an evening card-party or a weekly picnic under the shade of the vineyards.

The campaign of Soult in Andalusia was, by this time, nearly over. The year 1812 marks an important stage in the war. The misdeeds of the Spanish Regency had reached a crisis by the beginning of the year. The discontent of the colonies, to which reference has already been made, had passed into open rebellion, and the Spanish Government had the effrontery to employ subsidies, granted by their allies for the war in Spain, as a means of quelling the colonists. In the month of January a new Regency was proclaimed, but matters remained much the same; a new constitution followed in March, but without any real improvement in the conduct of affairs; and a considerable section of the democratic party were in favour of abandoning the struggle and making terms with Joseph. From this fate the Peninsula was delivered by the success of Wellington's operations during the year. On January 19, fell Ciudad Rodrigo, and, on the 6th of

April, Badajos, the two most important strongholds in the hands of the French on the Spanish-Portuguese frontier. Soult, who had failed to reinforce Badajos, returned to the blockade of Cadiz, and Wellington meditated an invasion of Andalusia. This design he was prevented from carrying out, as Marshal Marmont menaced the newly captured fortresses, and it was impossible for Wellington to trust their defence to the Spanish generals. The scene of the summer campaign of 1812 was, therefore, not Andalusia, but Castile, and there, on the 22nd of July, he defeated Marmont in the brilliant action of Salamanca, which laid open the way to Madrid. Joseph became thoroughly alarmed, and sent instructions to Soult to evacuate Andalusia. These orders Soult was most unwilling to execute. The fall of Badajos, which rendered practicable a campaign of Wellington himself in Andalusia, had been a severe blow to Soult, and from the fear of such an attack he had just been relieved. He now proposed to capture Tarifa and Cadiz and to crush Ballesteros, and he had inflicted a defeat upon that general when Joseph's orders were conveyed to him. Soult urged the king to concentrate his forces in Andalusia, pointing out that the loss of Madrid was not really a matter of first importance, and dwelling upon the difficulty of a retreat. The allies had 60,000 men in Andalusia who, on Soult's retirement, would be available for pursuit, while Wellington himself was in front. Joseph's reply was a renewal of his order (although he had already

deserted Madrid), and the siege of Cadiz was raised on the 25th of August. Within six weeks Soult had made good his retreat, and effected a junction with the other French troops in Valencia, whither Joseph had fled from Madrid. Meanwhile, Wellington was engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to capture Burgos, an important French magazine in the north of Spain. The advance of Souham forced him to raise the siege, and he retreated across the Douro, pursued by Souham (October 29). Both Souham and Wellington were in expectation of reinforcements; the French general was awaiting the arrival of Joseph from Valencia, while Wellington was in daily expectation of a junction with Hill and the forces which had been detained in the south by the movements of Marshal Soult. To the march of this force it is now time to turn.

As early as August 2, Gough wrote to his wife that Soult's abandonment of Andalusia was now more than probable. On August 24 he says that four companies of the 87th had been sent to join Hill, and on September 6 he announces his resignation of the command at Tarifa, which had ceased to possess any military importance:—

ISLA DE LEON: *6th September*, 1812.

The late occurrences make the movements of the army in Spain so uncertain, particularly that part to which I belong, that even General Cooke is quite in the dark as to what is to become of us. I gave up my command on the 31st August, and marched overland here, leaving two companies of the German

battalion there. I arrived here on the 4th, and I believe shall march for Seville, where the remainder of the division are, on the 8th. I am the only Corps now remaining here, except the German battalion who remain behind to take charge of the redoubts and stores. We are to remain at Seville until General Cooke receives orders from Lord Wellington; until those arrive, our future destiny is quite unsettled. General Cooke has taken this movement on himself. I am apt to think we shall either join General Hill or Maitland; I hope the latter. . . . The enemy has entirely evacuated this part of the country. I have been through several of their works; we were most completely deceived as to their strength. They might have been all easily carried without much loss. In coming from Tarifa, I past near Barrosa, but had not time to go over the ground, as I was Commander-in-Chief. I was then uncertain whether General Cooke had left this or not—he sets off tomorrow. I will own I almost regret leaving Tarifa.

Ten days later he was at Seville, and still uncertain as to future movements:—

SEVILLE: *September 15th*, 1812.

We arrived at this town yesterday morning, after a very pleasant march of some days from the Isle, which town we left the day I last wrote you. . . . We that night got into Puerto Real, the principal point of defence of the French, as it covered the Trocadero. They appeared to have fortified it by surrounding it by a dry ditch with Bastions. The houses of all such as fled they destroyed. As we marched for Xeres before daylight, we could hardly distinguish or make observations, but from what I could judge it is a wretched town, though rather

a strong military position. On the march to Xeres on the 8th, three leagues, we past the Guadelete on which the Enemy had a very strong post, and arrived at eleven o'clock at Xeres, a most beautifully situated town, in which is made all the Sherry wine sent to England. I was billeted in the same house where Marshal Victor had his Headquarters, and had the honour of sleeping in his bed. I was quite pleased with this town; it is situated on a hill and has a most extensive and beautiful view of the country, which even now is almost a vineyard. Soult, when in the lines before Cadiz, had his Headquarters here, and the people seem quite Frenchified; indeed they do not conceal their sentiments. My landlord, a most gentlemanly and well informed man, was of French extraction and had the contract for provisions. He, however, was to a degree civil to me, and gave me a most excellent dinner and more real information of the French Generals and their military policy than I could otherwise procure. I went through his wine stores, supposed the largest in Europe; he has frequently shipped six thousand pipes of wine from them in one year. I was very much pleased with them, and the Cathedral, which was a very fine building. On the ninth we got to Lebrija, five leagues, and on the tenth to Los Cabas; these are two small towns without anything particular, in which the Enemy generally had a few infantry and cavalry to keep up the communications on the Seville road on which they are. On the 11th we got to Utrera, where we met the Guards and the heavy Brigade of nine-pounders. This, though not very large, is considered one of the richest towns in the South of Spain; some of the houses are magnificent. On the 12th we reached Dos Hermanas (two sisters) a small village, and yesterday arrived in this Quarter. The road from Isla here is to a degree beautiful, however it wants water. The

people, particularly in the last village (we having been the first red coats they ever saw) were to a degree civil and seemed delighted, with the exception of Puerto Real and Xeres. This is a very magnificent city, formerly the Capital of Spain. The public buildings are superb to a degree. The Cathedral far surpasses anything I ever saw, but I have been so much hurried with Regimental duties that I have had very little time for observation. I was at the Theatre last night and was much pleased, the performers seemed better than those at Cadiz, except the dancers, but the house is not near so good, about the size of the Hay Market, but far more beautiful. The streets, however, are uncommonly narrow and not at all clean, the houses are very irregular. The town appears twice the size of Cadiz. The Almeida, or public walk, the Spaniards call one of the wonders of the world; it runs several miles along the river Guadalquivre, which is a beautiful river and navigable up to the town for small vessels. It is to me the most extraordinary thing that ever occurred, how the Enemy could have been so deceived, as the allies had to cross the Bridge, which is a very strong position and the city is walled. They had between three and four thousand Infantry and two Regiments of Cavalry in town. We had now 1,600 British and six thousand Spaniards, which one thousand French would have drove before them. They knew Skerret was in their neighbourhood and his force, and had no idea of his daring to attack them. They were all at breakfast when they heard that a host of red coats were pouring down the Hills close to the Town, our advance were certainly in the suburbs when their General was . . . . .[1] They therefore thought it was General Hill and fled in the most disgraceful confusion, their officers, such as collected in the hurry, could not get the men to

[1] Word illegible.

stand against the red coats. The conduct of the inhabitants was enthusiastic, long before the Enemy left the town the joy bells in all the Churches began ringing, and the stragglers were pelted by the people, who ran out and embraced our men; several cheering on the English were actually wounded in the Batteries. Villatte was to have retired in two days after, before which he was to have raised a contribution that was tantamount to sacking the Town, after which the Division that retired from the Lines was to have come in and given it the finishing stroke. Well therefore might the inhabitants have rejoiced. When I see more of the public buildings, I will give you, or rather will attempt to give you, some description of them. . . . General Cooke waits for orders; some say we are to spend the winter here, I think not. We have not a Frenchman within 130 miles of us. Cooke is here, I dine with him today; he is still as attentive as ever to me. We are in Lord Proby's Brigade, who is not a little proud of us—however, I have found the detachment in shocking order, but am making every exertion to fit them out. I have upwards of seven hundred with me.

The movement in which Cooke's force was engaged was designed to harass Soult's retreat, or, rather to reinforce Sir Rowland Hill. But Soult was already far on his road to Valencia, and Cooke hurried forward to join Hill, with a view to a concentration with the Commander-in-Chief, now engaged in the siege of Burgos. They marched through a desolate and devastated country to Truxillo, which they reached on October 14. This advance involved some severe marching, and Gough rejoices in the reputation which his regiment was achieving:—

TRUXILLO: *Oct. 14th*, 1812.

We have got thus far on our route to join General Hill, who is either at Toledo or Aranjuez. This town is quite destroyed, I really would not know it: my old billet is in ruins. I regret to tell you the weather has, I fear, set in for the first rains, which generally last a fortnight, which will about bring us to the end of our March. My men have astonished the Division in marching; I never saw such a set of fellows. I came yesterday seven and twenty miles over a most wretched road, and it raining all the time, in eight hours and a half, without having one man out of his section an inch. The Guards saw us come in to their astonishment. Skerrett, who was present, cried out 'G— d—n me, my Brigade, let them look at that Regiment, and be ashamed of themselves.' I trust the fellows will continue, if they do there will be nothing but comfort. . . . The day after tomorrow we shall cross the Tagus at Almaraz, where we shall see the scene of Sir R. Hill's last brilliant affair. . . . It is here reported that Marquis Wellington has taken Burgos and that one or two of his Divisions are on their march to join Sir R. Hill: if so, I have some hopes still of seeing William, which I own I should be very glad of.

At this point there is a break in Gough's correspondence. His regiment continued its march to join Hill at Aranjuez, and reached him in time to take part in the defence of the Puente Larga, a bridge near the junction of the Jarama with the Henares, and to accompany the retreat from Madrid to Salamanca, to join the Commander-in-Chief. It is, for our purpose, unnecessary to describe the incidents of the next fortnight, in which neither

Wellington's nor Soult's intentions are absolutely clear. On the 15th of October, Wellington, having failed to bring about a pitched battle, continued his retreat, and the army went into winter quarters. The general position selected by Wellington for this purpose, extended from Plasencia and Coria to Lamego, in Portugal. The 87th was separated from the 4th Division with which it had acted since joining Hill, and rejoined the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division, stationed in Portugal. Gough writes from near Lamego in December, but the letters which follow speak of changes, and we find him, consecutively, at Villa de Ponte, at Adbarros, at Quinta de Robira, and finally, in April, at Vide. The retreat from Burgos and Madrid was an inglorious ending to a year of triumph, and the British army was disheartened to the last degree. As a natural consequence, its discipline deteriorated. The men plundered and mutinied, and, at the small combat of the Huebra, at the beginning of the retreat, some of the general officers deliberately ignored the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and, but for Wellington's promptness, might have caused a heavy disaster. All through the winter, complaints continue about the condition of the army, and Gough attributes the discontent partly to disappointment and ill-health, and partly to the disgraceful outbursts which had followed the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos. The general discontent had infected the 87th, and Gough's letters are full of illustrations of the difficulties of

that dreadful winter. The buoyant tone of his letters changes at the end of November, when he describes 'the miseries of a retreat in winter, and the feelings of an officer, commanding, not a fortnight back, one of the nicest Corps in the service, now reduced to half its numbers, and that half broken-spirited and starved.' A fortnight later, he gives a more detailed account of his troubles:—

FORT ALCADA (five leagues from Lamego): *Dec. 9th*, 1812.

. . . We have at length got into what is called Winter Quarters, in a most wretched little village, but I trust as we are very crowded, with the 94th Regt. we shall get removed to some other Quarters—as nothing can be worse than this. . . . The Battalion is so cut up from its late march, that it quite sickens me to look at them, particularly as the means of getting them shortly again into order is not within my reach—I mean Money, Necessaries, &c. . . . This Battalion having been paid at Seville to 24th Oct., while the Army here have only been paid to 24th July, they now, when it is required, get two months' pay; we get nothing. When I reflect on what we were, when we left Seville, and what we are, I will own I have scarcely heart to undertake a total equipment and reorganization of the Battalion. There are difficulties attending on 2nd Battalions which scarcely can be surmounted on service, and Col. Fulton, from the class of men he sent us, has done the Battalion more injury than any other officer can ever repair. They will ever distinguish themselves in the Field, but I fear it will be a long time before they can bear a review. Want of provisions has also produced thieving, which is hard to eradicate, I am sorry to say, in an Irishman.

The numbers of the corps continued to decrease: in the beginning of January it was only 350 strong; a month later, out of 400 men, 65 were in hospital. 'The army at large are in a very shocking way, several Corps not more than my strength have two hundred in hospital—I mean Regimental Hospital, the General Hospitals are full.' The morale of the 87th continued good, and the men showed an attachment to their corps and to their commander which was very gratifying to Gough's feelings. An unfortunate incident occurred in March; the misconduct of a few men, while bringing military stores from Lisbon, brought upon the 87th a severe and largely unmerited censure from Wellington. It is probable that Wellington wished to make an example, for insubordination was so common that, as Gough remarks, 'Court-Martials are the order of the day throughout the army.' The incident is noteworthy only as it contributed to give a general impression of want of discipline in the 87th—a charge which Gough repudiates by reference to the reports of Generals Graham and Cooke, and the other officers under whom it had served.

IV

VITTORIA AND NIVELLE

WELLINGTON spent the winter months in making preparations for the campaign of Vittoria. Reinforcements reached him from England, and it is estimated that in the spring of 1813 he had nearly 200,000 troops (British, Spanish, and Portuguese) under his command. He had been, in the preceding September, appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish armies, and, in January, he paid a visit to Cadiz to lay his plans before the Cortes. While the campaign of 1813 opened with an increase of the numbers under Wellington's control, the forces of the enemy had been diminished owing to the mortality of the Russian campaign, but they still remained about 30,000 in excess of the allied armies. The French were in four divisions; in the north, they held the Tormes and the Esla; in the north-west, Cafarelli separated the British from their fleet in the Bay of Biscay; while, in the south, one division held the Tagus, and another covered Madrid. In these circumstances, Wellington determined to strike a blow before they were ready, and to evade the defences of the Tormes and the Douro by turning the right flank of the enemy. This important movement he entrusted to General

Graham, the hero of Barrosa. Early in May the scheme was arranged, and Graham was instructed to cross the Douro, march through the Tras-os-Montes to Zamora, and thence northwards to Valladolid. Graham's force included the 3rd Division now under Picton. Gough writes on May 14 in good spirits; they are on the point of departure, his men are in excellent order and spirits, and the rank and file now numbers 510. We have no further account of his march; but it can have been no easy task to make their way through that wild country. While Graham was traversing the Tras-os-Montes, Wellington forced back the French from the line of the Tormes, and reached a point between Miranda de Duero and Toro. Graham's appearance on the right bank of the Esla took the French by surprise, and they retreated first to Zamora and then to Toro, whence the concentration of Wellington's army drove them still backwards. From Toro Wellington advanced to Valladolid, in pursuit not only of the army which had held the line of the Douro, but also of the army of the south, under Joseph, which, fearing that it might be cut off, was marching with all haste to join the army of Portugal. Had this concentration taken place earlier, Wellington's task in such a country, and against so large a number of the enemy, would have been something very different from the triumphal march which Gough describes in a letter written early in June:—

CAMP (two leagues in front of Palencia): *June 8th* [1813].

. . . We got into Palencia the day before yesterday at three o'clock. The Intrusive King reviewed the French troops the day previous, and left the town at five in the evening, after which they commenced their retreat taking all they could carry off. Their cavalry left the town six hours' before we came in. Notwithstanding, you would imagine we were at peace. I go as regularly to bed in sheets as I would in England and with as little prospect of being disturbed. I own it is quite a new thing to me. . . . Lord Wellington, in passing the Brigade the other day, on the march, pulled in his horse in rear of the Regiment, on which he kept his eyes so stedfastly fixed during the quarter of an hour he remained in their rear, and the whole time he took walking his horse along their flank. I never saw so minute an Inspection. When he got to our head he again put spurs to his horse and galloped on. We were marching in prime order; he said not a word. It is said the Enemy are destroying the works of Burgos and are determined to retire behind the Ebro, so I fear there will be little chance for some length of time for us to distinguish ourselves.

The rumour about Burgos, improbable as it seemed, turned out to be correct. The French had trusted to keeping back the enemy at the Douro, and had left the new fortifications of Burgos unfinished, but sufficiently high to command the older defences which resisted the besiegers in the preceding year. The fortress which had put a limit to Wellington's victorious career after Salamanca, fell, therefore, into his hands without a struggle, and the French continued their retreat to the Ebro. It was decided

to hold this strongly, and a detachment was left to guard the left flank at Pancorbo, while the line of the river was occupied down to Haro. Wellington adopted precisely the same device that had served him so well at the crossing of the Douro, except that he now turned the French position with his whole army, instead of with one division. Graham's experience among the Tras-os-Montes showed the possibility of leading an army and of moving artillery through mountainous country, and Wellington decided to cross the upper waters of the Ebro, and to repeat Graham's exploit by marching through the mountains on the borders of Guipuzcoa. On June 18, Gough wrote to his wife, relating some of the incidents of their rapid march. 'We crossed the Ebro,' he says, 'at St. Martin, on the 15th, and have been making long and distressing marches since, through the boldest, most mountainous, and romantic country I ever beheld. The Spaniards deserve to lose their country for not having defended the passes of the Ebro, and indeed, all the country to the North of it. I was much disappointed on finding that River, this far up, quite a stream. The inhabitants either dislike or fear us much, as they have forsaken most of the Villages we have past through. We have latterly been badly off for bread, but our General (Picton) has been indefatigable in his exertions. The Seventh Division have been with us for some days. I have therefore seen a good deal of William, who is quite well. . . . I am happy to tell you my Men are getting on capitally—only

eight sick, after all my fatigues. The whole army are in high order and spirits.' The feeling of confidence seems to have been general. 'I am sanguine,' says Gough, 'that this will be the most brilliant campaign for the Grand Lord that he has ever attempted.'

On the 19th of June, Wellington was encamped on the Bayas, facing the French position at Vittoria. It is not necessary, in a biography of Lord Gough, to do more than give the merest outline of the famous action that followed on the 21st. The French position was chosen with that lack of military insight which characterized all the movements of the well-meaning Joseph. The river Zadora turns almost at right angles in front of Vittoria, and the French were drawn up along the river bank, presenting a double face to the attack of the allies, and covered by a stream crossed by seven bridges which they did not attempt to hold. The centre and left stretched from the village of Hermandad to the heights of Puebla, while the right (the army of Portugal) was seven miles distant. Wellington divided his army into three columns and arranged a simultaneous attack upon the French. Sir Thomas Graham was entrusted with the assault upon the right wing of the enemy, and Sir Rowland Hill with the assault on their left, while the Commander-in-Chief took charge of the centre. In spite of some scarcely avoidable delay, these movements were effectually carried out, and Graham and Hill soon menaced the enemy's flanks. Gough, with the rest

of the 3rd Division under Picton, formed part of Wellington's left centre, and reached the field somewhat late. Along with the 7th Division, under Lord Dalhousie, they took a distinguished part in the action, and Gough, with the 87th, made a brilliant charge, and captured the village of Hermandad. The French centre began to give way, and soon were in full retreat, pursued by Picton and Dalhousie, towards Vittoria. Earlier in the day Hill had carried La Puebla, and the gallant stand made by Reille and the army of Portugal against Graham was rendered useless by the retreat of Joseph and the centre, which exposed their left and rear. Reille therefore withdrew his forces and succeeded in keeping them in good order, so long as they were separated from the frightened rout of the French centre. This of course could not be for long, and the whole French army was soon in helpless and hopeless flight. In the following letter Gough describes the fight, and refers to the enormous amount of spoil which was one of the features of the victory. He was himself unwounded, although he had been hit in three places: 'the skin,' he says, 'not broken.' A shot had passed through his coat in two or three places, and his horse had been killed under him. 'The Officers,' he says, 'are surprised I brought my men under such a tremendous fire; they would be more astonished if they had been in it.'

CAMP (before Vittoria): *June 22nd*, 1813.

My beloved will rejoice to hear that the opportunity of distinguishing myself and the Corps occurred yesterday, the glorious Twenty-first June. The Battalion out-Heroded Herod, its conduct called forth the warmest encomiums from General Colville, who witnessed a part of its conduct. After the action he said before several officers, 'Gough, you and your Corps have done wonders.' But, by the bye, he did not see all, a village having separated me from the rest of the Brigade, when I charged two heights on which were a numerous Force of Artillery, supported by a heavy column of Infantry, I should think about two thousand, without a Corps to assist us. My good fortune still supports me, as I found one of my Sergeants got the Batonner (Truncheon) of Marshal Jourdan, who commanded the French, carried, I should think by one of his staff who was killed. I shall present it tomorrow to General Colville for Lord Wellington. Unfortunately no officer saw the fellow take it, I should therefore fear our action will not appear. . . . It is a staff about two feet long covered with purple velvet, most beautifully embroidered with Eagles. The young rascal has taken off the two Gold Eagles on either end, which he pretends he has lost. I cannot express to you my satisfaction at the conduct of the Officers and Men, they really have proved themselves heroes, which indeed I understand have all the other Corps of this Division. We have taken innumerable Guns, I should think nearly the whole the Enemy had, and the whole of their Baggage. Some of my fellows have made fortunes, but much less than the old soldiers of other Corps. I passed some Hundred carriages, some beautiful, all laden with trunks &c. I hear, full of gold. I have purchased some plate and a magnificent sword.

I regret to tell you my loss was enormous, but

few when I reflect on the tremendous fire we were in for two hours and a half.

The bâton was presented by Wellington to the Prince Regent who sent him, in return, that of a Field-Marshal of the British Army.

The plunder of Vittoria had its usual sequel in the degeneration of discipline, which prevented the allies from using to the full the opportunities afforded by the complete rout of Joseph's army, and, while Wellington began the sieges of Pampeluna and San Sebastian, the Emperor sent Soult to reorganize the wreck of the armies in Spain. Only one army remained in the east of Spain, and the British force under Sir John Murray should have kept a check upon it and its commander, Suchet. Murray, however, embarked his men, and Wellington's movements were now threatened by the possibility of an advance by Suchet. He therefore undertook only the siege of San Sebastian which he could not leave in his rear, and blockaded Pampeluna. Gough and the 87th were in the latter portion of the army; on June 30 he writes from halfway between Pampeluna and Saragossa, engaged in an attempt to cut off General Clausel from France; the attempt was unsuccessful, and on July 16 he is again in the north, occupied with the blockade of Pampeluna. His regiment has behaved well, and he boasts that only two of the 87th have fallen out, while from fifty to a hundred of all other corps have dropped by the way. Soult had now taken command, and on the 24th he advanced to the relief of San Sebastian and

Pampeluna. The immediate result was the first check to the British arms since the retreat from Burgos. Soult succeeded in driving out the enemy from the passes of Maya and Roncesvalles, and Cole and Picton, who had been in command at Roncesvalles, retreated to Huarte. Gough does not describe this retreat in any extant letter, and, when he next writes, a week later, the situation had been retrieved by Wellington himself. Returning rapidly from San Sebastian, when he understood the danger arising from Soult's appearance, he surprised Picton's force by his sudden arrival, and possibly restrained Soult from making an immediate attack. In the two battles of Sorauren, fought on July 28 and 30, Soult was completely defeated, and driven back over the frontier into France. In these the 87th had no share of the fighting, but Gough's account of the action is interesting:—

Camp (one Mile above the Clouds): *August 2nd*, 1813.

We ascended yesterday from Roncesvalles (the celebrated) to our present exalted situation, which, though much nearer Heaven, partakes nothing of what we paint to ourselves are the pleasures and comforts experienced there. Except bilberries is the food of the Inhabitants, I know of no other they can possibly procure in this wretched region, and playing hide and go seek in the clouds—I know of no other possible pastime. In short, we are encamped on a heath on the summit of the Pyrenees, and in a thick mist, but for which we could see many leagues into France, from which we are about six or eight miles—our object to cover the pass of Roncesvalles, which we passed through in our ascent,

but which is commanded by this Mountain. From the pass, which is below the cloud, we had a most extended view of France, which appeared just under us, and was very inviting. The little Town of Roncesvalles, which is at the Spanish side of the Mountain, just under the pass, and is the most beautiful and romantic situate place you can paint to your imagination, I quite regretted leaving it. The Pyrenees are nearly wooded to their summit with very fine Beech, and are very grand indeed. This pass is that which Soult came lately through and which the Fourth Division abandoned, just as we came up to them; both Divisions then fell back to Huarte, the village we formerly were quartered in, close to Pampeluna, where Sir Thomas Picton took up a position, placing us, his own Division, on the right of the village; which he conceived the most assailable, the Fourth Division on the Left, supported by a Brigade of the 2nd and the Spaniards. The enemy pressed close after us, and we scarcely had got into position when their Columns made their appearance, but unfortunately (perhaps you will think otherways) for us, they attacked the Hills on which the Fourth Division were posted, leaving 7,000 Infantry and 2,500 Cavalry in front of us, so close that Colonel Duglas' guns frequently fired over them—a small rivulet only separated us. We every moment expected them, but that was not Soult's intention. . . . During the night, the Enemy moved Columns to his Right, for the purpose of turning our left, which he would have done but for the providential arrival of the 6th division at the very critical moment. These attacks were very formidable as to numbers, but as to spirit miserable. This day they again attacked the hill twice, and were twice repulsed at the point of the Bayonet. Conceive how interesting this was to us, who could see every part of it and close to us. It was quite a show. Early the

third morning, the Marquis came up to our hill. I was standing with Thos. Picton, who with Sir Stapleton Cotton, Generals Colville and Ponsonby, was with us the whole time. He appeared in the most wonderful good spirits, and shook Sir Thos. (who by the bye he has not been hitherto on good terms with) most heartily by the hand. It was this day supposed that Soult, finding himself foiled on the left, would have attacked the Right. We were therefore all prepared, but alas no such thing. . . . The night passing, at daylight we saw the Enemy in full retreat, but supposing it to be manœuvring we did not follow till 10 o'clock. Our Division then pushed forward, and we were in hopes we should have made up for lost time. He kept on the hills, and we were on the main road just below him, on his flank . . . we did not bring him into Action, altho' for two leagues we were within half a mile of his Columns. I will own I felt much disappointed as I think our Division might have done much more, had they either pushed in (as they latterly did) and got in the Enemy's Rear, or ascended the hill and attacked his flank. We however made him alter his point of Retreat. The whole business was grand to a degree and glorious. It is estimated that the Enemy's loss has been at least 15,000. He brought 45,000 into the country, and there are nine thousand still straggling amongst these Mountains. The fighting Division [1], or the 3rd consisted of 3 companies of the 60th, 5th, 45th, 74th, 83rd, 87th, 88th, and 94th Btns., 9th and 21st Portuguese. We were for the first time without fighting and all disappointed, except the 45th and 74th. . . . Lord Wellington is certainly a very great, but he is a very fortunate Man. He has now fully crippled the Enemy, who, between ourselves, had they not made some blunders, and had fought like men, would have

[1] The 'fighting Division' was the local nickname of the 3rd.

crippled him. The French peasantry are all in arms, and frightened at our being so near neighbours. Was it left with me, I would at once move into France. It is expected that the Garrison of Pampeluna finding Soult's failure, surrendered the day we left it. If they have not, they shortly must for want of Provisions. St. Sebastian must also very shortly follow. What they will do with us then God knows.

Soult's retreat into France cut off Suchet from any possible co-operation with the rest of the French army, and the arrival of Lord William Bentinck to replace Murray freed Wellington from any danger from the only French army left in Spain. The Maya Pass and the Pass of Roncesvalles were again held by the British forces, while the siege of San Sebastian was renewed with vigour. Gough was stationed in the Maya Pass, whence he writes on August 12:—

We have been in this Pass two days, together with the 6th Division (now under the command of General Colville). I thought the scenery of Roncesvalles grand, but this is infinitely superior. From our camp we see from twenty to thirty leagues into France, studded with Towns and Villages, with a most extensive view of the Bay of Biscay. . . . We look over on the French Camp, in which it appears they have very few men. It is said they have marched some heavy Columns to the Right (their Left). I own I do not think Soult will, from the loss of one action, give up a kingdom. I am persuaded he will again try to raise the siege of Pamplona, by pushing through the Maya Pass (to the right of Roncesvalles), shewing columns at the same time on our right to keep us here, while

Suchet threatens the Right, and perhaps joins him. To counterbalance this 50,000 Spaniards join us, 5,000 British from England, 2,000 Guards from Oporto, and about the same number of the slight cases from Vittoria and Pamplona. This will enable His Lordship again to set you English all agog . . . and I own I think the time fast approaches. But don't be uneasy, if I thought there was any chance of this Battalion being much employed, I should not have been so very communicative. . . . Tell Edward [1] he must not be frightened, that the French will not eat his Papa until he gets fatter, which there does not appear much chance of, in these mountains.

Eight days later, his estimate of Soult's intentions has changed. 'We are still,' he says, 'in the Maya Pass, the enemy in our front are very weak in numbers, but in position very favourable. They say they hourly expect to hear of a General Peace; under this conviction they do not even fire on some of our Light Troops, who have struggled into France to collect vegetables.'

Meanwhile, San Sebastian and Pamplona were still holding out; the former fell on August 31, and the latter exactly two months later. During this time, Soult remained on the defensive, holding the line from Ainhoue to the coast, while Suchet was detained by Bentinck in Catalonia. Gough's division continued to garrison the Maya Pass, and two months elapsed before he was again in action. The time passed quietly, with an occasional excursion into the mountains, a rumour that they were to be sent into Catalonia, and the excitement of the

[1] His son, cf. p. 118.

arrival of dispatches. These, indeed, can have brought little satisfaction to the 87th, whose services at Vittoria received scant recognition. Wellington had just made a rule not to name in dispatches regimental commanding officers, except those who had been killed, as he found that the opposite practice was productive of never-ending jealousies. It may be doubted if the decision was a wise one, and it must have been somewhat disheartening to the colonel of the 87th, for alike at Barrosa, at Tarifa, and even at Vittoria, circumstances had made Gough, for the time, his own commanding officer. He had now commanded a battalion longer than probably any other officer in the Peninsula; the only French bâton and the first French eagle captured in the war had fallen to the 87th, and Wellington himself had declared that their courage at Tarifa was greater than could reasonably be expected even of British soldiers. The disappointment of the dispatches was, however, amply atoned for a few weeks later, when Wellington himself gave to Gough a 'full and most gratifying explanation' and an invitation to memorialize, through the Commander-in-Chief, for a medal for Talavera. While Wellington was preparing for the attack upon Soult, and an action was imminent, Gough's thoughts were distracted by the news of the death of his little son, Edward [1], whom he had not seen since his birth, but

[1] The child had been born on December 9, 1810, during a second visit home paid by Colonel Gough in the course of that year.

of whom his home letters had been full. His letter of consolation to his wife was written on the 3rd of November; a week later his attention was once more diverted by the approach of another important action, his last, as it turned out, in the Peninsular War.

In the battle of the Nivelle (November 9, 1813), Gough and the 87th bore an honourable part. The French line of defence stretched across twelve miles, and the fighting on both sides took place in three divisions. On the British right Hill was opposed to d'Erlon, in the centre Beresford faced Clausel, and Hope commanded our left wing against Reille. In the morning, the British carried all three positions, and drove the French upon their second line of defence. The moral effect of this early repulse was very great, and Soult's army was further depressed by the news (unknown to the Allies) that Napoleon had suffered his great defeat at Leipsic. The British had entered on the struggle full of confidence, and Wellington's admirable strategy was carried out as he wished. By nightfall, the French position ('strong by nature,' says Gough, 'and made as strong as art can make it') was in the hands of the enemy. The 87th, under Colville, had been stationed on the right of the British centre, close to Zugaramundi, with the rest of the 3rd Division. The division was given a part in the heavy fighting which took place round the village of Sarre, in front of which the French had constructed two formidable redoubts, and later

in the day they were sent against the fortifications of Saint Pé. In one of these actions (it is not clear which) Gough was wounded. In a note written to his wife the same evening, he says:—

'Don't be frightened, my darling Frances, by seeing your old man's name in the list of wounded. I got a hard rap in the hip, but the bone is not touched. I however fear it will be some time before I will be well. However, I fully did, I trust, my duty—one comfort, I feel I did. I fear I lost most severely—three other officers wounded are in the room with me.' The 87th had fully maintained its reputation. 'The old Corps,' he says, 'behaved as usual. . . . Nothing could withstand the Prince's Own. Old Colville cried out, "Royal 87th, Glorious 87th," and well he might.'

Gough had been removed to hospital at Zugaramundi where he remained till the end of the year. His letters to his wife report gradual progress; by the beginning of December he is able to go about on crutches, on Christmas Day he entertains a party of wounded friends to celebrate the arrival of Colville's dispatch on the battle, one sentence of which runs:—'The Major-General is happy to communicate the latest information received from the Medical Officers in the rear, that the severe wound of Lt. Colonel Gough of the 87th, does not threaten more than the temporary loss of his very valuable services.' It was, of course, a great disappointment to be unable to take his part in the victory of the Nive and Saint Pierre, although it brought some

comfort that the 87th, not being engaged, had not entered the field under any other commander. His wound progressed slowly. A removal, on a bullock conveyance, to a new hospital at Restoria did not help his convalescence, and he saw none of the little fighting that remained for the Peninsular forces. Wellington remained in winter quarters till the middle of February; on the 27th, he won the battle of Orthes, and, a fortnight afterwards, Beresford entered Bordeaux. Soult made some further resistance, but the abdication of the Emperor Napoleon put an end to the long struggle. Gough writes his last Peninsular letter from hospital at Restoria, on February 28th—he hopes to be home in a month. Of the precise date of his arrival and of the long hoped for meeting there is no record. Among all the wanderings in many climes which lay before him in the future, there was not to be another visit to Spain. Long years afterwards, when he had attained almost the highest honours for which a British soldier may wish, he spent some months, in hale and vigorous old age, at Saint Jean de Luz. One day he disappeared, taking with him a small grandson [1]. His family and the little community, who took a pride in their distinguished visitor, became alarmed and were going out to search for him, when he appeared tired and hatless. 'If I have not been again in Spain,' he said, 'at all events,

[1] Now Colonel Hugh Grant, C.B., who commanded, from 1891 to 1895, the regiment in which his grandfather had served in the West Indies—the 78th or Seaforth Highlanders.

my hat is there, for it blew off at the top of the hill, as I looked down upon the soil of the Peninsula.' Nearly six years of strenuous work lay 'over the hills and far away,' in the treasure-house of memories which few living men could share with him. He had laid there the foundations of fame and fortune, and he had been the almost idolized leader of a gallant and devoted Battalion. His commanding officers, and the great Duke himself, had expressed the highest appreciation of the achievements of the 87th and their Colonel. 'I should be very ungrateful,' Wellington wrote to Sir John Doyle, in the summer of 1814, 'if I was not ready to apply for promotion for the gallant officers who have served under my command, and will forward Colonel Gough's Memorial.' Recollections of the Peninsula remained a permanent possession and had their influence upon his future career. He had seen the strategy of Wellington at Talavera; he had taken his share in the brilliant campaign of Vittoria, when the difficulties of a dangerous and delicate position vanished before the military genius of his Commander; he had witnessed the sudden and dramatic appearance of the Chief as the two armies faced each other on the Pyrenees, and he had borne his part in the almost faultless carrying out of the attack upon the extended front along the Nivelle. The lessons thus learned bore fruit in China, and in India, where Wellington's own early reputation had been won.

Rewards of a substantial kind were freely be-

stowed by a grateful country upon the soldiers of the Peninsula. In August, Gough was awarded a pension of £250 a year, increased in 1816 to £300. The medal for Talavera, for which Wellington had applied, was duly granted, and the Brevet-Rank of Lieutenant-Colonel was, on the Duke's representation, antedated to the date of his Talavera Dispatches. In 1815, the Prince Regent conferred upon him the honour of Knighthood, and he was permitted to adopt the following augmentation of his coat of arms—'In Chief, a representation of the Fortress of Tarifa, with the Cross of the Order of Charles III pendent; and as an additional crest, An Arm vested in the uniform of the 87th Regiment, supporting a Banner inscribed with the number of the Regiment, and grasping at the same time a French Eagle reversed, in commemoration of the one taken by that Corps at Barrosa.'

Colonel Gough's correspondence from the Peninsula throws considerable light upon the character of the writer. It is impossible to peruse these letters without being deeply impressed with the sincerity and earnestness of purpose of the soldier who penned them, with his devotion to his profession, his loyalty to those in authority over him, his regard for the happiness of those committed to his charge, and with the soldierly instinct which led his battalion to victory on so many well-fought fields. But the impression left is not only that of a gallant and humane soldier. Gough's deep religious spirit, his trust in an all-wise Providence which he

believed to have him in special protection, and his honourable and unswerving acceptance of all that he judged to be the direction of Providence, are features that marked his younger days in Spain not less than his later campaigns in India. His affection for the faith in which he had been nurtured and for the Church of which he was a member was unwavering. But, while he accepted loyally the principles of the Church of Ireland, he was unusually liberal in his attitude towards the religion of the majority of his fellow countrymen. His letters breathe a love for Ireland and an interest in her welfare, and he regarded the religious disabilities as a great menace to a proper understanding between the two countries. 'I wish to God,' he writes in June, 1812, 'the Prince had declared for Catholic Emancipation. This measure in the end he must give way to, and every hour injures his popularity.'

The letters show also the warmth of the writer's family affection. He had two brothers serving in the Peninsular Army—Captain George Gough of the 28th Regiment, and Major William Gough of the 68th, who distinguished himself at Salamanca, and to whom there are various references in his brother's letters. Of them, of his father, and of other members of his own family he often speaks, and his devoted affection to his wife and children is a frequent theme of these numerous letters. Such expressions of affection he would not himself have regarded as fit matter for the printed

page, and they have been omitted from the letters we have quoted. So powerful, however, were these emotions that his letters record a not infrequent conflict between them and the desire for military glory and the love of serving his country. Through a large part of his later life, the separation from his wife, which was the cause of this conflict, was avoided by the courage of Lady Gough, who accompanied him to India, and whose presence was, to a man of his temperament, a source of inspiration and strength. While in garrison at Tarifa and at Cadiz, he made plans for her arrival in Spain, but the nature of the operations in which the army was engaged prevented their execution, and he could receive only letters and such parcels of provisions as it was possible to send. To Cadiz and Tarifa there came from England a succession of hampers which relieved Colonel Gough from many of even the lesser privations of a state of siege, and as long as he was stationed there, there was a reasonable probability of such things reaching him. References to lump sugar and fish sauce read curiously in the circumstances of a beleaguered town and remind one how complete was the British command of the sea.

Throughout almost the whole of the War, Gough's health continued excellent, except for his attack of fever in June, 1809, and for some inconveniences resulting from the wound he received at Talavera. In January, 1813, in the course of his wanderings while the army was in winter quarters before the

campaign of Vittoria, he writes—'Do not, I pray you, entertain so erroneous an opinion as that my constitution is broken; 'tis true I am not as strong as I was, but there are very few in this army more capable of undergoing fatigue. When I tell you I never sit down from breakfast to dinner-hour, except to write a letter, you will see my health must be good. I have not had a cold this winter, although I have no fireplace in my room, and there is not a day that I am not wet in my feet, often all over.' This confidence in his own powers of physical endurance continued to be characteristic of him throughout the whole of his life, and it was fully justified by the event. In India, in China, and at home, during the long period of rest and retirement which he was destined to enjoy, his constitution remained sound and his frame vigorous, and this active and strenuous habit of body must receive due weight in any appreciation of his military career.

BOOK II

IRELAND

1. Public Life, 1814–1840
2. Home and Family



I

PUBLIC LIFE, 1814–40

It is one of the difficulties of the biographer of a soldier that the events which it is his duty to relate are crowded into a few years of what may be a long life. Five years in Spain, two in China, and five in India comprise that period of Sir Hugh Gough's nine decades of life in which alone he was enabled to give to his country the services which have rendered his name illustrious, and which entitle him to a place and a memorial among British soldiers. When he sailed for Cadiz, to serve under Wellington in the Peninsula, he was under thirty years of age; when he landed in China, to take command of the Expeditionary Force, he was over sixty. The years which intervened between the battle of the Nivelle in 1813 and the assault upon Canton in 1841 were not all spent in retirement. The work of Sir Hugh Gough during this period was worthy to be done and it was done worthily; nor can there be any doubt that it helped to train and to fit him for high and responsible duties in the days to come. But it passed away and left little or no record; even if record there were, it would claim but slight space in this book. The story we have to tell of Indian wars will prove sufficient theme for these pages.

One cannot write the life of a soldier in garrison, and we make no further apology for a rapid sketch of nearly thirty years, a mere connecting note to transfer our interests from West to East.

The 2nd Battalion of the 87th Regiment had continued to distinguish itself in the Peninsular War, even after Colonel Gough's wound had rendered him incapable of leading it into the field. It was engaged in several skirmishes with the French; it behaved with distinction, and it suffered heavily, in the action at Orthes on February 27, 1814; and it shared in the victory of Toulouse. On the abdication of Napoleon, the Peninsular army was broken up, and the battalion marched from Toulouse to Pouillac, and disembarked at Cork in the end of July. After a month spent in Ireland, it went into garrison at Plymouth, where it remained till December, 1814. The American War of 1812–14 was still in progress, and, for a month, the battalion guarded the prisoners at Dartmoor. In the end of the year, it was transferred to its old quarters at Guernsey, where its Colonel, Sir John Doyle, was Governor. It remained at Guernsey during the memorable year 1815, and had no share in the glories of Waterloo. On recovering from his wound[1], Sir Hugh Gough had again taken command, and, on May 25, 1815,

[1] The recovery was slow and tedious. On June 24, 1814, he writes: 'I am still on crutches, when I am able to leave my bed, which is not often the case, as my health, exclusive of the wound, has suffered severely.'

he was gazetted Lieutenant-Colonel, having held that brevet rank for six years.

After the European settlement which followed Napoleon's imprisonment in St. Helena, there was a natural desire to reduce the army establishment, the burden of which had pressed heavily on the nation during twenty years of warfare. Among the corps which it became necessary to sacrifice to the desire for economy, was the 2nd Battalion of the 87th. It had been removed from Guernsey in April, 1816, first to Portsmouth, and then to Colchester, and it was from Colchester Barracks, on January 24, 1817, that Colonel Gough issued his regimental orders on the disbandment of the corps.

'The *Prince's Own Irish*,' he said, after a recital of the deeds of the battalion, 'bled prodigally and nobly; they have sealed their duty to their King and country by the sacrifice of nearly two thousand of their comrades. . . . In parting with the remains of that corps, in which Sir Hugh Gough has served twenty-two years, at the head of which, and by whose valour and discipline, he has obtained those marks of distinction with which he has been honoured by his Royal Master, he cannot too emphatically express the most heartfelt acknowledgements and his deep regret. From all classes of his officers he has uniformly experienced the most cordial and ready support. Their conduct in the field, while it called for the entire approbation of their Commanding Officer, acquired for them the best stay to military enterprise and military renown, *the confidence of their men*, and led to the accomplishment of their wishes, the Approba-

tion of their Prince, the Honour of their Country, and the Character of their Corps. Every non-commissioned officer and man is equally entitled to the thanks of his Commanding Officer. To all he feels greatly indebted, and he begs to assure all, that their prosperity as individuals, or as a corps, will ever be the first wish of his heart, and to promote which he will consider no sacrifice or exertion too great.'

On February 1, the battalion was disbanded; 330 men were transferred to the 1st Battalion, which formed part of the Bengal army, so that the present regiment, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, is the lineal descendant of the second battalion as well as of the first, and its regimental colours still bear the words 'Barrosa' and 'Tarifa' in remembrance of its Peninsular exploits. Sir Hugh Gough's official connexion with the 87th came to an end in 1817, but, as we shall see, it was renewed later in life, and his memory lives in the traditions[1] and the legends of the regiment.

For more than two years, Sir Hugh remained on half-pay, but his services were too distinguished to permit of his continuing to be out of active employment, and on August 12, 1819, he was appointed to the command of the 22nd Regiment,

[1] It is recorded that a recruit, seeing the picture of Lord Gough, reproduced as the frontispiece of the second volume of the present work, asked who it was. 'That,' said a sergeant, 'is Lord Gough, and that is his fighting coat. After a battle, it was a perfect sight to see him shake the bullets out of that coat.'

which had just returned from Mauritius. On the same day he was gazetted full Colonel. The 22nd or Cheshire Regiment was of much more ancient date than the Prince's Own. It had been raised by the Duke of Norfolk after the Revolution of 1689, in order to defend the Protestant cause, and it had served in the battle of the Boyne, and at the siege of Limerick. In more recent days, it had been represented in the small force which accompanied Wolfe to the Heights of Abraham, in the skirmish on Bunker's Hill, and in the second capture of Cape Colony. During the Peninsular War it had been stationed in India. For two years after its return, the 22nd was in garrison at Northampton, with Sir Hugh Gough in command; but in the autumn of 1821, it was called to more active service, not by an outbreak of foreign war, but in view of the disturbed condition of Ireland.

The question of Catholic Emancipation seemed no nearer settlement in 1821 than it had been when Colonel Gough had written from the Peninsula deploring the Prince Regent's refusal to give way on the subject. It had been generally believed that the visit of George IV in August, 1821, would prove the occasion of granting the boon which had so long been craved[1], and the disappointment of this expecta-

[1] Cf. *Mr. Gregory's Letter-Box*, edited by Lady Gregory, (Smith, Elder, 1898), which contains some interesting information regarding the state of Ireland at this period. The Irish history of the time remains to be written, and it is difficult to find any satisfactory general account of the subject.

tion was followed by an outburst of agrarian crime, an outburst which owed its origin to a combination of causes, religious, social, and economic.

'The results of our rule in Ireland, during the fifteen years that followed the Union,' says Judge O'Connor Morris [1], 'had been, if we speak generally, these. A system of severe repression had been established, and, for the most part, affected Catholic Ireland; there had been a large growth of Orangeism favoured by the state, and stirring the passions of the Irish Protestants; divisions of religion and race had probably widened.' These were natural results of the rebellion of 1798, and of the identification of the Papacy with the French Empire, in the days when Napoleon menaced England. The end of the war might seem to inaugurate a happier era, but that event, in turn, was followed by economic troubles which opened fresh sores before the old ones had time to heal. During the long struggle with Napoleon, the food supply in this country had always been a matter of anxiety; fresh Irish land was thrown into cultivation, and the high prices which continued during the war sufficed to repay the labour of the peasantry. The population increased, and taxed to the utmost the resources of the good years. When peace came, and prices fell, it ceased to be profitable to cultivate large tracts of land; rents and wages shared in the universal decline of prosperity; and the results of this economic crisis were complicated by the added

[1] *History of Ireland*, p. 297.

misfortune of local famines, caused by the failure of the harvests in certain districts. It was natural that the agrarian troubles which followed should, in part, take the form of a resistance to tithes, which pressed heavily upon the peasantry.

With the political causes which led to the formation of the Catholic Association we are not here concerned; the main result of the discontent, as far as it affects our story, was the revival of the outrages of the 'Whiteboys.' During the Irish disturbances of the first years of the reign of George III a band of semi-organized rebels perpetrated a series of agrarian crimes as a protest against enclosures and against tithes[1]. They were called 'Whiteboys' because of the white linen frocks which they wore partly as a kind of disguise and partly as a badge. Robbery and arson, outrages on cattle, and occasionally murder, were their ordinary methods, but they sometimes raised what amounted to petty insurrections, in the course of which they traversed the country in disciplined bands, attacked gaols, and threatened villages. They issued notices warning men to comply with their demands, adopting a judicial language which gave to them some wild and rude appearance of legality. These manifestoes were published in the name of a fictitious leader, Captain Right, who professed to guide their actions.

The movement which Sir Hugh Gough had to

[1] Lecky's *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. ii. chap. 3.

face was a recrudescence of Whiteboyism. The disturbed district, the charge of which was entrusted to him, was Buttevant, in county Cork, which remained his head quarters from October, 1821, to October, 1824. Detachments of the 22nd were stationed at Mallow, Bantyre, Charleville, Newmarket, and Ballyclough. The Whiteboys of 1821 were less numerous than those of sixty years before, and they rarely attempted open insurrection, preferring secret outrage. Their reputed leader was now Captain or General Rock[1], in whose name their proclamations were issued. To illustrate the nature of the Whiteboy movement, it may be well to print an interesting specimen of the warnings they issued from time to time:

Mr. Haines, You are hereby Required to take Notice that the Catholick Potentates of Europe concur'd at the Consistory at Rome to Elect me as a Despotick to superintend Ireland, and to Distribute publick Justice with Impartiality to the Devided people thereof. The laws given down to me are Consistant thereof.

Therefore it is explicit to you or any person concerned that in the omission of so Important a duty that I should be accountable at the Temporal Tribunal of the aforesaid Monarchs and Secondly at that Awful Tribunal where the best Constructed fabrica-

[1] A history of this fictitious personage was published in 1824, entitled *The Memoirs of Captain Rock*. It is, in effect, a history of agrarian troubles in Ireland, from the reign of Henry II to that of George IV, but it throws little light upon our period. 'Captain Rock' was in reality, a generic name for Whiteboy leaders.

tions of Falsehood will be Developed, and truth only shall prevail. The aforesaid Consistoral Laws being formed at the Constory in Rome it is not abstruce to any human being tho inexpert he may be that Human and Divine Justice Requires a Condign punishment to be inflicted on any person or persons who would be so unfortunate as to Violate so Holy and prefound a systim. You remained obstinate in keeping the Farm you hold from Mr. Jephson situate at old Two Pot House. But However its a matter of indiference to me now Whether you Surrender it or not this year because my inclination is to settle such offences against the 25th day of July Next, I did not know at the same time that you had any more Strangers but the Connells, But my superintending Magistrates Whose duty it is to Indogate What tendancy the People may be devoted to thus informs me that your place is still a receptacle for Strangers and that you have a heardsman and a Dairy Woman still in two pot House who are Strangers Which I require you will discharge before the 25th Instant. But if you persist I will Comit all your Houses to my Unextinguishable Flames likewise I will Drench my Sword in the Blood and Slaughter of your Cattle. To make a short Conclusion I will Inflame the Frantick Jaws of Distruction to Champ your Person and Property. Therefore Comply and do not Regret your obstinancy when too late.

Yonder Green Senate House to the throne of State, Ireland. May 19th, 1823.

GENERAL ROCK, Governor and Defender of the Faith, &c., &c., &c., &c.

This notice was conveyed to the unfortunate Mr. Haynes in a manner sufficiently menacing. On the night of May 22, two of his cattle, in his farm near Two Pot House were hamstrung, and on the horns

of one of them was fastened this notice. Mr. Haynes, who was a prosperous farmer, was wise enough to send this threatening letter to Sir Hugh Gough, and it is pleasant to note that the list of outrages for July and August contains no mention of Two Pot House. But if, in this particular instance, 'forewarned was forearmed,' there was no lack of crimes of the nature indicated in 'General Rock's' letter. Statements as to a large number of these are preserved among Sir Hugh Gough's papers, but they are all of a type only too familiar in more recent days, and it would serve no useful purpose to repeat the unhappy tale.

For three years, the suppression of these outrages was Sir Hugh's task. The district committed to him covered a large portion of county Cork, north of the Black Water, and, as the state of the country became worse, other regiments, including, at different times the 57th and the 42nd Highlanders, were included in his command. The only incident which resembled an insurrection on a general scale took place in January, 1822, when a detachment of the 22nd Regiment, consisting of two officers and thirty men, defeated a gathering of rebels whose numbers were estimated at 3,000, and who were meditating an attack on Newmarket. The grateful inhabitants presented a silver cup to the officers, in recognition of their services. Sir Hugh Gough's papers of this period, which have been preserved, relate chiefly to the year 1823 and contain no allusion to this skirmish, with which he himself

had no personal connexion. The disorder reached its climax in 1823, when the burning of ricks and houses, and the hamstringing of cattle were very frequent. The number of instances of shooting at unpopular persons greatly increased, and one murder further stained the record of the year.

To deal with such a crisis special powers were required, and they were freely granted by the Government. The Insurrection Act placed the country practically under martial law; the Arms Act rendered the possession of arms a serious criminal offence and gave the authorities the right of search; and the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended[1]. A regular system of police had been established by the Peace Preservation Act in 1814, but Sir Hugh mainly depended upon military patrols. The disaffected area was divided into districts which were regularly patrolled, and the houses of all unpopular people and of those who had been warned by the Whiteboys were carefully watched. The results were not immediate, for it is always easy to take advantage of the weak points of such a system, and the terror to which the Whiteboys reduced the peasantry prevented their calling for aid or making any resistance when they were attacked, as it also

[1] It is interesting to note that, as recently as 1886, the appointment of Sir Hugh Gough to the disturbed districts of county Cork was quoted as a precedent in the House of Commons. The occasion was the selection of General Sir Redvers Buller to perform similar duties in the autumn of that year. Cf. the *Irish Times*, August 24, 1886.

rendered difficult the task of obtaining evidence against suspected persons. At first, the mills of law and order 'ground slowly,' but, as time went on, they 'ground exceeding small.' A considerable number of the criminals and at least two 'Captain Rocks' were captured and executed; the risk of detection and of punishment became greater, and, as the people gained confidence in the power of the Government, it became more easy to identify the perpetrators of outrages. By the month of October, 1824, the district was in a much more normal condition, and the 22nd Regiment was removed to the ease of garrison duty in Dublin.

The occasion of Sir Hugh's departure was marked by a public address expressive of the confidence which was reposed in him and acknowledging the good effects of his work. More than twelve months before, when a rumour of his approaching departure was circulated, the magistrates of the baronies of Duhallow, Fermoy, Orrery, Kilmore, and Clongibbon had sent him an address. 'We gratefully acknowledge,' they said, 'that chiefly through your Prudence, Zeal, Activity, and Example, have we been enabled hitherto to avert those evils which were impending over us. In you, Sir, we have seen combined the prudent foresight of the Commander, the upright spirit of the Magistrate, the humane Heart and courteous Demeanor of the Gentleman.' The mark of esteem now offered was wider and more representative. On October 16, 1824, a meeting of the noblemen, magistrates, and gentle-

men resident in Sir Hugh Gough's district, was held at Mallow, under the presidency of the Viscount Doneraile, and an address to Sir Hugh Gough, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the 22nd Regiment, was prepared. The language of the address is indicative of a depth of feeling natural at such a time:—

On your first appointment to the command of this District, you were placed in a situation, arduous and critical, a situation which required the most active and increasing energy, joined to the most cool and deliberate judgement, and never was the union of these rare and essential qualifications more fully and uniformly exemplified, than in your Conduct on every occasion, while every evil passion of a misguided and infatuated Population was let loose in the Land, while the murderer and incendiary were destroying the Lives and Properties of innocent, unsuspecting and defenceless Families, while social order and security were shaken to their very Foundation, your persevering activity and judicious Arrangements interposed a Barrier against Miscreant Outrage, and certainly diminished tho' it was impossible totally to prevent the commission of Crime.

Officers and men alike had won golden opinions in county Cork, and the good wishes of the people followed the regiment to Dublin. For two years longer it remained in Ireland, stationed at Dublin and afterwards at Galway, and during these two years Sir Hugh's connexion with it continued. His tenure of the command was further distinguished by the reintroduction of a system of regimental

orders of merit[1]. The practice of rewarding good conduct while the regiment was not on active service had been commenced in 1785, but during the long revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, it had fallen into abeyance. To Sir Hugh belongs the credit of again adopting it. A good conduct badge, representing the cak leaves which are still associated with the Cheshire regiment, was worked by Lady Gough at Northampton in 1820, and it continued to be used in the regiment until the establishment of a general system of good conduct medals throughout the army.

Sir Hugh Gough's command of the 22nd Regiment came to an end in August, 1826[2]. The regiment was broken up into six service and four dépôt companies. The service companies were sent to the West Indies, whither Sir Hugh, mainly for family reasons, did not wish to accompany them. In the *Army List* for Septefnber, 1826, his name appears as 'half-pay, unattached.' For eleven years he remained without active employment, and it seemed as if his military career were over. This

[1] The first example of good conduct badges was set by General Studholme Hodgson, Colonel of the 5th Regiment (Northumberland Fusiliers), in the year 1767. The Order of Merit instituted in the 22nd Foot in 1785 was a similar distinction. It is possible that General Hodgson was imitating the medal given by General Forbes for his expedition to the Ohio in 1758, though that was not strictly regimental.

[2] For information regarding the 22nd, cf. the volume devoted to its history in Cannon's *Historical Records of the British Army.*

enforced leisure, in the very prime of life, irked his restless spirit, and he made effort after effort to obtain some recognition of his claims. His hopes were raised when, on July 22, 1830, he was gazetted to the rank of Major-General, but he was doomed to disappointment, for nothing followed beyond a promotion in the Bath on the occasion of the coronation of William IV. Sir Thomas Picton had urged his claim to the distinction of K.C.B. in the beginning of January, 1815, as a reward for his services at the battle of the Pyrenees. The Order was at this time in process of reorganization, and on its being remodelled, Sir Hugh Gough was made a Companion, with the understanding that his claim to the second class would be favourably considered on his attaining the rank of a general officer. This promise was fulfilled in 1831, but the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hill (the Sir Rowland Hill of the Peninsula) remained deaf to all applications for employment. The most bitter disappointment of all occurred in August, 1834, when the Colonelcy of the 87th Regiment became vacant by the death of General Sir John Doyle. The hero of Tarifa and Barrosa naturally considered that his claims could be regarded as second to none, but Lord Hill selected for the appointment Major-General Sir Thomas Reynell. So crushing was the blow that Sir Hugh was with difficulty restrained from retiring from the service by selling his regimental commission. Fortune had been very kind to him up to the close of the Peninsular War, and

the long years of idleness which followed may have been his proper share of the evil chances of military life, but it was not easy to regard calmly this apparent close of a career which had opened so brilliantly. It has seldom happened to a man that his life work should be divided between his fourth and his seventh decade, and no one could have foreseen that the neglected General Officer of 1834 would live to be the conqueror of the Punjab.

The long period of inaction came unexpectedly at length to an end in the year 1837, when Sir Hugh Gough was invited to accept the command of the Mysore Division of the Madras army, with his head quarters at Bangalore. Lady Gough determined to accompany him to India, and, in the early autumn, they sailed in the *Minerva Castle*. An incident of the journey deserves to be recalled. On their way, the ship touched at Mauritius, where Sir Hugh's old regiment, the 87th, was stationed; and the enthusiasm of his reception impressed itself on the memories of all who witnessed the meeting. 'He received,' wrote a companion of his journey (unconnected in any way with him or his family), 'a most wonderful ovation from the officers and men of his old regiment, the fighting 87th. During the time the ship lay at the Mauritius, they were in a state of wild excitement. The whole regiment followed him down to the boat, waded into the water, and would even have followed it swimming if they had not been sternly ordered back. The headlands were lined with them, still cheering, and the last

we saw of the Mauritius was a bonfire with a number of their figures around it[1].' It was a grateful reminiscence of the past, and a prelude and inspiration to new service for Queen and country.

Sir Hugh landed at Madras in October, and at once proceeded to Bangalore, which continued to be his home for three years. A few letters of this period remain, but they are concerned with administrative details, and the writer's life differed in no respects from that of any other officer commanding a district in India. These three years of military life were a valuable experience after his civilian years, and they formed a useful preparation for a period of renewed service if the call should come. We shall find that call after call did come, and that to every call there was given a loyal and willing response.

[1] Letter from Captain Rutherford of the Bengal Artillery, written from Assam in 1838.

II

HOME AND FAMILY

When Colonel Gough returned from the Peninsula in 1814, his immediate family circle consisted of his wife and one child, his daughter Letitia, now six years old. The little son, who had been born in the course of the war, had died, it will be remembered, some months before his father's return, so that the household was again reduced to the number which Colonel Gough had left behind him in 1808. During the next few years, more children gathered round the family hearth; a son, George Stephens, born on January 18, 1816, took the place of the dead boy whom his father had just seen, and, ere long, three daughters, Gertrude (born October 21, 1817), Mona (born February 28, 1819), and Frances (born January 5, 1825), completed the circle, which was only once broken during the lifetime of the parents. Of the family life at Guernsey or Colchester, in Buttevant or Dublin, while the children were growing into boyhood and girlhood, there is no record. In undivided families there are no letters to remain as permanent memorials of domestic affection, of home joys and sorrows. The few traces that do exist are instinct with affection, and, in the subsequent lives of the members of the household, it is possible to discover the fruits of

a wise and loving training in childhood. To Sir Hugh, in later life, it was no slight satisfaction to see his children bound together not merely by a constant devotion to himself and Lady Gough, but also to one another, and by the closest and most intimate ties.

The wandering life which Sir Hugh had led since childhood had prevented him from attaching himself to any permanent home, and the absence of this was a grief to one of his temperament. His associations with his birthplace were now only of the past, for his father, Colonel George Gough, had left Woodsdown and was resident at Ardsallagh in county Tipperary. Shortly before the 22nd Regiment was sent to Jamaica, in 1826, Sir Hugh had purchased a lease of the property of Rathronan, near Clonmel, in the same county, and it continued to be his home until his departure for India. His reasons for declining to accompany his regiment were threefold. The climate of the West Indies had, during his former residence there, proved injurious to his health, and, now that so many were dependent upon him, he felt that his health was, more than ever, a matter of first importance. His new estate (the lease of which he had purchased for his own life and that of his son) had claims upon his attention, and, above all, he felt that his children were now at the stage when they most required a father's care, and he was unwilling to leave them for an indefinite period. Such were the reasons which convinced him that it was his

duty to risk his chances of professional advancement, by going upon half-pay, instead of retaining his connexion with the 22nd.

The duty which had guided his decision brought its own consolations to lighten the tedium which, for eleven years, it involved. He had a real affection for Rathronan; he had entered into negotiations for a lease of it, because it had caught the fancy of Lady Gough as they passed it in the course of a long drive. 'That is where I should like to live,' she had said, and subsequent experience confirmed this first impression. He enjoyed the opportunity of unrestrained and unlimited intercourse with those nearest and dearest to him, and he took a deep interest in local affairs. As a magistrate of the counties of Cork, Limerick, and Tipperary, he was unremitting in the performance of his duties, and, in some respects, he really continued the work that he had done at Buttevant. His first biographer[1] relates an anecdote of this period which, in the dearth of other material, may be worthy of record. A farmer, who had been attacked by moonlighters, and who had given up to them his gun while it was still loaded, applied for compensation. The magistrates hesitated to grant his request. Some of them took the high ground that he should not have yielded without firing his single charge, and others pointed out that to do so would almost

[1] A pamphlet of some sixty pages, by the Rev. Samuel O'Sullivan, was privately printed in 1890. It had been written, in Lord Gough's lifetime, for an Irish newspaper.

certainly have involved the murder of his family and himself. The dispute had lasted some time, when the hero of Tarifa put an end to all hesitation. 'Mr. Chairman,' he said, 'I beg pardon for interfering on an occasion like the present, when the regularly resident gentry are so much better able to form a correct judgement than I should be. But if I may presume to give an opinion, I would say that, if I were in that farmer's situation I would have done just what he did; and been, moreover, very much obliged to the midnight gentlemen for letting me off so easily, when such dreadful consequences might have resulted from refusing to comply with their demand. Nor do I think that the man who thus made discretion the better part of valour, would be one whit less brave than the bravest amongst us, on a proper occasion, when his courage could be turned to good account.' The incident is characteristic of the strong common sense which had rendered him so capable an administrator at Buttevant.

The years of Sir Hugh's sojourn in Ireland were marked by family sorrows as well as by family joys. Ere his return from the Peninsula, both his sisters had been married and one widowed, and his brothers were winning for themselves distinctions in the Church and in the Army. Before he left Ireland for India, in 1837, he had stood by many graves. The first break in his father's family occurred in the spring of 1822. His brother, Major William Gough, who had been for twenty-three

years an officer in the 68th Light Infantry and had served with distinction in the Peninsula (where he was engaged in the battles of Salamanca, Vittoria, and Nivelle), was drowned in the wreck of the *Albion* off Kinsale Head, on April 22, 1822. His regiment had, for some time, been stationed in Canada, whence he was returning in the ill-fated *Albion*. Sir Hugh was resident in county Cork at the time, and to him fell the last sad duties of identification and interment. Seven years later came a fresh grief in the death of his mother, and, in 1833, he lost his elder sister, Jane, the widow of Colonel Lloyd of the 84th. A year before Sir Hugh's appointment to Bangalore, his father died (March, 1836), full of years. His life had stretched from the reign of George II nearly to the end of that of William IV, and it had covered the most eventful period of the history of Modern Europe. He died at Rathronan, while on a visit to his son.

We shall have another opportunity of referring to the domestic life of Sir Hugh Gough, and, towards the close of our story our material of this kind becomes much more abundant. It is desirable that the already complicated narrative of his campaigns in China and in India should not be rendered more difficult by references to family events, and it may therefore be well to mention here the marriages of his children, although some of these fall outside the years with which this connecting chapter is intended to deal. Sir Hugh's four

daughters were all married within eight years. The eldest, Letitia, married, in 1836, Mr. Edward Supple, who afterwards adopted the name of Collis, and, in the following year, her sister, Gertrude, was united to Mr. Archibald Arbuthnot, of the great Madras house of that name, and a son of Sir William Arbuthnot, 1st baronet. Sir Hugh entertained for his son-in-law a deep and constant respect and affection, and Mr. Arbuthnot's residence in Madras did not involve a complete separation from Bangalore. The third daughter, Mona, was married, in 1840, to Lieutenant-Colonel Gregory Haines, of the East India Company's service, a son of General Gregory Haines, who had distinguished himself in the Commissariat of Wellington's Peninsular Army, and was afterwards Commissary-General of the Army. Colonel Haines accompanied Sir Hugh to China, but was forced to return owing to the effect of the climate upon his health. His brother Frederick acted as Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief in the two Punjab campaigns, served with great distinction in the Crimea, and finally became one of Sir Hugh's successors in the command of the Indian Army. He is now (1903), as Field-Marshal Sir Frederick Haines, the last survivor of the Staff of the Armies of the Sutlej and the Punjab.

The son-in-law who was brought into closest contact with Sir Hugh Gough was the husband of his youngest daughter, Frances, who was married, on September 17, 1844, to Major Patrick Grant,

afterwards Field-Marshal Sir Patrick Grant, Governor of Chelsea Hospital, and, like his father-in-law, Gold-Stick-in-Waiting on Queen Victoria. Major Grant was not acquainted with Sir Hugh Gough before the latter's appointment to the command of the Bengal Army. He had held office in the Adjutant-General's Department of the Bengal Army under Sir Hugh's predecessors, and his first meeting with him was in connexion with the Gwalior campaign, in which he acted on Sir Hugh's staff. He was immediately attracted by his Chief, and the good understanding was mutual. 'There is a real pleasure in working for him,' wrote the younger man at an early stage of their acquaintance, 'he is such a fine manly hearty old fellow, and so completely the thorough gentleman in all his proceedings and feelings. Nothing can exceed the kindness I have, from the very commencement of our intercourse, experienced at his hands.' Major Grant had the good fortune of conducting Lady Gough and her daughter from a position of some danger at Maharajpore (cf. p. 337), and in the following August he became engaged to Miss Frances Gough. After their marriage they continued to reside with Sir Hugh and Lady Gough until the Chief left India in the beginning of 1850, and from 1845 to 1851 Major Grant was Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army. In this capacity he rendered important services in both the Sikh Wars. His subsequent career was distinguished. In 1856 he became Commander-in-Chief at Madras,

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and held the office for five years, except for a short period during the Mutiny (between the death of General Anson and the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell) when he acted as Commander-in-Chief at Calcutta. From 1861 to 1867 he was resident at home, and constantly with his aged father-in-law. He was Governor of Malta from 1867 to 1872, and of Chelsea Hospital from 1874 to his death in 1895.

Sir Hugh had long been anxious to number among the rapidly increasing number of his grandchildren an heir in the direct male line, and he frequently urged upon his son the desirability of marriage. George Gough did not share his father's love of a military life; he accompanied Sir Hugh to China (cp. p. 290), but he saw no further active service, although he afterwards joined the Grenadier Guards and attained the rank of Captain. In October, 1840, he married Miss Sarah Palliser, daughter of Colonel Wray-Bury Palliser of Comragh, but this lady died of fever in Italy in August of the following year, leaving no issue. Her premature death was a great grief to her husband and his family, and it was after this sad event that he joined the staff in China. The grant of hereditary honours after the China War revived Sir Hugh's longing for an heir, and he was much gratified when, in the summer of 1846, his son married Miss Jane Arbuthnot (afterwards Jane, second Viscountess Gough), daughter of Mr. George Arbuthnot of Elderslie,

Surrey. We shall see that, before leaving India, Sir Hugh heard of the birth of the long wished for grandson.

We have wandered far from the date of the command at Bangalore, but, as these personages will all appear upon our scene before we next take up the tale of family life, it will prove convenient to the reader to introduce them at this stage. From these domestic details we now pass to the narrative of the military services on which rests our hero's title to remembrance.


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BOOK III

CHINA

1. Canton
2. Amoy
3. Chusan, Chinhai, and Ningpo
4. The Chinese and the War
5. The Yang-tse-kiang
6. The Treaty of Nanking

I

CANTON

THE call made by the Indian Government upon Sir Hugh Gough was the result of twelve months' experience of desultory warfare in China. Great Britain and the Celestial Empire had been on the verge of warfare since the beginning of 1839. The trouble arose from a series of commercial disputes, partly connected with the opium traffic, and partly arising out of Chinese demands which seemed outrageous to European eyes. Into the causes of the first China War we cannot here enter[1]; they are at once too intricate and too controversial to render a brief summary either fair or desirable; and the initial difficulties were in the distance, and almost forgotten, by the date of Sir Hugh Gough's arrival. The first action in the war was fought in November, 1839; two British frigates defeated a number of Chinese war-junks off Chuenpee. No further encounter took place till the summer of the following year, when an expedition, under Sir Gordon Bremer, appeared off the coast of China. It numbered fifteen men-of-war, with four armed steamers, and twenty-five transports carrying some 4,000 soldiers. It was hoped that this display of force might be sufficient

[1] The reader is referred to *The History of China*, by Mr. D. C. Boulger, for a lucid statement on this point.

to frighten the Chinese into submission, and Sir Gordon Bremer, leaving some ships at the mouth of the Canton river to protect the British inhabitants of Canton, proceeded to the island of Chusan, which he occupied in the beginning of July, 1840. The result was far from fulfilling the expectations of Lord Palmerston's Government. The Chinese, confident in their imperial traditions, despised the small number of the barbarians, and were but little impressed by the prestige of a nation which, after so long a delay, sent so slight a force. At home, it had even been hoped that a blockade of Canton and a naval demonstration would suffice on our part, and it was only after our demands were contemptuously refused by the Commissioner of the Chinese Emperor that a landing was effected.

This Commissioner, Lin Tsihseu, was one of the most notable Chinamen of the nineteenth century. Of his personal character, there is every reason to speak with respect and admiration; he was a man of considerable ability and of high moral tone; his reputation was unsullied, and his opposition to the opium trade sincere and disinterested. Had he lived at a time when China was more ready to accept Western ideas of commercial intercourse, he might have proved a wise and far-sighted statesman; as it was, his lot was cast among Chinamen 'who only China knew,' and he was fated to be the cause of the first serious humiliation which befel the Celestial Empire. When the efforts of the Peking Government to prohibit the importation of opium

had first brought about conflicts with the foreign merchants, Lin was sent (in January, 1839) to take charge of the negotiations, or, rather as it appeared to him, to convey to the barbarians the commands of the Emperor. His preconceived ideas of the relative position of China and foreign countries were confirmed by his experience of British diplomacy. The British Superintendent of Trade, Captain Elliot, was placed in an extremely delicate position; he was not strong enough to compel respect for his opinions, nor was he a match for the wily Lin. Hampered by the pressure of the merchants, strengthened by no definite instructions from the Home Government, and well aware that there was no British cruiser in Chinese waters, Captain Elliot had been worsted in the diplomatic duel. It was, therefore, not surprising that Sir Gordon Bremer's appearance off Canton produced only a Chinese proclamation offering rewards for the persons of the barbarians and for the capture of their ships.

The landing of the British troops on the island of Chusan met with a brave but hopeless resistance on the part of the people of Tinghai, but it failed to produce much effect upon the authorities of Peking. After the lapse of some weeks, Captain Elliot, who, with his relative, Admiral Elliot, had been appointed joint Plenipotentiaries, went with some ships to the Peiho, and the rest of the fleet commenced to blockade Canton, Amoy, and Ningpo. Lin was degraded and a minister of the Emperor, by name Keshen, was appointed to succeed him. Some hopes

of a peaceful settlement were raised, but these soon disappeared, and British subjects in China were irritated at the long period of inaction. Admiral Elliot was in bad health and had to go home, leaving Commodore Sir Gordon Bremer in command and Captain Elliot as sole Plenipotentiary. No serious attempt was made on the two forts which protected the entrance to Canton and, worst of all, the forces on the island of Chusan were, in the month of October, greatly reduced by the ravages of disease.

This (says an eye-witness) had long been foretold. It required no gifted soothsayer to prognosticate what the results would be, when men were placed in tents pitched on low paddy fields, surrounded by stagnant water, putrid and stinking from quantities of dead animal and vegetable matter. Under a sun hotter than that ever experienced in India, the men on duty were buckled up to the throat in their full dress coatees; and in consequence of there being so few camp followers, fatigue parties of Europeans were daily detailed to carry provisions and stores from the ships to the tents, and to perform all menial employments which, experience has long taught us, they cannot stand in a tropical climate[1].

Such was the situation when Lord Auckland addressed Sir Hugh Gough, on November 30, 1840.

[1] *Two Years in China*, by Surgeon McPherson, 1843. But the Court of Inquiry (cf. p. 163) came to the conclusion that even these wet paddy-grounds were preferable to the narrow streets and stagnant canals of the town of Tinghai, to which it is sometimes said the troops should have been transferred.

In offering him the command of the expedition, he pointed out how badly the war had been conducted, and urged upon him a series of operations along the coast of China, largely to punish ports that had been guilty of offences against international law. He hoped that Sir Hugh would ask for no fresh troops, for he could spare him only 700 recruits. Sir Hugh accepted the burden thus laid upon him, and at once prepared to quit his command at Bangalore and to sail for China. By the date of his arrival, on March 2, 1841, the situation had been altered in several important respects. In the beginning of the year, an attack had been made on the forts placed on the islands in the Bocca Tigris, the channel connecting the outer with the inner defences of the Canton river. The outer forts were captured on January 7, and this success led to a cessation of hostilities, brought about by the diplomacy of Keshen. It was agreed that a truce should be made, pending negotiations with the authorities at Peking. The British Plenipotentiary put forward four main demands—the cession of Hong-Kong to Her Majesty, an indemnity of six million dollars, direct official intercourse, and the re-opening of the trade at Canton. Keshen gained more than time by this arrangement, for the preliminary agreement involved the evacuation of Chusan. This provision was immediately carried into effect, and the remnants of the British forces sailed from Chusan, leaving behind them in alien graves about half of

the force which had landed in the preceding July. On February 26, 1841, the British took possession of Hong-Kong, one of the more northerly of the islands in the Canton estuary. The sole result of the truce was the transference of the garrison from Chusan to Hong-Kong, and, on February 25, operations recommenced with an attack on the inner forts[1]. The day before Sir Hugh's arrival saw the complete success of this attack, and when the new Commander-in-Chief landed at Hong-Kong on March 2, he found that only the last defences of Canton remained in possession of the Chinese. Sir Hugh placed his forces at the disposal of the naval commanders, and gave them his hearty co-operation in the concluding attacks which, between March 3 and March 18, resulted in the complete reduction of the Chinese defences. The story of these operations, which occupied the first three months of the year 1841, is foreign to our purpose. They were almost entirely naval in character; before

[1] A full and most interesting account of the naval operations at the mouth of the Canton river will be found in *Voyages and Services of the 'Nemesis' from 1840 to 1843*, by W. D. Bernard (pub. by Colburn, 1844). The *Nemesis* was the first iron steamer which was employed in the southern hemisphere; she had been specially constructed for the navigation of river canals, and her distinguished services, under Commander W. H. Hall, possess great importance in the early history of the first China war. The *United Service Journal* of May, 1840, contains a description of the construction of the vessel, the novelty of which aroused much public interest at the time.

Sir Hugh came, the military officer of highest rank at Canton was Major Peath, who served with considerable distinction, but who was in command of a very small detachment. It was not till Sir Hugh arrived that the Chusan garrison, under Major-General Burrell, actually reached the Canton river. The augmented land forces, under their new leader, were most useful in the final assaults, but the real work of the Expeditionary Force and of its Commander-in-Chief did not begin until the city of Canton lay at the mercy of the British fleet, which controlled the whole of the intricate channels which form the mouth of the river.

The first months of Sir Hugh's residence in China brought little but unpleasant controversy. Not only had he the difficult and delicate task of presiding over a Court of Inquiry[1] into the causes of the sickness at Chusan, but he was also involved in an anxious dispute with the Plenipotentiary, Captain Elliot. The Commander-in-Chief strongly urged

[1] The Court reported that the prevalence of sickness was owing to the climate and the season of the year, and to the military duties which proved too exhausting in such circumstances. They found that the food was, if not insufficient in quantity, unnutritious in quality, and most unsuited to invalids, and that the number of camp-followers was so small that an undue amount of work was performed by the soldiers. The proper remedy they held to be the re-embarkation of a large portion of the force, but this was not done owing to a difficulty about transports, over which the military authorities had no control. It is clear that the whole affair was a sad muddle.

an active policy. If the Chinese did not give way at once, he proposed to occupy the city of Canton; but operations on the coast he considered as merely preliminary to a more important movement. Feeling that assaults at so great a distance from the capital would inevitably fail to affect the Chinese Government, he proposed 'to proceed to Amoy, there in conjunction with the naval force destroy all the works, shipping, &c., and proceed to operations up the Yang-tse-kiang, which has always been my point[1].' The letter in which these words occur was written about a month after Sir Hugh's arrival, and it shows that he had mastered the conditions of warfare in China. Lord Auckland had recommended to him (cf. p. 161) only attacks on the shipping along

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to Mr. A. Arbuthnot, March 31, 1841. Mr. Boulger, in his *History of China*, says, referring to the campaign of 1842:—'The instructions from the new Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, produced a still greater effect so far as the final result was concerned. Lord Ellenborough has been charged with committing some acts of doubtful policy, and with overlooking the practical side in the affairs with which he had to deal; but it should be remembered to his credit, that he was the first to detect the futility of operations along the coast as a means of bringing the Chinese Government to reason, and to suggest that the great waterway of the Yang-tse-kiang, completely navigable for warships up to the immediate neighbourhood of Nankin, afforded conveniences for effecting the objects which the English Government wished to secure.' It will be seen from the sentences quoted in the text and from subsequent references (pp. 204, 256) that Sir Hugh Gough had resolved upon this movement nearly a year before Lord Ellenborough's appointment.

the coast; the credit of suggesting a more effective project has generally been given to Lord Ellenborough, but it is clear that the Commander-in-Chief had, from the first, made up his mind upon the question. Ultimately, he was permitted to carry out his intentions; but a long interval of wearisome and futile negotiation had yet to elapse.

The Treaty of Canton, negotiated in January, 1841, had been merely a private arrangement between Keshen and Captain Elliot. Although Chusan had been evacuated and Hong-Kong occupied in accordance with its provisions, it had not been ratified by the Emperor. Keshen had promised that Canton should be open to foreign trade on February 2; when he failed to fulfil this condition, Elliot, instead of taking strong measures, agreed to hold a second interview, at which the time for the ratification of the treaty was extended to February 20. A second failure was followed by the assault which lasted from February 25 to March 1, and which, as we have seen, resulted in the capture of the Bogue Forts. Next day, Elliot granted another truce; on its expiration, on March 6, another fortnight of hostilities followed, the decisive effect of which we have already described. Captain Elliot was even yet disposed to trust Chinese assurances and to hope for the ratification of his treaty, and, on March 20, he once more assented to a suspension of hostilities. Keshen, whose arrangement with Elliot, and whose candid confession of the inadequacy of Chinese defences and armaments, had alike brought down upon him

the severe displeasure of the Emperor, had been replaced by three Commissioners, Yang-Fang, Lung-Wan, and Yih-Shan. The first of these met Captain Elliot on March 20, and assented to re-opening the tea trade at Canton. This was, to some extent, a concession, but its effect upon the Chinese was lessened by their belief that the barbarians were reduced to starvation by the stoppage of the tea trade, on which they depended for their living. Moreover, the Chinese population were eager to dispose of their tea, and a temporary resumption of trade enabled them to do so, and gave the Government time for more elaborate preparations.

The measure of success which had attended his negotiations inspired Captain Elliot with the hope that further military operations might prove unnecessary. Gough himself never entertained any hope of an ultimate settlement without recourse to warfare, but he could only submit to the decision of the Plenipotentiary, and devote himself to making satisfactory arrangement for the establishment of an adequate garrison at Hong-Kong, the harbour of which impressed him as offering great possibilities for trade. At this juncture, came the news of the death of Sir Sanford Whittinghame, the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, as whose destined successor Sir Hugh Gough had been generally regarded. In informing him of the fact, Lord Auckland wrote :—

I fear I shall have done you a bad turn, by naming you to this appointment [China], for the

sudden death of Sir Sanford Whittinghame might otherwise have given you for a time an advantageous position at Madras, and if the anticipations of Captain Elliot should be true, there will be no demand for active service in China. It will be for you, with reference to a judgement formed on the spot, on experience and events, to decide on your future course. I must bear a grateful remembrance of the readiness with which you complied with my wishes, and shall much regret it if such alacrity should turn to your disadvantage. At the same time, I conceive that for the arrangement which may be necessary either for future service or for the settlement and protection of the island of Hong-Kong, your presence in the Canton river may be of much importance and benefit[1].

Sir Hugh's reply to this communication from the Governor-General is not less characteristic of his sense of public duty and of the paramount importance of the public interest than another letter, written at the conclusion of the China expedition, and afterwards read aloud by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons[2]. His actual reply is not preserved, but he thus describes it in a letter to his wife[3]:—

To all this fair address, I have merely said I trust His Lordship will do me the justice to believe I accepted his offer of this Command with better and other motives than that of pecuniary advantages; that while my services may be deemed useful they

[1] Quoted in a letter from Sir Hugh to Lady Gough, April 21, 1841.

[2] Cf. p. 287 and vol. ii. p. 111. [3] April 21, 1841.

shall be cheerful and zealously given; that although I must confess my present position is not that I could wish as a Military man, still I feel I may do some service.

The difficulty of co-operating with Captain Elliot involved more than a mere difference of opinion; the Plenipotentiary varied so much in his views that it was impossible to place any reliance on his expressed intentions. From the outset, Sir Hugh had grasped the weakness of Captain Elliot's character. He respected him as an amiable and honourable man, but, in his earliest letter to his son-in-law from China, he describes him as 'whimsical as a shuttle-cock,' a comparison which the Plenipotentiary did not fail to justify. The Chinese showed no signs of coming to terms, and the Emperor's Commissioners evinced great unwillingness to enter into negotiations at all; nor, with the fate of Keshen[1] before their eyes, is their attitude in any way surprising. In the end of March, Sir Hugh Gough succeeded in persuading Captain Elliot that a series of combined military and naval operations should be at once undertaken, and a statement of their joint views, signed by both, and by Sir Gordon Bremer, was sent forthwith to Lord Auckland. Amoy was selected as the first point of attack, and preparations were commenced: but

[1] His property was forfeited to the Crown, and he himself was condemned to death. After some months the sentence was, however, commuted, and he lived to win and lose again the Imperial favour.

excuses for delay were again discovered by Captain Elliot who once more began to entertain a hope of avoiding a recourse to arms. This fresh postponement of the movement was opposed by Sir Hugh, who never wavered in his distrust of the Chinese, but Captain Elliot declined to make the necessary preparations. A letter to Mr. Archibald Arbuthnot, dated April 24, indicates how Sir Hugh's active spirit fretted against the long inaction, which achieved no good result, delayed operations till the hot weather, and gave the enemy time to prepare for the conflict:—

Here we are at the island of Hong-Kong, in the most delicious state of uncertainty. Captain Elliot has never once come near us, although he promised to be down immediately after we arrived. As Governor, we really can do nothing without, and, between ourselves, I fear we shall do less with him. . . . Thank God, we have the Chinese to deal with; otherwise, defeat and disgrace must be the result. I do not know what kind of a place Ben Lomond is, but I take it is very like Hong-Kong, with the addition that the latter is surrounded by the sea. The Island is one succession of precipitous hills rising almost perpendicular from the sea; the height is not perhaps very great, say about from 12 to 15 hundred feet, but they are nearly perpendicular. I yesterday got to the summit, and I never was so gratified. The panoramic view of the Canton river, with its multiplied Islands and innumerable boats, was grand beyond description. From the summit, it would appear you could roll a stone to either side of the Island. . . . There are about four villages, all poor ones, and not 50 acres of cultivated land in the whole Island; the number of inhabitants

from one to two thousand. Twice that number have come since our arrival, not of the most celestial description. The defences for the Island would not require much, but to make the roadstead secure, it will be necessary to occupy a promontory on the mainland, without which the roadstead will not be tenable [1]. This possibly would be the best site for a Town, but it will require a large outlay to make it a secure post. The Chinese as a military nation, looking to them to repel an aggressive attack, are very contemptible, but they are neither wanting in courage nor bodily strength to make them despicable as a foe in a defensive system of warfare. In short, I conceive the Chinese at present a totally unmilitary nation, with capabilities of making a very formidable one. . . . You are aware the trade is open. Captain Elliot only thinks and dreams of this, as if its being so was the sole object of the frightful outlay of money expended and expending. When I look around me and see the number of transports lying idle, all receiving from 12 to 15 thousand rupees each a month, exclusive of eighteen ships of war, when I look at corps reduced from 900 to 400, which will have to be replenished at the expense of at least 1000 rupees each man, and when I feel that we are not one inch further in adjusting our differences with the Emperor, and are merely permitted to carry on a trade under less advantages to our merchants than we were two years back, I must naturally feel an anxiety for a change of men and measures. Whatever may be [the] cause for the war, having entered

[1] This view was strongly opposed by Captain Elliot, and, in the end, it was not adopted by the Government. But subsequent experience proved that Sir Hugh's contention was justified, and after the second Chinese War the promontory of Kowloon was ceded to the British Crown.

into it we must get out by different means from those hitherto used. In fact, the War Party has the upper hand in the Celestial Cabinet, and we must, as the Chinese term it, squeeze them out by proving to the Emperor, by an active continuous system of operations, our power to shake his Dynasty. In these southern Provinces, this might easily be done, but I doubt whether we are prepared to risk so much. I am now entirely engaged in preparing the force to proceed, holding Hong-Kong as a resource and as a depot and base for future operations, and the island of Wang Tung as an advance and check in the Canton river. The force, weak as it is, will have greatly to be separated. However I expect 700 men belonging to the regiments here. I expect another European and one Native Regiment; at least I have applied for and expressed my decided opinion as to the necessity of sending them, and I cannot think Lord Auckland will withhold them. With this force, I will be able to [do] anything, if I can only leave Elliot behind, or if I get a man who will think more of national honour than of present Trade. Had my advice been followed up, Canton would be now virtually in our possession, and I have no doubt would remain so. As it is, a few merchants have alone benefited, while the rest are all at war. Our mercantile world here is the reverse of an united body; they are all at loggerheads; they only agree in one thing, that is, in their abuse of Elliot, who, to do him justice, takes the matter very stoically. I apprehend our first movement will be Amoy, possibly the Yang-tse-kiang the next. God grant that we may be able to preserve the health of the men. Those who have been at Chusan are fearfully cut up. You can hardly picture to yourself the effects that climate has had on them, particularly the 26th, many of whom, without having actual

disease upon them, are so prostrated that I have strong doubt if they ever will rally.'

It may be readily admitted that Captain Elliot's position was no easy one, but his half-hearted measures are incapable of defence. The night after this letter was written, Captain Elliot made an unexpected appearance at Hong-Kong, and, at a conference held with Sir Hugh, on April 25, he again agreed to the proposals which he had adopted a month before, and a statement to this effect, signed by Elliot and Gough, was again dispatched to Lord Auckland. May 12 was appointed as the date when the expedition should sail for Amoy. But, a week later, the Plenipotentiary had again altered his views. The whole expedition was ready to sail when, on May 3, Sir Hugh Gough was summoned to Macao, along with Sir Le Fleming Senhouse, who was now in command of the naval forces, Sir Gordon Bremer having gone to Calcutta to confer with the Governor-General. Various influences, naval and mercantile, had been brought to bear upon Captain Elliot, and he now suggested that the uncertainty of our relations with the Chinese at Canton necessitated the retention of the military forces there, and that the expedition to Amoy should be purely naval. Sir Hugh saw no reason to alter the decision at which they had unanimously arrived in the end of March, and, again, on April 25; and he strenuously 'protested against any other than a combined military and naval attack on Amoy as

leading to no beneficial results, and paralyzing the moral effect' which could be expected from a combined movement. In this protest, he was supported by Sir Le Fleming Senhouse; the Plenipotentiary, for the time, gave way before these appeals, and assured Gough and Senhouse, that he laid small stress on Canton rumours and alarms and only wished to ascertain the real sentiments of his colleagues. But, almost immediately, the course of events at Canton led him once more to alter his decision, and the expedition to Amoy was indefinitely postponed.

Captain Elliot had continued to hope against hope that his scheme of conciliation might yet prove successful. But, towards the end of April and in the beginning of May, he was forced to admit that the Chinese had no intention of making any permanent arrangement. Reinforcements poured into Canton; new artillery began to arrive; the spirit of the people was raised by appeals from the Emperor for the utter extermination of the whole of the English barbarians. The danger of the situation was revealed to Captain Elliot by a visit which he paid to Canton on May 11. He immediately hastened to Hong-Kong, and at a conference with Sir Hugh Gough, and Sir Le Fleming Senhouse, held on May 13, he invited these officers to combine in an assault upon Canton, which was protected by forts situated upon some heights above the city. Almost immediately after his arrival, Sir Hugh had suggested the capture of these heights,

but he had grave doubts of the propriety of the measure at the late period which had been reached. 'Sickness,' he said, 'has greatly increased in our advanced squadron; Canton has lost half its population and will probably lose the greater part of those when it is known that we are actually going up the river, which will take some days; added to which it will necessarily suspend other operations in my mind much more likely to be effective at the present moment[1].'

Before another week had elapsed it became only too clear that, whether or not it would have been better to capture Canton in the end of March, an assault must, at all costs, be made upon it in the end of May. The Chinese had formed a plot for the extermination of the foreign merchants, who were taking advantage of the resumption of trade at Canton; they proposed to make a sudden attack which would leave the foreign factories at their mercy. On May 20 an official edict was promulgated, 'in order to calm the feelings of the merchants and to tranquillize commercial business,' which might be disturbed by the military preparations. 'It was to be feared,' said the Prefect, in this remarkable proclamation, 'that the merchants, seeing the gathering of the military hosts, would tremble with alarm, not knowing where these things would end, being frightened out of their wits, so as to abandon their goods and go secretly

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to Lord Auckland, May 14, 1841.

away.' They were, therefore, assured of the protection of the government and requested to remain in Canton, following their lawful pursuits. The issue of this edict, on the very day before the plot was to take effect, seems to indicate that the Chinese had decided to adopt a device not unknown in more recent times; the foreigners were to be attacked nominally by the population, while the authorities expressed ignorance and even disapprobation of the massacre. This impression of the intentions of the Government is confirmed by an unofficial proclamation, posted on the walls of Canton, threatening the foreigners with annihilation: 'We have solemnly sworn your destruction, even though we are stopped for the moment by the pacific intentions of our high officers.'

Fortunately, the Plenipotentiary was now thoroughly alarmed, and he replied to the Prefect's treacherous edict by issuing a notice to the merchants on the following day (May 21) in which he urged all foreigners to leave Canton before nightfall. This warning was obeyed, and, by the evening, the foreign factories were deserted both by the merchants and by a party of marines which had been stationed there to afford some protection. The forces under Sir Hugh Gough were gradually making their way up the river; but, on the night of the 21st, only a few vessels were close to the town of Canton. On these the Chinese opened an attack on the evening of May 21.

On board the British vessels every precaution

was observed, for it was generally expected that the night would not pass undisturbed. About eleven o'clock at night some dark objects were observed in the water by a sentry of the *Modeste*. These soon proved to be fire-rafts which the Chinese had constructed in the hope of setting fire to the British fleet; the discovery of their intentions forced the enemy to set fire to the rafts sooner than they had intended, and the author of *The Voyages of the Nemesis* mentions that, owing to this fortunate accident, their preconcerted plan was not carried out, and only ten or a dozen of their hundred rafts were actually ignited, and some of these drifted to the shore and set fire to the town. 'It was a grand spectacle,' he says, 'in the sullen darkness of the night, to see these floating masses of fire drifting about the river, and showing by their own reflected light, the panic-stricken parties of Chinese, who had charge of them, trying to escape towards the shore which few of them were destined to reach.' The Chinese themselves described the failure of this part of their scheme with naïve simplicity:—'Some of the boldest of our men were to hook on combustibles to the enemy's shipping, and thus spread destruction throughout. But this did not succeed, as their vessels opened such a fire that it was impossible to get near them[1].'

[1] Quoted in *China* by Sir J. Hart Davis, vol. i. p. 112. A similar attempt made on the night of May 23 was equally unsuccessful.

In two other respects the intentions of the Chinese proved futile. A battery, which (in defiance of the terms of the truce) had been erected above Canton, opened fire on the fleet, and was silenced by the guns of the squadron under Captain Herbert, of the *Calliope*; in the morning a party was landed to seize and destroy these fortifications. No sooner had this been accomplished than the never-failing *Nemesis* discovered the storage of the Chinese rafts and junks, and, within three hours, forty-three war-junks and thirty-two fire-rafts were destroyed[1]. All that the Chinese had gained was the pillage of the foreign factories, which were looted by the mob.

Combined operations, on a larger scale, could not now be delayed[2]. A suitable landing-place had been discovered during an attack on the Chinese shipping on the morning of May 22 or 23, and a reconnaissance was made at this point by Sir Hugh Gough and Sir Le Fleming Senhouse, on the 23rd[3]. Tsingpoo, the spot selected, is in a

[1] This summary of the events of May 21 and 22 is based on the official dispatch of Captain H. Le Fleming Senhouse and on Mr. Bernard's narrative in *The Voyages of the Nemesis*, which is by far the best authority for the naval history of the war.

[2] There is something pathetic in Captain Elliot's final appeal to the mob of Canton to turn out the Commissioners and the Imperial troops, and thus to obtain British protection for the city.

[3] Authorities differ as to whether the landing-place at Tsingpoo was discovered on the 22nd by the *Nemesis*, or by

creek or river about four miles to the west of the city of Canton. It runs up to the base of the hills under which the city rests and which command the whole defences of Canton. Tsingpoo, therefore, gave the British commanders the key of the situation. The city is covered by these hills along its whole northern side, and its north wall stood immediately under them. The eastern, western, and southern walls were surrounded by suburbs, which extended on the south and west almost to the water; the foreign factories were in the western suburbs. The town itself was divided into the old city and the new, by a wall running from east to west, parallel to the northern wall. The 'old city,' which was the northern part, was much larger than the 'new city,' and it contained the official residences and the arsenal. Outside the city, near the south-east corner of the wall, was a fort known as the French Folly and, further westwards, almost opposite the centre of the southern wall, a similar fort called the Dutch Folly. Both these forts commanded the arsenal, and within the city wall itself was a fortified spur of the range of northern hills. The city was at the mercy of any force which occupied this hill, but the hill itself was well within the range of the higher summits outside the wall. On these summits,

Commander Belcher in a slight action (of similar nature) on the morning of the 23rd. The latter is the statement in the official dispatches, but evidence on the other side is brought forward in *The Voyages of the Nemesis.*

the Chinese had constructed four strong forts, manned by forty-two guns; these were directly above the city, from which they were separated by a ravine outside the city wall.

The naval forces under Sir Le Fleming Senhouse numbered about 3,200 officers, seamen, and marines[1]; of these, a thousand could be placed at the disposal of Sir Hugh Gough, in addition to the land forces, which numbered some 2,200.

A paragraph from Sir Hugh's general orders dated on the morning of the 24th, may be quoted as evidence of the spirit in which he regarded the expedition, for, like most achievements of the British army, the first China War has been described by the candid friends of their country as barbarous and brutal in its methods:—

The Chinese system is not one to which the British soldier is accustomed, but if the Chinese have not bravery and discipline, they have cunning and artifice. They have had ample time to prepare, and we may be well assured that their system of stratagem will be called into full play on the present occasion. But though such a system may be effectual against a mob, it must fail before the steady advance of disciplined soldiers. The Major-General will only add that Britain has gained as much of fame by her mercy and forbearance, as by

[1] The ships were H.M. ships *Blenheim, Wellesley, Blonde, Sulphur, Hyacinth, Nimrod, Modeste, Pylades, Cruiser, Columbine, Algerine, Calliope, Conway, Herald,* and *Alligator;* the schooner *Starling,* and the steamers *Nemesis* and *Atalanta,* forming the Macao and Whampoa Divisions of the China Squadron.

the gallantry of her troops. An enemy in arms is always a legitimate foe, but the unarmed, or the supplicant for mercy, of whatever country or whatever colour, a true British soldier will always spare.

Sir Hugh Gough and Sir Le Fleming Senhouse had been desirous of celebrating the twenty-second anniversary of Queen Victoria's birth by the capture of Canton, but the difficulty of obtaining craft for the conveyance of the troops prevented them from doing more than landing on Chinese soil, to the sound of the guns which were firing a salute in honour of the Queen. At two o'clock on the afternoon of the 24th, the troops began to land, provided with cooked provisions for two days. Sir Hugh had divided his forces into a right and a left column, the former to attack and hold the foreign factories, and the latter to make the main assault on the heights above the city. The right column was under the command of Major Pratt, of H.M.'s 26th Regiment, and Sir Hugh in person commanded the left[1].

[1] Right column under Major Pratt: H.M.'s 26th Regiment (numbering 15 officers and 294 rank and file), an officer and 20 rank and file of the Madras Artillery, with one 6-pounder and one 5½-inch mortar, and 30 sappers with an officer of Engineers.

Left column under Major-General Sir Hugh Gough, commanding the Expeditionary Force: 1st Brigade, under Major-General Burrell; Royal Marines, under Captain Ellis; and 18th Royal Irish, under Lieut.-Colonel Adams. 2nd Brigade (naval), under Captain Bourchier, H.M.S. *Blonde*; 1st naval battalion (Captain Maitland), H.M.S. *Wellesley*; 2nd

Major Pratt and the right column found their task an easy one. They landed about five o'clock in the afternoon, and made their way to the factories, which they found deserted, except for some unfortunate Americans who had been rash enough to remain in Canton on the night of the 21st, and who, after being subjected to various indignities and hardships, were literally planted, in chairs, among the ruins of the British and Dutch factories[1]. Major Pratt then took the necessary steps to strengthen his post, and prepared to bivouac, ready for offensive or defensive action, as circumstances might require.

The left column was towed by the *Nemesis*, and, as the flotilla which followed the steamer was composed of about eighty boats, progress was necessarily slow for the five miles which separated the factories from the place of landing. Tea-cargo vessels, and ordinary fishing-boats had been pressed

naval battalion (Commander Barlow), H.M.S. *Nimrod*. 3rd Brigade (artillery), under Captain Knowles, R.A.: 2 officers and 33 men of the Royal Artillery under Lieut. Spencer; 10 officers and 231 men of the Madras Artillery under Capt. Anstruther; sappers and miners under Capt. Cotton. 4th Brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Morris, 49th Regiment: H.M.'s 49th Regiment under Major Stephens; 37th Madras Native Infantry under Capt. Duff; and one Company Bengal Volunteers under Capt. Ince. Ordnance: four 12-pounder howitzers, four 9-pounder and two 6-pounder field-guns, three 5½-inch mortars, 152 32-pounder rockets.

[1] Cf. *The Nemesis*, vol. ii. pp. 14–28.

into the service along with those which belonged to the ships of war; among the passengers in the *Nemesis* were Sir Hugh Gough, Sir Le Fleming Senhouse, and Captain Elliot. Darkness was falling as the steamer reached H.M.S. *Sulphur*, which had remained near the landing-place since Sir Hugh's reconnaissance of the day before. No opposition was offered; but every precaution was observed, for Sir Hugh had not anticipated that the enemy would throw away such an opportunity. He himself landed first, along with H.M.'s 49th Regiment, and he immediately made a reconnaissance to some distance. Only a few straggling Chinese could be descried, and Sir Hugh, after placing piquets, returned to cover the disembarkation of the artillery. Throughout the night, this operation proceeded, and early in the morning of May 25, the whole of the column was ready for the attack.

No reconnaissance on a large scale had been possible, nor could the British general obtain any exact information as to the nature of the ground, or the number of the enemy; but he had satisfied himself on the 23rd that an attack from this point was feasible, if carried out with spirit and discipline. The heights were distant from the landing-place about three and a half miles; the ground was undulating and broken up by rice-fields. The infantry advanced from position to position, and found themselves unopposed, until they came within range of the forts. Two of these were situated close to the north-west corner of the walls,

and the others were on higher ground some distance eastwards and near the centre of the northern wall, but at a greater distance from the city than those at the north-west. On coming within range, Sir Hugh placed his men under cover and awaited the arrival of the artillery, which could make but slow progress over such difficult ground.

By eight o'clock in the morning, the rocket battery and six heavy guns[1] had been brought up and a heavy fire was directed upon the two western forts. After the artillery had played for over an hour, the Chinese were observed to collect outside the forts[2], and Sir Hugh then gave the order to advance. He had already made a disposition of the troops in echelon of columns, and he now ordered the 4th Brigade (consisting of the 49th Regiment, supported by the 37th Madras Native Infantry), under Colonel Morris, to carry a hill on the left of the nearest of the two more eastern forts. This movement was directed in combination with an attack by the 1st Brigade (the 18th Royal Irish and the Royal Marines) under Major-General Burrell, upon a hill which flanked the approach to the fort on which the 49th Regiment were moving. Burrell's advance was intended not only to cover the attack of the 49th, but to cut off any possibility of communication between the two eastern forts. Simultaneously with this onslaught

[1] Two 5½-inch mortars, two 12-pounders, and two 9-pounders.

[2] Report of an eye-witness in the *Chinese Repository* for July, 1841.

Sir Hugh had ordered an attack by the naval brigade upon the two western towers. Just as this series of combined movements was about to commence, the Commander-in-Chief was informed that a body of the enemy was threatening his right, and he therefore detached the marines from Burrell's brigade, and sent them to protect the right flank and the rear.

At half-past nine o'clock Sir Hugh gave the order for a general advance. It was carried out under cover of the British artillery, but in the face of a heavy fire from the forts and from the city wall, and along a difficult road. The 49th had, perhaps, the easier task, and they advanced so rapidly that they outdistanced the 18th Royal Irish and captured the two eastern forts, while the naval brigade, which was exposed throughout its whole advance to a galling fire from the north-western rampart, carried the western forts. The Chinese behaved with considerable courage, and in attacking one of the two western forts, the seamen had to enter by means of scaling-ladders and cut down the enemy. Within half an hour all four forts were in the hands of the British forces.

But the day's work was only begun. From the city walls came a continuous shower of grape and matchlock upon the captured forts, and on the north-east of the city wall, upon rising ground, the Chinese had entrenched about 4,000 men in a strong camp, whence they had from time to time harassed the British left, which was stationed near

the eastern forts. About two o'clock in the afternoon, this force began to occupy a village on our left, and Sir Hugh sent the 49th to dislodge them. This object was effected forthwith, but, an hour later, the enemy again showed signs of activity at this point, and one of the Chinese generals was observed to be urging on his men to attack. Sir Hugh therefore decided that the enemy must be driven out of this position. The task was not an easy one, for the only approach to the encampment was across a narrow causeway, and the whole movement was exposed to a fire in the rear from the walls of the city. The European troops were selected for the operation; and both the 49th and the 18th Royal Irish were placed (along with one company of marines) under the command of Major-General Burrell. The severest losses of the day were incurred in crossing this causeway, but the troops pressed gallantly into the encampment, and drove out the enemy, the camp was destroyed and the magazines were blown up, while the Chinese fled in all directions. Two companies of the Royal Irish led the advance across the causeway, and gained the warm approval of Sir Hugh, who himself accompanied and witnessed the movement.

Sir Hugh (says Colonel Armine Mountain[1]) was always on the alert, always on foot, day and night, never thought of himself in anything; and during the approach to, and halt in front of, the

[1] *Memoirs of Colonel Mountain*, p. 185.

heights, though he was careful to post the men under cover, he was always exposed, eagerly reconnoitring the ground, for which he has a capital eye. The matchlock balls whizzed over and around him, cannon balls ploughed up the paddy fields within a few paces of him; he never seemed to notice them in the least and never once deviated from his erect posture.

After the destruction of the Chinese encampment nothing remained but the final assault on the city walls. Sir Hugh had been watching all day for the moment when he might commence this assault, but the last ascent to the forts was so rugged and steep that it had proved impossible to bring up, in the time, more than a few of the lightest pieces of ordnance, and he therefore decided to postpone operations till next morning, as he could not for a moment entertain the idea of making the assault 'without this necessary arm.' He occupied the rest of the day in a careful reconnaissance of the position, while his men rested, overcome with fatigue, and with the heat, which was almost intolerable. The result of his investigations was a decision to concentrate his attack upon the strong fortified height to which we have already referred as being within the city wall.

While the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by Sir Le Fleming Senhouse, was personally superintending the important operations on the heights, his instructions were being carried out in other portions of the neighbourhood of Canton. It will be remembered that two forts, on the southern side

of the town, commanded a large part of the area within the city walls. The military and the naval commanders of the expeditionary forces had arranged for the seizure of these French and Dutch 'Follies,' as they were called. The Dutch fort proved to be undefended, but the French was assaulted and captured on the morning of the 26th, when the whole of the river defences were in British hands. Before leaving the landing-place, Sir Hugh had been careful to place a rearguard (including detachments of his European regiments) to prevent the loss of our communications. The precaution was a wise one, for, on the afternoon of the 25th, while the British forces were engaged on the heights above the town, some Chinese troops were seen to leave Canton by the western gate and to make their way to the landing-place. Sir Hugh at once asked Sir Le Fleming Senhouse to dispatch orders to the vessels anchored near the spot to render assistance to the scanty rearguard. A sharp action followed, and the Chinese were driven back upon the town [1].

We return to the main body, encamped on the heights above Canton. At ten o'clock in the morning of the 26th, the Chinese floated a white flag from the city walls, and a message was received to the effect that the enemy desired peace. Sir Hugh refused to treat with any one except the General in command of the Chinese troops, but indicated that he would suspend hostilities for two hours to enable

[1] The authority for this incident is *Voyages of the Nemesis*, vol. ii. pp. 39–41.

the Chinese General to have an interview with himself and Sir Le Fleming Senhouse. 'I further explained,' he says, 'that Captain Elliot, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, was with the advanced squadron to the south of the city, and that if I did not receive a communication from him, or had not a satisfactory interview with the General, I should, at the termination of the two hours, order the white flag to be struck.' Tents were pitched halfway between the British camp and the city wall, and the Chinese promised that their general would make his appearance in an hour and a half [1].

[1] The Chinese Generals thus described the incident to the Emperor:—'Soldiers on duty at the embrasures reported that they had seen the foreigners beckoning with their hands towards the city as if they had something to communicate. We thereupon immediately ordered the brigadier Heung Suyshing to mount the city wall and look. He saw several barbarian eyes [i.e. chiefs or heads] pointing to heaven and earth, but could not make out what they said. He forthwith called a linguist to inquire what they wanted, when it appears they said that "they begged the great general to come out as they had some hardships to complain of to him." Upon this, the commanding officer, Twan Yungfuh, said to them in an angry tone: "How can the great general of the celestial dynasty come out to see such as you? He has come here by command of the great Emperor, and he knows nothing more about you than to fight with you." Upon this, the said barbarians took off their hats and made a bow; then they sent away the people who were about them, and casting their weapons on the ground, performed an obeisance towards the city wall.'—*Chinese Repository*, July, 1841, p. 403. This account places the incident on the 27th, but it clearly confuses the events of the two days (26th and 27th).

Sir Hugh waited considerably longer than the appointed time, but no general came, and no message arrived from Captain Elliot. He then ordered the white flag to be hauled down and proceeded to place his artillery in position. The Chinese left their white flag floating on the city wall, and made no attempt to interfere with Sir Hugh's arrangements for getting up guns and ammunition. Rain fell very heavily, and it was clear that hostilities could not be seriously resumed that night; but orders were given for commencing the final assault at an early hour on the morning of the 27th. The batteries were to open at seven o'clock, and, an hour later, four columns were to make simultaneous assaults.

The ground (says Sir Hugh's dispatch) was peculiarly favourable for these several attacks, and for the effective fire of the covering parties, without a chance of injuring the assailants. The heights which we occupied are from 90 to 250 paces from the city wall, with a precipitous glen intervening. On making a lodgment on the walls, each column was to communicate with and support that on its inner flank, and when united, to make a rush for the fortified hill within the walls, on which the artillery was directed to play from the moment the advance was sounded. I directed Captain Knowles to ascertain, as far as practicable, by the fire of heavy rockets and shells, whether it was mined, which alone I apprehended—the Chinese usually forming their mines so as to make them liable to explosion by such means.

It is needless to go into further detail on this

well-planned assault, for it was destined never to take place.

At six o'clock on the morning of May 27, the white flag was still visible on the walls of Canton. Sir Hugh was on the point of sending a messenger to indicate to the Chinese that he must decline to respect it, when a letter was brought to him by a naval officer, who had been wandering about all night trying to find the General. The Chinese, knowing that they could make no impression on Sir Hugh, had appealed to Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, who once more assented to their demands. Captain Elliot's letter ran as follows:—

To His Excellency Major-General Sir Hugh Gough, K.C.B., and Captain Sir H. Le Fleming Senhouse, K.C.B., etc.

H.M.S. *Hyacinth*, off Canton,
May 26th, 1841. 10 p.m.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to acquaint you that I am in communication with the officers of the Chinese Government, concerning the settlement of difficulties in their province, upon the following conditions:—

1st. The Imperial Commissioner, and all the troops, other than those of the province, to quit the city within six days, and remove to a distance exceeding sixty miles.

2nd. Six millions of dollars to be paid in one week for the use of the crown of England—one million payable before to-morrow at sunset.

3rd. British troops to remain in their actual positions till the whole sum be paid; no addi-

tional preparations on either side; but all British troops and ships of war to return without the Bocca Tigris[1] as soon as the whole be paid. Wang-tong[1] also to be evacuated, but not to be re-armed by the Chinese government, till all the difficulties are adjusted between the two governments.

4th. The loss occasioned by the burning of the Spanish brig, *Bilbaino*, and all losses occasioned by the destruction of the factories to be paid within one week.

For the purpose of completing the arrangement, I have to request that you will be pleased to suspend hostilities till noon.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

CHARLES ELLIOT,

Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary.

On receipt of this communication, Sir Hugh Gough and Sir Le Fleming Senhouse dispatched a strong protest to Captain Elliot, but they had no option save to acquiesce in his decision. When it is understood that the Chinese had 45,000 troops within the city, the terms may seem, at first sight, not unreasonable. But it must be recollected that Canton was absolutely at Sir Hugh's mercy, from the moment he had planted his artillery on the heights, and that it was impossible to trust the Chinese to remove their 45,000 men to a distance

[1] The Bocca Tigris, or Tiger's mouth (commonly called by sailors the Bogue), is, it will be remembered, the channel connecting the outer with the inner defences of the Canton river; Wantong is an island in the Bocca Tigris.

of sixty miles. Nor can the agreement be fairly said to have prevented the sack of a rich and ancient town; for Sir Hugh's contemplated attack was directed on the fortified hill within the walls, and he was confident that, with this in his possession, he could not only afford to spare Canton, but could undertake practically to prevent his men from entering the city proper, by concentrating them on this height. Still more reprehensible was the conduct of Captain Elliot in concluding such a treaty without consulting the commanding officers of the two services, and his utter disregard of military precautions in leaving a small force, with insufficient commissariat, and with a long line of communications, exposed to the attacks of a treacherous and undisciplined mob.

I feel it right to observe (remarked Sir Hugh in his reply to Captain Elliot) that, had Your Excellency done me the honour to consult with me as to the military arrangements you have entered into, I should strongly have opposed them as injudicious; placed now as we are, I am bound, therefore, and I do it with much regret, to enter my protest against the measure. I will only add, my arrangement was made, and the guns placed in position for the assault; and that within two hours from this moment the fortified height in the Town, and the Northern Gate would have been in my possession which would be a much more judicious and safe position, and which, if the authorities were sincere they could have no reason to object to.

In a private letter which covered this official communication, Sir Hugh remarked:—

You have placed us in a most critical situation. My men of all arms are dreadfully harassed, my communications with the rear continually threatened and escorts attacked. My men must suffer dreadfully from the necessity of continued watchfulness. For however you may put confidence in the Chinese, I do not, nor should I be justified in relaxing in the least.

Events proved that the caution of the Commander-in-Chief was more than justified. May 27 and 28 passed without disturbance, and with no further excitement than the conclusion of an agreement for the evacuation of Canton by the Imperial troops, Sir Hugh permitting them, at the request of Captain Elliot, to pass out by the north-east gate, carrying with them their arms and baggage. An encounter of some importance took place on the 29th. About noon on that day, Sir Hugh observed, about four miles on his rear, a number of irregular Chinese troops, which constantly increased, and showed symptoms of attacking the camp. He determined to disperse them and immediately made arrangements to divide his force into an attacking and a defending party, for he could not be certain that the assailants on the heights were not co-operating with their friends within the town. The charge of the camp was committed to Major-General Burrell, who was instructed to hold every man ready, in case a sortie, or other act of treachery, should be intended. The attacking force consisted of a wing of the 26th, or Cameronians (who had been stationed at the factories on the evening of

the 24th, and so had not taken part in the attack on the forts), three companies of the 49th, and the 37th Madras Native Infantry. To these Sir Hugh added a rearguard, consisting of the Bengal Volunteers and the Royal Marines, instructing them to act as reserve and to be ready to return and meet any advance from the town. The enemy in front, who numbered about 4,000 men, were posted behind an embankment along the bed of a stream; their position was carried by a charge of the Cameronians, supported by the Madras Native Infantry, who destroyed a military post and a magazine in their progress. In this assault, not a single man was lost. For about two hours, the British force watched the enemy, who had retreated to some heights, and who were continually increasing in numbers. Sir Hugh had fallen back somewhat upon his camp, and this movement seemed to give courage to the foe, who again advanced, numbering now between 7,000 and 8,000. Sir Hugh had ordered an artillery officer to bring up some rockets; these were now directed upon the Chinese, but with little effect, and as a very severe thunderstorm was about to break, another attack became necessary. Two charges were made at this stage; the Cameronians, under Major Pratt, dispersed a body on the left, and the 37th N. I., with the Bengal Volunteers [1], expelled

[1] The 49th, the Royal Marines, and the Bengal Volunteers had been sent back to the camp after the success of the first attack; the last-mentioned corps was brought back by the General's A.D.C., Colonel J. B. Gough, who had been so

a party of the enemy who had reoccupied the military post which had just been destroyed, and then cleared the heights in front. All these corps behaved with gallantry, and their movements were completely successful. The heat had been overwhelming; the Deputy Adjutant-General, Major Beecher, fell dead on the field before the second attack, and many others were affected by the merciless rays of the sun. The rain now descended with almost inconceivable fury, turning the wet paddy-fields into lakes, and rendering very insecure the men's footing on the heights. Still more disastrous was the effect of the water on the firelocks; at one point, the 26th could not fire a musket, and had to repel the enemy by means of hand-to-hand fighting. Finally, the enemy retreated, and Sir Hugh's small force retired to the camp.

The trials of the day were not yet over. In the course of the second attack, Captain Duff, who was in command of the 37th Madras N. I., had been forced to detach a company under Lieutenant Hadfield, in order to open communications with the Cameronians, who were on his left. When the order to retire was given, Sir Hugh understood Captain Duff to say that this company had rejoined. It had not done so, and the fact was not discovered until the forces had regained the camp. Captain

seriously affected by the sun that Sir Hugh sent him back. On hearing of the second Chinese advance he returned,

Duff was at once dispatched, with two companies of marines, armed with percussion locks, to the rescue of the lost sepoys. They were found bravely defending themselves from immense numbers of Chinese who had surrounded them. When they failed to rejoin their regiment, they had been attacked, and, in spite of the fact that the rain rendered their firelocks useless, had made their way to a mound which offered some possibilities of defence. A temporary cessation of the thunder-storm permitted them to pour a fire upon the enemy, who fell back, and allowed them to commence a retreat; but the pitiless rain soon fell again in torrents, and their rescuers found them formed in a square and surrounded by some thousands of Chinese. Two or three volleys from the percussion locks of the marines dispersed the enemy, and the little band returned home, having added new laurels to the glories of the Indian army. They had lost only one man killed and one officer and fourteen men wounded.

There was no further disturbance that night, and, early in the morning of the 30th, Sir Hugh sent a message to the city to the effect that, should any further outbreak occur, he would recommence hostilities. In the afternoon, a conference was held between Sir Hugh Gough, Captain Elliot, and the Chinese general. Just before it began, the hills which had been the scene of the skirmish of the day before, were again seen to be covered with Chinese, who were firing in all directions, and

throwing out advance parties. The conference met while the British forces were drawn up ready to repel an attack of the enemy. The Chinese authorities succeeded in convincing Sir Hugh that the hostile demonstrations on the hills were not part of any combination directed against him from the city, and that the Tartar troops who had been permitted to march out of Canton had taken no part in the fighting. They explained that the attacking parties were merely militia who had been protecting the villages in the neighbourhood of Canton, and they offered to send out a mandarin of rank to command them to disperse. An English officer, Captain Moore, of the 34th Bengal Native Infantry, who was acting as Deputy-Judge-Advocate-General, accompanied the mandarin, whose orders were obeyed by the crowd.

The moral of the incident was that Captain Elliot's error could only be rectified by the withdrawal of the British forces from Canton, as soon as the conditions of the agreement had been, to any reasonable extent, fulfilled. Within the town, they could have remained in safety; on the heights outside it, their position must be constantly insecure. The Chinese had now paid 5,000,000 dollars and had given security for the sixth million; over 17,000 of the Tartar troops had left Canton, and the rest of the 45,000 were prepared to follow. In these circumstances, Sir Hugh acceded to Captain Elliot's request for an immediate withdrawal, and on June 1 the British flag disappeared from the

heights above Canton [1], and the whole force embarked and reached their transports by nightfall. Thus ended the first military conflict between the British and the Chinese. The losses on the British side were not great. In the storming of the forts, on May 25, the total casualties were nine killed and sixty-eight wounded; in the skirmish of the 30th, five were killed and twenty-three wounded. The total in the two days' fighting was, therefore, 105 killed and wounded, or slightly over three per cent. of the whole forces engaged.

I shall be accused (wrote Sir Hugh to his wife [2]) of making too much of the affair, but those who really know the situation under which I have been placed will do justice to the devotedness of my gallant little band. It must be remembered I had to land in a country totally unknown, never before trodden by European foot, unconscious of what difficulties I might have to encounter, or the numbers I had to oppose. These were enough to make caution necessary. Look to facts—the difficulties of the country as to advance of troops, in any other [order] than that of file, the impossibility of a rapid move of artillery, an enemy 45,000 strong (or thirty men to one) of regulars, to oppose, besides a militia of equal amount, the former posted on fortified heights, impregnable to any but European soldiers, with a Town in their rear containing upwards of one million of inhabitants, who considered you as barbarians, strongly fortified, its walls being, at the point of attack, from 28 to 35

[1] The hill on which the army had bivouacked is now known by the name of Gough.

[2] June 6, 1841.

ASSAULT ON CANTON, MAY 25, 1841.


A Tsingpoo, point of landing and of disembarkation.
B Fortified hill within the walls.
C, D Forts stormed by Bourchier's Naval Brigade.
E Fort stormed by force under Colonel Morris.
F Fort stormed by force under Major-General Burrell.
G Encampment stormed by European troops under Burrell.
H Dutch Fort.
I French Fort.
K Causeway leading to encampment G.
X.X.X Gates of the city.
Scale of One Mile
CITY OF CANTON
Chinese Camp
Hospital
Tsim-ta
Hwi
Lyn

Darbishire & Stanford Ltd.
The Oxford Geogl Institute.

feet. These were obstacles which may not be well understood at home. These obstacles were to be, and were, overcome by about 1500 bayonets, unsupported and without the power of support—I might say of retreat, as the only two ships, the *Sulphur* and the *Nemesis* were both aground the first day. I mention not this to enhance this business, but I merely mention facts to prove that I am not, nor have I been, too lavish of praise. This and this alone I care for; personally, I am indifferent, but I own I shall be jealous of the lowering the exertions and the devotedness of my noble band. You know I am a little of an enthusiast. At Barossa, my motto was that spirit of Fitzjames[1], 'Come one, come all! this rock shall fly from its firm base as soon as I.' I have on the present occasion changed it into the address of one of our English kings in the old French Wars:—'We few, we happy few, we band of brothers[2].' I look upon every one of my fellows in that endearing light; I am jealous of their fame, and feel a deep and anxious interest in their professional characters, and I hope the feeling is reciprocal. . . . Let your anticipations join with mine in thankfulness, in deep unaltered gratitude to that Being who in my old age enables me to serve my country.

[1] *The Lady of the Lake*, Canto V.

[2] *Henry V*, Act iv. Sc. 3.

II

AMOY

NEARLY three months were to pass between the capture of the forts at Canton and the next operations in the war, three months which were, in many ways, a period of disappointment and disaster for the Expeditionary Force in China. Two events of these dreary weeks gave great personal satisfaction to Sir Hugh Gough. A letter received from Lord Auckland, on June 18, closed with this sentence:—'I may congratulate you upon having been named to the Chief Command at Madras, and I trust that you will not repine at being asked to continue in the conduct of your present most important command.' The chief command at Madras had never yet been entrusted to an officer of the rank of Major-General, and Sir Hugh was correspondingly grateful for the honour which the Government proposed to confer upon him. There were, of course, objections; apprehensions of the effects on Lady Gough's health of 'five years' more residence in such a furnace as Madras' tended to lessen his satisfaction with his approaching promotion. No such consideration interfered with his appreciation of another distinction, the announcement of which reached him about the same time—his appointment as Colonel-in-Chief of the 87th Regiment. 'My appointment to the

87th comes much more home to my feelings as a soldier and a man,' he wrote in reply to the congratulations of the Commander-in-Chief in India (Sir Jasper Nicolls), 'such unsolicited acknowledgements of Lord Hill's sentiments as to my exertions at the head of that dear old Corps in by-gone days, make me feel proud of my profession and of its head.'

The pleasure arising from such purely personal causes was greatly diminished by the condition of the forces in China. The exposure on the heights at Canton was followed by a serious outbreak of ague and dysentery; at one time, about eleven hundred men were on the sick list at Hong-Kong. The outbreak lasted through most of the month of June, and the navy suffered more severely than Sir Hugh's own forces. The most severe loss was that of Sir Le Fleming Senhouse, who died on board the *Blenheim* off Hong-Kong, on June 13. In announcing the event to Lord Auckland, Sir Hugh wrote:—

The loss of such a man must be deeply felt by every individual in this force, military as well as naval. For myself, I am unable adequately to express how much I lament it, both on public and on private grounds. Sir Le Fleming Senhouse accompanied me at the assault and capture of the heights and forts over Canton, remained with me three or four days greatly exposed to alternate sun and rain; on the morning of the fourth day he went back to the Fleet, and had actually reached the base of the heights on his way to rejoin me about

noon on the 1st June, when we met, and he returned with me on foot to the landingplace, under a most powerful sun. He further greatly exerted himself in the subsequent embarkation. His death is to be attributed to over-exertion.

The noble and unselfish nature of Sir Le Fleming Senhouse made a lasting impression upon Sir Hugh Gough, who never ceased to be grateful to him for the generous co-operation which he had extended at Canton, where his naval arrangements added largely to the success of Sir Hugh's plans. Although, in the absence of Sir Gordon Bremer, the credit of a purely naval expedition would have fallen to Sir Le Fleming himself, he had strongly opposed Captain Elliot's suggestion to this effect, and had supported Sir Hugh's protest. 'When his country's interests were concerned,' said Sir Hugh, 'no personal or professional feelings had influence with Sir Le Fleming Senhouse.' He was buried, not in the newly-acquired territory of Hong-Kong (which was meanwhile only in military occupation, as Captain Elliot's treaty had not been ratified), but on Portuguese soil at Macao.

Sir Gordon Bremer returned on June 18 as Joint-Plenipotentiary with Captain Elliot. This joint power they continued to hold for two months, but their tenure of office was distinguished only by a furious typhoon which burst over Hong-Kong towards the end of July, doing serious damage to the hospitals and other buildings which were in course of erection. The two Plenipotentiaries were wrecked

in Captain Elliot's cutter, the *Louisa*, and had several narrow escapes. This is their only claim to distinction, beyond that of reopening, about the beginning of August, trade with Canton. Otherwise, matters remained precisely as they were, and no step was taken towards a settlement of the disputes which had occasioned the war. The ransom of Canton gave the expedition, as Sir Hugh Gough complained, something of a buccaneering aspect, and the Emperor of China was informed that the indemnity represented private debts. The barbarians had begged 'the chief general that he would implore the great Emperor in their behalf, that he would have mercy upon them, and cause their debts to be repaid them, and graciously permit them to carry on their commerce, when they would immediately withdraw their ships from the Bocca Tigris, and never dare again to raise any disturbance.' It was further represented that the forts in the Canton river might now be restored in such a manner as to defy all attacks. 'Commerce is to these said foreigners the very artery of life . . . should they ever dare again to give rein to their outrageous conduct, we can in a moment stop their commerce —this then is a mode of governing them which is always in our own hands[1].' Views like these did not augur well for a speedy conclusion of peace.

Throughout these months, Sir Hugh never ceased to urge the wisdom of prosecuting the war:—

[1] *Chinese Repository*, July, 1841, p. 404.

The more I see of the Chinese (he told Lord Auckland[1]), the more I am impressed with the expediency of a continuous system of operations on a large scale. While going forward, our power is felt and respected; the moment we pause, the Chinese false representations and ingenuity come into play. I have before stated to your Lordship, and I beg to repeat the opinion, that the Chinese individually are by no means despicable, and that their militia, as I witnessed on the 30th and 31st May, showed as much boldness as any irregular troops I have ever seen. In short, my Lord, the longer we continue the war, the more formidable the Chinese will become. It is for this reason I regret our present inaction.

Sir Hugh also continued to hold that the proper course was an expedition up the Yang-tse-kiang, in opposition to a suggestion of the Governor-General that the Peiho river would be the scene of operations:—

The movement on the Peiho (he said[2]) is certainly very attractive, and in all probability would have the desired effect upon the Court of Peking, if the expedition arrived off the river at a seasonably early period of the year and after the Chinese had been made to feel, at two or three intermediate points, the pressure of the war; but I doubt, in the event of the Court refusing to redress us, the practicability of any continued movement of sufficient strength to approach Peking by the river. If I am rightly informed, the Peiho is capable of being made perfectly impassable, and there can be little doubt that the Chinese have not been idle. It

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to Lord Auckland, July 1, 1841.

[2] Ibid., cf. pp. 164, 256.

would be impossible to make any military demonstration on its marshes to aid a naval armament, and any delay in such a climate would entail dreadful sickness. This, I think, is self-evident, if the war be not ended this year, large re-inforcements will be absolutely necessary at the earliest possible period for the following campaign. I own I looked forward at one time to doing much this season; even late as we are, much still may be effected. The Yang-tse-kiang I have ever considered the most vulnerable point of the north. Whether or not a healthy location for the winter can be found on its banks, is of course uncertain; but it has ever struck me, once established there, the Court of Pekin must either by force or by concession get us out of that great source for provisioning the Capital, and of commercial intercourse with the interior.

The authorities were still trifling with the idea of a purely naval expedition, and Sir Hugh, in arranging for a campaign in the North, was much hampered both by delay in sending him troops, and by the arrival of raw recruits, many of whom scarcely knew how to bear arms. In these circumstances, he decided to form a provisional European battalion, composed of the recruits and invalids of all the corps, and to leave them to garrison Hong-Kong, the real defences of which depended upon the navy. H.M.'s 55th Regiment was now on its way from India, and on its arrival, he hoped to be able to take northwards a force of about 2,250 of all ranks (exclusive of artillery), leaving about half that number in garrison. There were also difficulties of commissariat and of medical attendance and hospital

requisites; in all these respects, the force was inadequately provided. Nor was the military equipment completely satisfactory.

I felt so much in want of rifles (Sir Hugh complained to Sir Jasper Nicolls), that I have substituted an expedient in the Queen's Corps, by selecting four marksmen per Division, most intelligent men and best shots. They fall in with the supernumerary rank, and skirmish under an officer as Rifles. Advancing on the Chinese in a mass is of no use. They require to be drawn on, and must appear to have a great superiority to receive our effective fire.

In spite of all difficulties, and of a renewed outbreak of sickness among the troops, Sir Hugh was ready to go northwards long before he was permitted to do so. The joint Plenipotentiaries were engaged in fresh negotiations with the Chinese, who fully appreciated the advantages of dealing with Captain Elliot. But the patience of the Home Government was at length exhausted; the evacuation of Chusan was strongly condemned, and on August 10, Sir Henry Pottinger, a distinguished officer of long experience in India, who had been Resident in Sindh, arrived at Macao as sole Plenipotentiary. He was accompanied by Rear-Admiral Sir William Parker, who now took charge of the naval operations. Captain Elliot and Sir Gordon Bremer almost immediately returned to England. With Sir William Parker, the Commander-in-Chief of the land forces acted in cordial co-operation throughout the war. Lord Auckland had thus

instructed the Admiral:—'You will determine the naval, and Sir Hugh Gough the military, means to be employed. The naval officer will take the lead, according to accustomed form, whilst the force is afloat, though in the government of all that concerns the troops, and their employment on shore, the military officer in command will be paramount[1].' This general rule proved sufficient guidance and there was rarely any difference of opinion between the two Commanders-in-Chief.

The effect of the arrival of Sir Henry Pottinger and Sir William Parker was seen, almost immediately, in the resumption of active operations. The Chinese showed no signs of willingness to come to terms, and Sir Henry Pottinger was not inclined to lay any special stress on the trading arrangements at Canton. He declined to receive the Prefect of the city, an incident which deeply impressed the Chinese, as he wished to impress them, with the fact that no local agreement at Canton was of any importance, and that the Imperial Government must be prepared to enter into negotiations for a permanent settlement as to the rights of British traders in China. Sir Henry immediately resolved to sanction the movement northwards, which Sir Hugh had so frequently urged, and August 21 was definitely fixed for the commencement of the long-deferred expedition to Amoy.

[1] Admiral Phillimore's *Life of Sir William Parker*, vol. ii. pp. 443–4.

The object of this expedition was simply to bring the scene of operations nearer Peking, and so to force the Government to come to terms. Light winds delayed the fleet, but, on August 25, it anchored off Amoy, and a proclamation was sent to the Admiral commanding the Chinese naval forces, asking him 'to deliver the town and all the fortifications of Amoy into the hands of the British, to be held for the present by them,' and assuring him of the safety of officers and troops, and of the town, should he comply with this demand. The white flag, which was to be the signal of compliance, did not appear on the defences, and the Commanders-in-Chief at once made arrangements for the commencement of hostilities. It was, of course, incredible that the Chinese would consider for a moment the suggestion of the Plenipotentiary, for, during the preceding year, large sums of money had been expended on the defences of Amoy, and they were now so strong that, after the capture of the town, it was generally believed that, had the batteries been 'manned by Europeans no force could have stood before them[1].'

On the morning of the 26th, a reconnaissance was made by Sir Hugh Gough, along with Sir William Parker and Sir Henry Pottinger. The town of Amoy is built on an island of the same name; the town and harbour lie in the south-west

[1] *Chinese Repository*, vol. x. p. 621 (November, 1841).

corner of the island. In the middle of the extensive harbour is the island of Kulangsu, which commands the town. It is separated from Amoy by a passage which practically forms another harbour, in which lie the vessels that frequent the place. The Chinese had carefully employed every possibility of defence. 'Every island,' says Sir Hugh's dispatch, 'every projecting headland, from whence guns could bear upon the harbour, was occupied and strongly armed.' Immediately in front of the outer town of Amoy stood a succession of batteries, and from these there extended a solid rampart, facing the sea, about a mile in length. It was, says an eye-witness, 'well built of granite, faced with earth, extending along the shore nearly up to the suburbs of the city, and designed to command the passage to the harbour. It presented a line of guns, a full mile in length, the embrasures being covered with large slabs of stone protected by earth heaped upon them, and mounting no less than ninety-six guns[1].' The end of this rampart was connected by a castellated wall with a range of rocky heights running parallel to the beach and the rampart, which was thus protected from a flanking attack. From underneath the embrasures the guns could be served without fear of retaliation. The entrance which was thus protected was only some six hundred yards in width, lying between Amoy and Kulangsu. On

[1] *The Nemesis*, vol. ii. p. 123.

this latter island there were several strong batteries, mounting altogether seventy-six guns, and some of these faced the long stone rampart on the opposite side of the strait, thus exposing the assailants to a cross fire.

The problem created by these defences was largely a naval one. Yet the event was to prove the futility of a purely naval action, such as had been seriously contemplated in the spring. Sir William Parker and Sir Hugh Gough agreed that a simultaneous attack must be made upon the fortifications of the two islands of Amoy and Kulangsu; that in each case a frontal attack was to be made by the navy, while the land forces made an attempt to carry the batteries in reverse. We shall follow, in the first place, the fortunes of the attack on Kulangsu.

Hostilities commenced at half-past one o'clock on August 26. Three frigates, the *Blonde* (44 guns), the *Druid* (44 guns), and the *Modeste* (18 guns), under the command of Captain Bourchier, had been entrusted with the assault upon the Kulangsu batteries, for, on that side of the channel, the water was very shallow; so shallow that the ships had to be carried almost into their own draught, in order to obtain an effective range. While a well directed naval cannonade was in progress, Sir Hugh's troops succeeded in landing in a small bay on the left of the easternmost battery. They consisted of three companies of the Cameronians, under Major Johnstone, accompanied by Major Ellis with 170

marines[1]. Immediately on landing, Major Ellis, with some of the Marines and Cameronians, attacked the batteries on the east; Major Johnstone, with the remainder of the force, which had been somewhat delayed, crossed the island and met Major Ellis's victorious band on the north side of the island, and helped him to clear out the works that had not been already abandoned, as Major Ellis made his way down the enemy's lines. By half-past three o'clock the island of Kulangsu was in the possession of the British forces.

The fortifications on the island of Amoy presented more formidable difficulties. The two line-of-battle ships, the *Wellesley* and the *Blenheim* (each 72 guns), were stationed at the extreme end of the great rampart, next to the town; the *Pylades* (18 guns), the *Cruiser* (16 guns), the *Columbine* (16 guns), and the *Algerine* (10 guns), continued the line of attack up to the outer entrance of the harbour. The spot selected for the landing of the troops was at the end of the castellated wall connecting the rampart with the fortified heights, and two ships were placed below this point, in order to protect the disembarkation from the fire of some flanking batteries which extended along the sea-coast beyond the rampart. The naval cannonade was not so successful as at Kulangsu; it helped to silence the separate batteries, but made little impression upon

[1] A company of artillery which had been detailed to assist Major Johnstone was placed on board the *Blonde*, whence it rendered considerable service.—*Nemesis*, vol. ii. p. 128.

the great rampart, which was, according to the evidence of the *Nemesis*[1], 'of such strength that the heavy firing of two line of battle ships against it, at the distance of only four hundred yards, had made very little impression; indeed, it might be said to be shot-proof.' This evidence is confirmed by the contemporary *Chinese Repository*[2] which says:—

For four hours did the ships pepper at them without a moment's cessation. The *Wellesley* and *Blenheim* each fired upwards of 12,000 rounds, to say nothing of the frigates, steamers, and small craft. Yet the works were as perfect when they left off as when they began, the utmost penetration of the shot being 16 inches. The cannonade was certainly a splendid sight. The stream of fire and smoke from the sides of the lines was terrific. It never for a moment appeared to slack. From 20 to 30 people were all that were killed by this enormous expenditure of dust and smoke.

The cannonade had commenced at 2 p.m.; it was an hour later (owing to difficulties of transport) before the 18th and 49th Regiments disembarked at the foot of the castellated wall; the 55th, which had just been sent from India, was further detained by a storm and could not be landed till next morning. The fighting, therefore, devolved upon the 18th and the 49th, along with some seamen and marines. The duty entrusted by Sir Hugh Gough to the 18th, was to escalade the castellated wall, while the 49th were directed to proceed some distance along the

[1] Vol. ii. p. 133. [2] November, 1841, p. 621.

beach and then to mount the rampart or penetrate through the embrasures. There was a gate in the wall which Sir Hugh was about to attack, when Captain Hall of the *Nemesis*, accompanied by a few seamen, made a rush on the wall itself. Colonel Mountain, who was in attendance on the Chief, now allowed two companies of the 18th (originally destined merely to cover the attack) to follow the seamen. 'I went on too,' he says[1], 'clambered over the wall with the help of a soldier whom I had helped up first, and, taking two men, ran down to the gate, unbarred it, and opened it for the troops, who were advancing.' The 49th were equally successful in making their way over the sea-face of the rampart, and both regiments swept down the lines, clearing out the Chinese in front of them. At the end of the rampart, near the outskirts of the city, they were joined by some marines whom Sir William Parker had landed in support. The outworks and batteries at both ends of the rampart, had been taken by the naval forces, and the 18th and 49th Regiments, with the marines, now formed up on the heights above the rampart. These heights commanded the outer town of Amoy, but the inner city was protected by another chain of steep rocky hills, running transversely to the beach, from the heights on which the forces at Sir Hugh's disposal were now concentrated. Sir Hugh had determined to force this position, which was held by the enemy, and

[1] Colonel Mountain's *Memoirs*, pp. 192–3.

had ordered the guns to be landed and brought near enough to support the advance of his columns. In this final attack, Sir Hugh again divided his men, instructing the 49th to enter the outer town and open a communication with the shipping, and then to proceed to the hills by the road which connected them with Amoy. The 18th were ordered to make a more direct attack through a precipitous gorge. The Chinese made only a slight resistance, and after some skirmishing, the troops bivouacked on the hills, with Amoy in their power. Next morning, amid the panic which prevailed among the inhabitants, there was no difficulty in obtaining an entrance into the town and the citadel for the British troops, probably the first Europeans to set foot in the inner city.

It was almost immediately decided to hold only the island of Kulangsu, and the combined forces remained at Amoy only long enough to destroy the defences of the town. Five hundred guns, of all kinds, had been captured in the course of the attack. Sir Hugh had lost nine men wounded, and Sir William Parker two men killed and six wounded. The Chinese had suffered severely; some of them committed suicide rather than face the shame of defeat. The death of one of these was reported to the Emperor in terms which described how he 'rushed on to drive back the assailants as they landed, and fell into the water and died.'

The town of Amoy suffered considerably after the assault, but no blame can be fairly assigned to the

British commanders. In his General Orders, issued before the attack, Sir Hugh Gough announced that any camp-follower found plundering would be immediately put to death, and that straggling from their corps would be severely punished. To the army generally he addressed this warning:—

> Sir Hugh Gough will only observe that, as Amoy is a principal commercial town, where there was once a British factory, it is an object of great national importance that no act should occur, that would preclude future friendly intercourse. The Government and the Military must be overcome, and public property of every description secured, under instructions that will be issued; but private property must be held inviolable; the laws of God and man prohibit private plunder; and the individual appropriation of the goods of others, which in England would be called robbery, deserves no better name in China.

In the General Orders issued on leaving Amoy, he was able to express his satisfaction 'in noticing the conduct of the troops on shore, amid temptations of no ordinary nature—shops on all sides abounding with liquor, and houses full of valuable property, abandoned in many cases by their owners, and already broken open by the populace. A few instances of misconduct alone called for the Major-General's disapprobation, and, for the most part, sobriety and regularity have been maintained.' The real causes of what almost amounted to the sack of the town were twofold—the presence of numberless Chinese robbers and irregular troops

who flocked into the town when it was deserted by the proper garrison, and who, when guards were placed at the front doors, broke in at the rear; and the unwillingness of Chinese owners of property to accept British protection, lest they should be accused of treachery and punished by the authorities after the town was abandoned by the conquerors. In a private letter to Lady Gough, the Major-General explains the real reasons of the disgraceful scenes which were witnessed. Some sentences may be quoted from it because the first China War has been so frequently condemned as a species of piracy, that it is important to show, from private, as well as from public sources, the attitude of the high-souled and pure-minded soldier who commanded the Forces, and whose own hands were clear of gain[1].

The sight about me now (he says, writing from the Citadel of Amoy on September 4) is heart-rending. Every house broken open and plundered, in most instances by the Chinese robbers, of whom there are 20,000 now in the Town, ready to sack it the moment we leave. I have had many conferences with the respectable Chinese merchants, urging them to aid me[2], for it is ten to one when I send out parties to protect property, I may be

[1] In numerous letters home, Sir Hugh describes the Chinese curiosities he has purchased, and the price paid for them. In one, he confesses to having plundered a disused pair of ladies' shoes, which he sent to show the size of their feet.

[2] Sir Hugh asked the merchants to appoint four men whom he might place at the gates, in order to distinguish householders from mere plunderers, and this they declined to do.

preventing them from taking away their own. The moment a house is broken open, what between Chinese, soldiers or followers, every article is destroyed. The wanton waste of valuable property is heart-rending, and has quite sickened me of war. I have punished to a great extent, both soldiers, followers, and Chinese; some of the latter three or four times. . . . For the first two days, the soldiers were well in hand, but when they found we were to give up the place, and saw the crowds of miscreants ready to plunder every house the moment we turned our backs, it has been most difficult to restrain them.

From Amoy, the expedition proceeded northwards to attack either Ningpo or Chusan, unless some communication was received from Peking. The capture of Amoy made, at first, but small impression on the Emperor, for it was represented to him as a Chinese victory. His generals admitted the seizure of the defences by the British; but the governor explained that he had 'sunk one of their steamers and five ships of war by our terrible fire, but the barbarians returned it, and the south wind blew the smoke into our soldiers' eyes, and Amoy was thus lost.' Another account represented the successful assault upon the Imperial forces as having been made, not by the barbarians, but by Chinese traitors [1]. But the acknowledgement of the capture served only as a text for a recital of the glories of the recapture. The fact of the presence of a British garrison on Kulangsu was suppressed, and the Emperor was informed how his troops, aided by

[1] Davis's *China*, vol. i. pp. 159, 160.

supernatural assistance, had destroyed eighteen of the barbarian vessels, captured seven of their chiefs, and slain upwards of 700 white devils, and more than 900 black devils. It was clear that some more convincing proof of European superiority must yet be given ere the Son of Heaven could be made to understand the real situation in which his Empire was placed.


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III

CHUSAN, CHINHAI, AND NINGPO

The Expeditionary Force set sail from Amoy on September 5, leaving a small force on Kulangsu, supported by the *Druid*, the *Pylades*, and the *Algerine*, which remained in the harbour. The original intention was to proceed at once to the capture of Chinhai and Ningpo, and afterwards to retake the island of Chusan. But the fleet was unfortunate in meeting a series of severe storms, which dispersed the vessels, and it was not till the 25th [1] September that the whole squadron was reunited. It was still unsafe to approach Chinhai, and the General, the Admiral, and Sir Henry Pottinger utilized the period of delay to make a reconnaissance of the island of Chusan and its capital, Tinghai. The fall of Chusan in the previous year had been a great blow to the Chinese, and its abandonment had appeared to them as a great victory for the Dragon Throne. They had, accordingly, taken elaborate precautions to prevent its falling, a second time, into the hands of the barbarians, and the reconnaissance had shown that the new defences, now unfinished, would, after the lapse of a very brief interval, be more capable of

[1] During this interval the *Phlegethon* inflicted a severe punishment upon a Chinese village in which two British subjects had recently been murdered.

resistance. It was therefore decided, on the suggestion of the Admiral, to make an immediate attack upon Chusan.

The town of Tinghai is situated in the south-west of the island of Chusan. It was a walled town, about two miles in circumference, and distant about a mile from the shore, from which it was separated by swampy paddy-fields or rice-grounds. Along the whole face of the harbour ran a raised bank, which protected the town from frequent inundations, and on this bank the Chinese had been constructing a battery since the evacuation of the island by the British forces. This battery was but a miserable imitation of the great sea wall at Amoy, for it 'had been hastily and unscientifically constructed, and consisted principally of heaps of mud, of a conical shape, raised upon the embankment, with embrasures between them for the guns. These intervals were so large, measuring generally from ten to fifteen feet wide, that it would be impossible for the men to stand to their guns. . . . There were altogether nearly 270 embrasures, but only about 80 guns mounted[1]. Towards the east end of this fortified wall was the landing place of the town, connected with the southern gate by a narrow causeway and a canal. Close to the landing place rose a steep hill which had been named by the British garrison Pagoda Hill. The erection of defences upon this hill had been commenced during

[1] *The Nemesis*, vol. ii. p. 191.

our occupation, and the Chinese were now engaged in completing the works their enemies had begun. Opposite Pagoda Hill were two small islands, one of which, Trumball Island, proved most useful as a site of a battery for shelling Pagoda Hill.

On the western side, the valley in which the city lies is enclosed by steep hills which approach the walls of the town, and commanding the flank of the battery wall in which the Chinese placed such confidence. These heights were known as the Forty-Nine Hills. Upon these hills, at the western end of the battery wall, the Chinese had fortified a camp and were in process of erecting two stone forts. It was this point which Sir Hugh Gough selected for landing his troops, and the knowledge that these two forts were as yet unarmed decided him in favour of an immediate attack.

Hostilities commenced on the 29th, when the *Nemesis* poured a heavy fire upon the fortified camp at the western end of the sea wall and destroyed the temporary buildings which the Chinese had prepared. A small party landed and reconnoitred, but a general assault was forbidden by the two chiefs. On the same afternoon, a battery was thrown up on Trumball Island by a detachment of the Artillery, and was completed on the 30th in anticipation of an attack on October 1. The scheme which Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William Parker had adopted was that the ships should protect the disembarkation of the troops at the western end of the sea wall, and that the batteries should then be

taken in flank or from the rear. The advance, composed of the Madras Artillery, with eight guns, the Sappers, H.M.'s 18th and 55th Regiments, and the rifle company of the Madras Native Volunteers, were duly landed, accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief himself. The *Wellesley*, the *Cruiser*, and the *Columbine* were stationed close to the shore and soon obtained the precise range of the Chinese, whom they prevented from any attempt to interfere with the disembarkation. When the men had landed, the enemy found opportunities of pouring in upon them a fire from matchlocks and gingalls [1], and Sir Hugh therefore ordered three companies of the 55th to advance, while the remainder of the force, as they landed, were to move up in support. The heights on which the enemy were posted were steep and rugged, and the Chinese behaved with much greater courage than at Amoy. They challenged the assailants to come on, subjected them to a rapid fire, and finally met them with sword and spear. The column, under Lt.-Colonel Craigie, overcame the opposition, and carried the whole range of heights and the encampment, taking, for the first time in the war, a stand of Chinese colours.

It was now comparatively easy to deal with the long line of batteries extending along the coast. H.M.'s 18th Regiment and the Artillery had mean-

[1] These long heavy guns were constantly employed by the Chinese.

while been landed, and, while the light guns enfiladed the position, Sir Hugh ordered the 18th to push forward. Their advance was contested with great courage by the Chinese general and a number of soldiers, who met the bayonet with the sword. But they soon fell before the onslaught of the 18th, who followed them down the narrow line of wall, inflicting considerable loss, and finally occupied the Pagoda Hill at the west end. They found it empty, for the fire of the battery on Trumball's Island, and of the ships, had forced the Chinese to evacuate it. While this operation was in progress, Sir Hugh had directed two companies of the 55th to support the 18th and these had been placed by Colonel Mountain outside the south gate of the city, at once preventing any resistance from the town, and intercepting the enemy who were flying from the batteries, should they attempt to enter Tinghai. They were joined at the south gate by the 49th regiment, which had just landed.

The outer defences had now been entirely abandoned, and it remained to effect an entry into the town. Captain Anstruther, of the Madras Artillery (who had himself experienced an imprisonment at the hands of the Chinese), had succeeded in bringing the light field-guns to the hills on the north-west, which commanded the town. He established a rocket-battery there, and opened fire. The Chinese had by this time lost hope and courage, and they began to escape by the north and east gates. Meanwhile, Sir Hugh had accompanied an escalading

party to these heights; the Madras Sappers had brought scaling-ladders. 'I had soon,' says Sir Hugh Gough's dispatch, 'the satisfaction of seeing the colours of the 55th regiment waving on the walls of Tinghai, while those of the Royal Irish were planted on the Pagoda Hill.' A hundred iron guns, thirty-six brass guns, and 540 gingalls fell into the hands of the victors, whose total loss amounted to two men killed and twenty-seven wounded.

No such scenes were witnessed after the capture of Tinghai as had distressed Sir Hugh's generous spirit at Amoy. The natives were familiar with the presence of British soldiers and they remained within the town and accepted British protection. Sir Henry Pottinger issued a proclamation to the effect that Chusan would be retained by the conquerors until their demands 'were not only acceded to, but carried into full effect[1].' The loss of the island was deeply lamented by the Emperor, but he was informed that a thousand of the barbarians had been killed and their shipping destroyed, and that all due measures were being taken for the protection of Chinhai, which was the next point of attack.

The island of Chusan was of little or no value for trading purposes, and its recapture was important because of its situation near the mouth of the Yang-tse-kiang, and also in view of the moral effect

[1] The author of *The Nemesis* mentions that our control of the island never really amounted to more than the possession of Tinghai and its suburbs.

CAPTURE OF TINGHAI.



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which its evacuation had brought about. Still more valuable would be the impression caused by the capture of Chinhai and Ningpo, and the consequent interference with trade. It was therefore decided immediately to attack Chinhai, a seaport at the mouth of the Ningpo river, and twelve miles from the large and wealthy city of Ningpo.

The capture of Chinhai affords a slight variation upon the kind of operation which is, we fear, becoming somewhat tedious to the reader. The town of Chinhai is situated on the left bank of the Ningpo river. At its south-west corner, and separated from the city wall only by a narrow gorge, rises one of the precipitous rocks which have occupied so large a space in our narrative. The rock, as usual, was crowned by a large and very strong fort or joss-house, which commanded both the city and the entrance into the Ningpo river. From this point the Chinese had extended across the river a series of piles which efficiently prevented the entrance of any vessel. Both the fortified rock and the city wall were strongly garrisoned; it was estimated that there were about 400 men in the joss-house, and 3,000 in the city. The novelty of the situation lay in the effective stoppage of the passage and in the fact that the main body of the Chinese troops was posted on the right or southern bank of the river, upon a range of hills which commanded the opposite side. 'All these heights,' wrote Sir Hugh in his dispatch, 'were fortified, and presented both a sea defence and a military position

of great strength, consisting of a chain of entrenched camps, on all the prominent points difficult of approach, from the natural steepness of the hills, which had been further scarped in several places: field redoubts crowned the summits, and hill and ravine bristled with gingalls.' It was arranged that the naval forces should undertake the conduct of operations on the left bank, and our attention must be more particularly directed to the military actions on the right bank.

Westward of the series of heights just described, there was a low-lying swamp extending to the shore. Across this marsh there were several narrow winding causeways, which alone afforded safe footing, and the swamp itself was separated from the hills by a deep canal. The canal was bridged in two places which were, respectively, about 1,200 and 1,800 yards from its mouth. An assault on the batteries could be carried out only after crossing this swamp and the canal, and, in order to do this successfully, Sir Hugh divided his forces into two columns[1]. The left column, numbering over

[1] Left column: A wing of the 18th Regiment, five companies of the 55th, the Rifle Company of the 36th Madras N. I., a company of Madras Artillery, and one of Sappers, with four light howitzers and two 5½-inch mortars.

Right column: The 49th Regiment, detachments of the Royal and of the Madras Artillery, and 50 men of the Sappers, with two 12-pounder howitzers and two 9-pounder field-guns. In Sir Hugh's dispatch, this is called the centre column, the right column being that which made the attack on the right bank; but it seems to be an aid towards clearness to keep the two attacks quite distinct.

1,000 men, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Craigie, and accompanied by the Major-General in person; the conduct of the right column, which was composed of less than 500 men, was entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Morris.

At eight o'clock on the morning of October 10, the *Phlegethon* and the *Nemesis* carried the different columns to the spots selected as their landing-places. The left column disembarked at the western end of the swamp, nearly a mile from the mouth of the canal; the right, about two hundred yards eastward of the canal, and therefore on the same side of it as the positions to be attacked. The head quarters column was intended to turn the enemy's right and cut off his retreat, while the smaller body diverted their attention by threatening a frontal attack, and so prevented them from strengthening their right. After landing, Sir Hugh Gough and his column moved rapidly over a succession of steep hills that skirted the swamp, until the General could reconnoitre the position and decide on the best method of crossing the canal. He resolved to subdivide his own column, and, accordingly, directed Colonel Craigie, with the 55th Regiment and some sappers and miners, to proceed to the more northerly of the two bridges, cross and advance on the hills beyond it, thus turning the Chinese right. While this division was being made, the bridge immediately in front had been secured, and when Sir Hugh was ready to cross, the right column could be seen, approaching the

front of the enemy's position from the other side of the flat.

The bridge had not been destroyed, but the Chinese had barricaded it with a single block of masonry, which just permitted one soldier to pass through at a time. Sir Hugh directed the Rifles to pass over in Indian file, while the 18th Regiment was assembled to support them at the foot of the bridge. This dangerous movement was accomplished not only without loss, but without opposition; a body of Chinese troops who occupied a redoubt on a height only 150 yards away, watched the operations and greeted the foe with cheers, but opened no fire. The Rifles now covered the crossing of the 18th, and, when this had been done, Colonel Craigie and the 55th were ready to attack, and the right column had for some time been awaiting the signal to advance. It was not possible to bring up the guns over such ground in time to go into action, but Captain Anstruther had, as at Tinghai, brought up a rocket-battery which immediately opened against the enemy's fortifications.

The Chinese seem at first to have been aware only of the presence of the 18th Regiment and the Rifles, who now began to advance, through a deep gorge, towards the centre of their encampment. Some of them were emboldened to leave their lines. They poured in a heavy but ill-directed fire, and met the advancing foe with courage and devotion. But, upon their right, came Colonel Craigie and the 55th, and, upon their left, the centre

column gallantly led by the 49th, and battery after battery had to be abandoned. 'From 1,200 to 1,500 of the enemy that had stood longest,' says Sir Hugh Gough, 'were driven down the heights into the river, their retreat being cut off by the flank movement of the 55th. Many were drowned in attempting to swim across to the city, others sought concealment on a rock in the stream, and were afterwards picked up by the boats of the *Queen*, and nearly 500 surrendered as prisoners.'

The action on the right bank had commenced earlier than the assault upon the Joss-house Hill, and Sir Hugh was able to aid the operations on the left bank by bringing some of the captured guns to bear upon the city and by the never-failing rocket-battery. No further aid could be given, as the enemy, in their flight, had carried off all boats from the right bank; but little aid was necessary, for the fire from the men-of-war was sufficiently powerful. A little after eleven o'clock, Captain Herbert of the *Blenheim*, who had been commissioned by Sir Hugh Gough to command the attacking party, landed with the seamen, marines, a detachment of the Royal Artillery, and fifty sappers (in all, about 700 men). To this little band, Admiral Sir William Parker gave the support and inspiration of his personal assistance. The enemy had already been forced by the fire of the ships to abandon some of their guns, and the column was thus enabled to make its way up the precipitous rock. As they approached the citadel,

a magazine exploded and the retreating Chinese were too much alarmed to close the gate. It was secured and an immediate attack made upon the city wall, which was escaladed at the south-eastern angle. Sir William Parker was one of the foremost to mount the walls. The Chinese made no further resistance, and escaped by the western gate.

Chinhai was now at the mercy of the victors. It proved to be what Sir Hugh describes as 'one great arsenal, with a cannon foundry and gun-carriage manufactory, together with warlike stores of various descriptions.' In the attack on the town and citadel, one man was killed by the explosion of a magazine; in the attack conducted by Sir Hugh Gough, three men were killed and sixteen wounded. The discrepancy between the trivial casualties on our side and the enormous loss sustained by the enemy could not fail to call for comment at the time. An explanation is offered by Colonel Mountain, a distinguished soldier, whom we have already had occasion to mention, who served in the second Punjab Campaign, and who died, in 1854, as Adjutant-General of H.M.'s forces in India:—

The report of the great loss on the Chinese side and the small loss on ours, upon all occasions, will appear strange to people in England, and almost incredible. The fact is, their arms are bad, and they fire ill, and having stood well for a while, give way to our rush, and are then shot like hares in all directions. The slaughter of fugitives is unpleasant, but we are such a handful in the face of so wide a country and so large a force, that we should

be swept away if we did not read our enemy a sharp lesson whenever we come in contact; but our General is very strict about sparing the country, and the consequence is that the people remain neutral. . . . John Bull proportions merit by loss, but I can tell you this, that, if we have done a good deal with a few men and trifling loss, it is to be attributed in a great degree to the nerve and confidence with which Sir Hugh Gough has led on his men, rushing on the enemy's flank or breaking through his centre, and deciding the day before many others (even men of name) would have ventured to advance. The Chinese are robust muscular fellows, and no cowards—the Tartars desperate; but neither are well commanded nor acquainted with European warfare. Having had, however, experience of three of them, I am inclined to suppose that a Tartar bullet is not a whit softer than a French one[1].

That more British soldiers did not share Colonel Mountain's experience of Tartar bullets was largely owing to two causes—to the excellence of our artillery, and to the manner in which the Chinese allowed their artillery to be outflanked and so rendered useless. To Sir Hugh's wise and constant employment of artillery, not less than to the inspiration which guided him to a detection of the critical moment for a bold onslaught, must be attributed the comparative immunity of his little army at Canton, at Amoy, at Tinghai, at Chinhai, and in the actions which remain to be described before we conclude the history of the Eastern Expeditionary Force.

[1] Colonel Mountain's *Memoirs*, pp. 199, 204.

CAPTURE OF CHINHAI.

A Joss-house Hill.
B Canal separating swamps from heights.
C D Bridges over canal.
F Landing place of left column.
G Landing place of right column.



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Meanwhile, the victory at Chinhai had placed in British hands not only that town, but the much more important city of Ningpo. On October 12 the Admiral made a reconnaissance to discover if the river was practicable, and found no appearance of opposition whatsoever. A surprise was suspected, and, when the forces moved up next day, every precaution was observed. But no enemy appeared, and no ambuscade had been prepared. So confidently had the Chinese trusted to the fortifications of Chinhai that Ningpo was almost unprotected. The enemy had resolved on submission, and they opened their gates to the invaders. By three o'clock in the afternoon, without having fired a single shot, Ningpo was in British hands and the band of the Royal Irish were playing 'God save the Queen' upon its walls.

Had the Expeditionary Force been sufficiently large, the most obvious course would have been to follow up these successes with an attack on Hang-chow, the capital of the province, and to proceed to Chapoo and the Yang-tse-kiang. But the garrisons at Hong-Kong, at Kulangsu, at Tinghai, and at Chinhai had required so large a proportion of Sir Hugh's small force that he had only about 750 men at his disposal. Apart altogether from the question of the weather, it was clearly impossible to undertake any further operation without a considerable reinforcement, and there was reason to doubt the expediency of a continued occupation of Ningpo. On this subject

Sir Hugh differed from the Admiral and Sir Henry Pottinger, who considered it necessary to retain the city. Sir Hugh's objection was based on the very small garrison at his command, the danger of treachery, and the propinquity of Chinhai. He pointed out that Chinhai was only twelve miles distant, and that its possession involved the command of Ningpo; that the presence of his small garrison would challenge the Chinese to 'put into operation the stratagem and intrigue which is their favourite form of warfare,' and that the consequent vigilance that would be required would be a severe strain on the men. While there was any possibility of the opening of negotiations at once he acquiesced in the measure, for political reasons, being unwilling to lose the moral advantage of the possession of Ningpo; but, as it became apparent that a spring campaign would be necessary, he urged upon the Admiral and the Plenipotentiary the advisability of husbanding, as far as possible, the strength of the men. Chinhai he regarded as more suitable for winter quarters than Ningpo, and it must be held at all hazards. Sir Henry Pottinger and Sir William Parker did not concur in this view, and Sir Hugh found himself compelled to undertake another military operation in order to render Ningpo as secure as possible.

Large bodies of Chinese troops were gathering in the neighbouring towns, and the General could not leave them to choose their own time and opportunity of attacking him. He therefore made,

in the end of December, 1841, an expedition to Yuyow and Tzekee. The movement was successfully carried out, and it effected its purpose of spreading consternation in the Fukien province and of relieving the pressure on Ningpo. Otherwise it possesses little or no importance, as Sir Hugh himself told the Governor-General, and we do not deem it necessary to go into any detailed account of what was little more than a reconnaissance in force. It is interesting to note that Sir Hugh's view as to the retention of Ningpo was adopted by Lord Auckland, to whom he had referred the question. In a Minute dated February 12, 1842, and addressed to Sir Henry Pottinger, the Governor-General said:—

I have observed with considerable anxiety the protracted detention of the small British force in an advanced and hazardous position at Ningpo, and should have much preferred that the troops should have been concentrated at Chinhai if they could have been there placed in undoubted security, or otherwise that they should all have been held together at Chusan.

This decision arrived, of course, much too late to be of any effect, and we shall see how, before it reached China, Sir Hugh's anticipation of a treacherous attack at Ningpo had been realized. The narrative of that event will find a fitting place at the opening of the campaign of 1842; meanwhile, it is necessary to refer to another difference of opinion between Sir Hugh and his colleagues.

The occupation of Ningpo raised a general question of policy, which formed the only permanent source of disagreement among the three leaders of the expedition, and to which we shall again have occasion to refer. The whole attitude of Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary towards the Chinese people fundamentally differed from that of Sir Hugh Gough. A memorandum from Sir Henry Pottinger, addressed to the General and the Admiral[1], places on record that he had 'looked forward with considerable satisfaction to the plundering of the city, not only as an act of retribution for the insults inflicted by its authorities on our people who were confined here, but as an example and warning to other places.' He admitted that, in the circumstances, it would be impossible to give over to plunder an unresisting town, and he proposed a much milder measure—the seizure of all public property and the exaction of a ransom for all private property, including merchandise. Sir Hugh could never have used language like this. His views on this question are expressed most fully in a private letter to his son-in-law, written from Ningpo in the end of November, while the subject was still under discussion:—

My great object is prospective, and, though a poor man, I would much prefer leaving a conviction on the minds of the people that we are not only a brave, but a just, a liberal, and a humane

[1] Printed in the *Life of Sir William Parker*, vol. ii. p. 460.

nation, than realizing a large proportion of prize money. My views on this head are not in accordance with those of either Sir Henry Pottinger or the Admiral. They say their instructions are to press the Government through the medium of the people, so as to make the war unpopular. Now this might apply to France, where the people's voice must have a strong influence on the acts of the Government, but in China it is chimerical. The Government care not for the people, and I verily believe the most annoying thing you could do is to prove to the people by our moderation and our justice that our characters were foully belied. The great object of the present expedition is to prove this, and to obtain, from such a knowledge, future commercial intercourse; and that can alone be obtained by mutual confidence. I have conveyed these my opinions most strongly both to the Plenipo. and to the Admiral; there shall at least be a record of my views. They, in short, wish to seize property found in large stores. The moment they open one, the mob will do their business in the rest, and, most assuredly, I will not disperse my men to punish one set of robbers for the benefit of another set. . . . If I can persuade or coax the Admiral, I will have my own way, but, with two against me, I can only protest. We are, however, great friends; they all dine with me to-day—if I could carry my point, I would feed them for a month.

Sir Hugh did not succeed in coaxing the Admiral, for Sir William Parker agreed with Sir Henry Pottinger that they were bound, by Lord Auckland's instructions, to consider private property as a lawful prize of war, in opposition to Sir Hugh's contention that only public property should be so treated.

They met on December 6, and Sir Hugh, finding himself outvoted, agreed to levy a ransom of ten per cent. upon all merchandise in store, in addition to a duty upon exports and imports. He felt that 'this species of ransom is much preferable to wholesale subtraction of property' after nearly two months' peaceable residence in Ningpo, but he protested against the adoption of the principle, and he foresaw that the arrangement would prolong the occupation of the town. Some influential merchants arranged, through a well-known interpreter, by name Gutzlaff, who was in the constant employment of the British authorities, that a composition of one million dollars should be paid for the ten per cent. levy. Postponement after postponement occurred, and, in the end of January, it was found necessary to act upon the resolution of December 6. By January 31, about 102,000 dollars' worth had been shipped. About the same time (whether from this cause or from the efforts of Chinese emissaries) the people of Ningpo began to lose confidence in the pacific intentions of the British; many shops were closed and several of the best houses bricked up. Sir Hugh Gough was confirmed in his own views by these incidents, and he wrote to Lord Auckland to obtain a decisive interpretation of the instructions on which the others based their action:—

I deeply regret the measure, as your Lordship will perceive by the copy of my reply to Sir William Parker. Our views otherwise so entirely

coincide, and I feel so much respect for his judgment and good feeling, that I am induced to submit these two letters to show that our difference of opinion only arises from our different views of your Lordship's instructions of May 10. I would beg, therefore, to be made acquainted with the error or correctness of my reading, whichever it may be, in order that I may shape my future conduct accordingly. . . . The surest means of attaining success in the war would be, I conceive, to combine energetic measures against the Government with just and kind treatment of the people—no private property should be taken that is not paid for, and nothing exacted that the inhabitants are unwilling to part with, unless where absolutely required for subsistence or shelter of the force[1].

The Governor-General, who had now been recalled, and was awaiting the arrival of his successor, Lord Ellenborough, expressed, in one of his last formal minutes, his concurrence in the opinion of Sir Hugh Gough. 'I should have desired,' he said, 'that no ransom should have been exacted upon the property of persons who, making no resistance to our original occupation of the city, had remained in the avowed charge of such property upon the faith of our protection. The remarks in my former dispatch of May 10, respecting the seizure of valuable private property, had reference to the forcible capture of towns[2].' In addition

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to Lord Auckland, January 20 and 31, 1842.

[2] Lord Auckland to Sir Henry Pottinger, February 12, 1842.

to this formal reply, Lord Auckland addressed to Sir Hugh a private letter, in which he said: 'I expect my successor to be here in a very few days and may hardly have to write to you on official subjects again. In taking leave of you, I would assure you of my esteem and respect. You have done for us all that the most sanguine of those who knew your character could have expected, and I heartily wish a continuance of success to your honourable career.'

The new Governor-General adopted the same view of the question. 'I used,' he wrote to Sir Hugh Gough on March 25, 1842, 'as I was authorized by Lord Auckland to do, your Excellency's letter to him, and I entirely agree with you as to the impolicy of the demand for money.' Some stress has been laid upon this long-forgotten controversy, because it brings to light a side of Sir Hugh Gough's character—his political wisdom, a quality for which he has received little credit, but which marked the whole period of his services to his country in the East, as it had characterized those services in Ireland. There can be little doubt that the policy which he advocated, and which commended itself to Lord Auckland and to Lord Ellenborough, was the wisest and the best-fitted to realize our aims in China. The question will meet us again six months later, and we shall find Sir Hugh's opinion unchanged. It was an opinion which was not merely prejudicial to his material interests, but which placed him in a difficult and

delicate position towards his colleagues, whom he liked and respected, but who regarded him as accusing them of cruelty and inhumanity. Neither Sir Henry Pottinger nor Sir William Parker could justly be suspected of any such tendency, for both were determined to conduct the war with all possible consideration for the innocent victims who must suffer through no fault of their own. It was a question of the policy best adapted to bring hostilities to a speedy conclusion, and Sir Hugh was convinced that his own view was based not upon any sentimental feeling of mercy, but upon the most sound and careful consideration of the political circumstances in which the war was being waged. Had he believed that severe measures would affect the Government, and bring about the conclusion of peace, he would have advocated severe measures, even at the cost of injustice to individuals. But justice and wise policy seemed to him to be combined in urging the lenient measures he advocated, and he permitted neither the feeling of personal interest (which affected him little) nor the consequent alienation from his colleagues (which pained him much) to modify the earnestness with which he pressed his views upon the Plenipotentiary and upon the Indian Government.

IV

THE CHINESE AND THE WAR

THE interval between the active operations of the campaign of 1841 and those of the following year affords a fitting opportunity of interrupting our narrative by a brief statement of the attitude of the Chinese Government and people towards the war. The Emperor, it will be remembered, was still in a condition of pleasant illusion; the mandarins found a ready explanation for every 'unfortunate incident,' and he was prepared to receive, at any moment, news of the extermination of the rebellious barbarians. 'Rebellious' was no figure of speech; the English had long been duly enrolled as tributaries of the Celestial Empire, and the events of 1841 appeared to the Court simply as a more than usually dangerous rebellion. The people, on the other hand, were gradually realizing that the boasted omnipotence of the Tartar Dynasty was a delusion, and that the barbarians were not only as brave as the Tartar troops, but more powerful, and much more merciful. The manners and customs of the British surprised and amused them, and they began to draw caricatures of British sailors and soldiers, of the General and his staff, and of the barbarians generally. We reproduce

on the opposite page two of these caricatures which were found at Ningpo, and which originally appeared in the frequently quoted *Voyage of the Nemesis.* Not less interesting and instructive are certain documents which came into the hands of Sir Hugh Gough, and which we print here as illustrating, more forcibly than any words of ours, the real point of view of the Chinese.

The first of these is a document which, about this time, was addressed to Sir Hugh Gough urging him to desist from warlike operations, and to submit to the Emperor. The grounds upon which this request is based are characteristic of the simple faith of the Chinese in their own learning and civilization and in their great destiny, and the rewards they offer for submission—the ennoblement of Sir Hugh's ancestors and the education of his children—are equally illustrative of the Chinese habit of mind.

To the English Minister Gough.

A public letter from the Imperial Commanders-in-Chief of the Celestial dynasty.

We have made ourselves fully acquainted with the contents of your last dispatch, and consider your views very correct, and what you are practising is also excellent. But now we beg you to listen to us. From the moment the ancestor of the Celestial dynasty of Great Purity (the spotless Manchoo Tartar Emperors) destroyed the robbers Le and Len, the Chinese empire as well as foreigners have submitted to their sway. From stupid buffaloes they have become intelligent horses.

TARTAR AND ENGLISH SOLDIERS FIGHTING

ENGLISH FORAGING PARTY

CHINESE CARICATURES

(*Cf. opposite page*)

We have taught and instructed the subdued, established schools in every district and country and sent them teachers. And so it has happened that children only three feet high, in the most remote corners of the world know the duties which a minister owes to his prince, and a child to his parent. Our officers have made the youths write literary essays, opened examinations, and promoted the worthy and excellent to offices, or made them celebrated military Mandarins and even Ministers of State. Their children have been provided for, and the Emperor has been so abundant in his kindness as to confer posthumous honours upon their ancestry in Hades.

Thus Cochin China, Siam, Burmah, Japan, Korea, and Loochoo have become tributary. All the countries to the East and West have become obedient to our sway, and the realms of the West and North, beyond the Kobi desert, many myriads of miles distant, have paid to us homage, appearing in Court before the Emperor, and calling themselves his servants. They were therefore honoured with the titles of Kings, and as vassals, the Emperor in his great bounty gave them embroidered dresses and official caps. From remote antiquity until now such abundant favours were never shown.

In former times the English likewise appeared at court with tribute, and therefore they were permitted to have commerce with Canton, and to trade in woollens, camlets, calicoes, and watches.

You have now all on a sudden sneaked into the eastern part of Chekeang, and without obeying the ancient laws, taken forcible possession of a frontier country. The reason of this is, that you did not know, that the Celestial dynasty, with the aid of worthies and sages has successfully for several centuries ruled over all who are in the

central country and foreign parts. Did you never hear, that towards the East, we conquered Formosa, and towards the West the great and formidable rebel Jehangir? Wherever there have been unruly villains we have gone to exterminate them. If they were obstinate they were attacked, if submissive we let them go. Should a great Country fear destruction from a small realm? I suppose you must have heard of the above facts.

Our Commander-in-Chief has now appointed above 200 Officers, to head an army of the best troops all clad in armour, amounting to several myriads, amply provided with all necessaries.

Still we do not immediately advance to seize you, but permit this letter to be sent, that you may submit with sincerity, and beseech to surrender your army, earnestly supplicating that this offer may be accepted. If you then indeed can prevail upon your troops to retire, we will on your behalf address the Emperor to ask favours for you.

If you, however, cannot be unanimous in this, and will not act in obedience to this mandate, then our officers will take you alive, and those who do not surrender will be beheaded. Those on the contrary, however, belonging to the great mass, that come over to us, or if any of the black Barbarians tender their submission, shall have their rewards according to their merit. It will then be at their option either to return home or obtain an establishment, and on going back, rich presents will be bestowed upon them, after having obtained an imperial decree to that effect.

As for yourself, rich rewards will be showered upon you, you will become an object of the highest favour, and your name become illustrious. Even your posterity will share in this, and will be imbued with the literature of the Celestial Empire, and having been well versed in Chinese lore,

they may even gain admittance to the Imperial College.

You of course are the best judge of the present state of affairs, and will look forward to the education of your children. You, like a clever bird, will choose the proper tree to perch there, and as a shrewd servant select your master and serve him. Then indeed you will be worthy of the highest praises.

This present letter has been handed over to the high authorities for their perusal and also been communicated in a secret dispatch to the Emperor and the Imperial favour will no doubt be awarded thereupon.

As soon as H.M.'s pleasure is known you will hear of it. May you prosper in all the ordinary business of the city. The man who brought your last paper (Linguist Pun) has been rewarded with the eighth rank of office and remains here in our employ. His name is on the book of merit, and as soon as a vacancy occurs he will be made a Mandarin. We are anxiously expecting a speedy answer to this letter, and from your great talents anticipate that you will make your choice.

The remaining documents were found, in March, 1842, upon the body of a dead Mandarin of high rank. They were translated by the interpreter, Gutzlaff, and they were found to confirm every view which had been adopted by Sir Hugh Gough. The long delays for which Captain Elliot had been responsible had affected the Chinese just as Sir Hugh had warned Elliot that they would. 'We may rest quiet,' says the mandarin, 'for how dreadful soever the inroads of these robbers, still, their long inertness, the want of activity in the

movement of their forces, renders the effects of their campaigns nugatory.' Almost all the papers in this bundle consisted of reports upon various aspects of the struggle and contained the advice of the writer as to how to deal with the enemy. One and all unite in deploring the effect of British lenity upon the people:—

The mass of the people remain neutral, for these rebellious barbarians issue edict after edict to tranquillize them. They do not oppress the villages, and we have therefore lost our hold upon the fears and hopes of their inhabitants. With our most arduous efforts, we have hitherto only prevailed upon robbers to join our cause, and these live in the eastern villages. Consider, moreover, the numerous city guards the barbarians have established, and how cunningly they proceed to manage matters, in order to keep the people in their interests. The best we can do is to scare the people away from the towns, to spread reports of our great intentions, to terrify the whole population by threats of extermination, and render all within reach of the Barbarians a dreary uninhabited waste. I am happy to tell you that we have tolerably succeeded in this matter.

A similar view is expressed in a paper entitled *Spirit of two late Edicts*, which appears to be a summary, by Gutzlaff, of a number of Imperial manifestoes:—

The High Imperial Commissioners lament the indifference with which the people answer their summons. There is no alacrity in enlisting, no ardour in defending the country. But every one looks only to his own affairs. Now the great Em-

MEDAL STRUCK BY THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES

(Cf. footnote on opposite page)

peror has showered down so many favours upon the nation (the edict does not mention of what a nature) and still the mass remains regardless of the great benefits. A large army is actually ready to free the land from the pest of the Barbarian robbers and nobody stirs to co-operate. The representatives of H.M., however, wish to exemplify the all-absorbing goodness of the great Monarch, and have therefore many hundred peacock feathers in store that are to be bestowed upon the warriors that will enlist. They have also struck off medals[1] as a reward for services, and moreover keep in store 100,000 taels of ingots to bestow upon the successful competitors for military renown. As it is, however, difficult to carry money about one's person, they will give in lieu of hard cash promissory notes upon the treasury and that will be a full equivalent. But the feathers and medals are all ready and will be served out forthwith. After such incitement to valour, the ministers expect a rise of patriotism never yet witnessed under Tartar rule. Rewards are held out and specified. There are only a very few heads that value 20,000 taels—as much as the Mandarins will give to any fishermen that will take the trouble of capturing a line of battleships. The common price for Barbarian eyes' heads is only 200 taels, camp followers, and the whole tribe of black faces, are valued still lower.

There are, moreover, bitter complaints, that the

[1] A large quantity of these medals fell into the hands of Sir Hugh Gough, and were converted into a miniature facsimile of the Porcelain Tower at Nanking. One of them is reproduced in collotype on the opposite page. It is made of very thin silver, and the inscription is simply to the effect that the medal is presented by the Governor, and contains no reference to the actual circumstances.

strongest inducements, and the very advance of the large exterminating army have not been able to rouse the people from their apathy. They even did not confide in the protection of the grand army, and harboured fears that the Barbarians would dare to attack the great host.

The last of these interesting documents brings us to the opening of the campaign of 1842, for it is connected with the attack upon Ningpo which Sir Hugh Gough had, throughout the winter, expected as the inevitable result of its continued occupation. The 'grand army,' to which there are references in the documents we have just quoted, was gathering in the vicinity of the town, and several reconnaissances, made in the course of the winter, had discovered to Sir Hugh the strength that they represented. He made all possible efforts to avoid a surprise, and concentrated his men in one quarter of the town, in order that they might be ready to support each other in case of need. The strictest orders were issued to maintain every precaution against a sudden attack, which every succeeding week gave fresh reason to expect. The actual attempt was made while Sir Hugh, who had remained at Ningpo all the winter, was absent at Chusan, concerting, with the Plenipotentiary and the Admiral, measures for the ensuing campaign. His departure is announced in the first paragraph of the following document, which reveals the Chinese plans for the attack :—

The Barbarian Eye has left the city; so also two

steamers; soldiers have been embarked and gone away, and the luggage is also sent to other places. Now, therefore, is the time for action, and let us no longer hesitate. We must attack them in every quarter, drive them from every position, cut off and harass their retreat, and thus employ the ample means at our disposal. The rewards held out to the brave are too scanty, we must shower upon them favours. Let the Emperor himself step forward and compensate our heroes for the risk they incur. My plan is to act boldly. Our water braves must board the steamers and men of war, and take them. In the attack upon the English robbers the soldiers ought only to use their swords and nothing else. The foremost must step forward and cut off the heads of the enemy. As soon as these are in their possession another file ought to advance and do the same; and thus they must go on until their army is annihilated. We must advance with a strong phalanx to strike terror, we must not fight, but kill them outright: let the daggers do this work—this is the proper weapon for spreading destruction.

In Ningpo everything is ready to second the attempt, and success certain. We have village braves that will do battle, but they have carefully until now kept out of the way in distant posts in order not to mar the plot. With Chinhai it is different. For though there are 2,000 water braves ready to venture their lives on a single cast, yet tides and waves are treacherous. . . . However, we shall endeavour to burn their shipping and you must advance with a large body of men, and then Chinhai will be ours. We know it now for certain that Pottinger's son-in-law died of his wounds. As he is a youth of twenty-three years of age, his untimely fate has spread great panic among the robbers.

This statement is dated March 7; on the evening of the 10th a simultaneous attack was made upon Ningpo and Chinhai. Only a small portion of the five-mile circuit of the walls of Ningpo could be guarded by the sentries of the small British force, and through the extensive suburbs the enemy could make their way, in the darkness, to the approaches of the city. The Chinese excelled in stratagem, and not a few soldiers—some of them hardy mountaineers who had never yet met the barbarians—succeeded in making their way into the town in disguise. Some warning had been given to the garrison by small Chinese boys who were employed as servants and who were proud of their connexion with the strangers, whose drill and discipline they were fond of imitating, and whose words of command might be heard from a group of Chinese urchins just as from the boys of a garrison town in England. These boys knew of the progress of the army, and they disappeared on the 9th, with the warning that the next day there would be sounds of matchlock and cannon[1]. Additional precautions were, therefore, observed; the officers went their rounds three times that night, and the guards of every gate were reinforced. Midnight passed without any sign of danger, but at four o'clock in the morning simultaneous attacks were made, by large bodies of the enemy, upon the west and south gates. The west gate was gallantly

[1] Davis's *China*, vol. i. p. 228.

held by a detachment of the 18th Royal Irish, who met with 'Tipperary touches' every effort of the enemy to scale the walls, and kept back the assailants until they were reinforced from the citadel and could take the offensive. A howitzer was brought up; the gate was opened, and the British sallied forth and inflicted a severe defeat upon the enemy, who were crowded together in the suburbs, and fell in large numbers. The attack on the south gate was more successful, for the Chinese were aided by their confederates within the town; the bolt was drawn, the gate opened, and the guards driven back. The enemy entered and made their way towards the marketplace, when they were met by the 49th Regiment, who were supported by two howitzers, and who soon drove the Chinese back upon the gate, many of them falling in the narrow street. They pursued the flying enemy through the suburbs; no attempt was made to rally, but many of the Tartar troops fell in their attempt to escape. Thus ended the long contemplated attack on Ningpo.

The simultaneous attack upon Chinhai was similar in design, but was less skilfully carried out; it was easily repelled and gave little trouble to the garrison. These outbursts determined Sir Hugh Gough to make an effort to disperse the 'Grand Army,' which had been sent to rescue Ningpo and Chinhai and to exterminate the barbarians. After the defeat of its attack upon the towns, the army retreated to Fungwah, whence it still menaced

Ningpo. On the approach of the British, led by Sir Hugh in person, the enemy retreated over the hills. Pursuit, by so small a force, was out of the question, and Sir Hugh determined to attack another large body of the enemy, near the town of Tzekee. His army, composed of about one thousand men, moved upon Tzekee on March 15, and found about 8,000 of the enemy posted on the hills above the town. Sir Hugh, having discovered that the town itself was not strongly occupied, instructed the naval brigade to scale the walls, protected by the guns, while the 49th Regiment made their way along a shallow canal and under the city wall, and the 18th Regiment, marching outside the wall, drove off a small outpost of the enemy. The little force was reunited near the north gate, only to be again divided, in order to turn the Chinese position. The enemy's camps and the summits of the hills beyond them were thickly occupied, but Sir Hugh at once perceived that their position was faulty, the hills on our right commanding their left, which, in turn, commanded their right. The 18th moved upon the enemy's left and, taking a steep hill which commanded those on which the Chinese were posted, turned their position; while the Naval Brigade and the 49th attacked from two different points, the latter regiment led by the General in person. Admiral Sir William Parker himself accompanied the Naval Brigade. 'It became,' says Colonel Mountain, 'a regular chase after the first brush, during which the Chinese

stood well, and their killed were scattered over the country for miles round[1].' As usual, the loss of the enemy was very great, and that of the British forces very small[2]. This section of the Grand Army disappeared like the other and made no further attempt at resistance, deserting a strong position some miles away, and leaving behind them arms and ammunition.

Sir Hugh returned to Ningpo on March 17. The Chinese had failed to capture the towns and their great preparations to meet the barbarians had come to nought, but much yet remained to be done before the objects of the expedition could be attained. The people were beginning to understand the futility of the Imperial threats, and the weakness of the Imperial armies; they were also learning to appreciate the real character of the invaders, in spite of the scenes which inevitably followed the British occupation of a Chinese town. One of the MSS. from which we have so often quoted in this chapter, remarks on the kindness of the British treatment of Chinese wounded. 'The doctors,' says the writer (speaking of the attack on Ningpo), 'were busy in bandaging the wounded and most humanely took care of the whole. Now this shows that they are not such abandoned wretches as you would lead us to believe.' Colonel

[1] *Memoirs*, p. 198.

[2] Three men were killed, seven officers and fifteen men wounded. The strategy in this engagement has received more praise than any other action in the war.

Mountain relates an incident of the skirmish at Tzekee, on March 15, which illustrates the temper of the soldiers. 'I was with the 18th,' he says, 'when a stupid old woman, with her no-feet and big stick, thought proper to totter across the field, right in the view of our fire. I called to the men not to hurt her, and she not only escaped, but was the means of saving several soldiers from biting the dust, as, from fear of hitting her, our people forbore to fire.' This moderation is the more remarkable because, throughout the winter, the Chinese had carried on their usual practice of decoying British soldiers and sailors and murdering them. Several instances of this had occurred in the vicinity of Ningpo as well as elsewhere in China.

But if the population were beginning to understand what the end must be, there was no indication that this conviction had been forced upon the Government, which still talked boldly of extermination. It remained for the leaders to devise a spring campaign which would bring the Emperor and his advisers to reason. They had already received some indications of the approbation of the Home Government, which had been earned by their efforts in the preceding summer. Sir William Parker was promoted to be a Vice-Admiral in November, 1841, and Sir Hugh Gough received the local rank of Lieutenant-General in India and in China, and was raised to the dignity of a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath. Negotiations were in progress for the grant, to the troops engaged at

Canton, of a *batta* or money payment out of the ransom paid for that city. Important reinforcements had arrived or were on their way to China, and it was generally anticipated that the ensuing months would witness the close of what had proved to be a protracted and unpopular war.


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V

THE YANG-TSE-KIANG

The new Governor-General had told Queen Victoria that the Expeditionary Force would keep Her Majesty's birthday in the Emperor's Palace at Peking, and he took the earliest opportunity of urging upon Sir Hugh Gough the adoption of measures calculated to bring about the performance of this somewhat rash promise. Sir Hugh, on his part, while he recognized that Lord Ellenborough's anticipations were visionary, was anxious to recommence active operations; but some important questions of military policy had yet to be settled.

Almost the whole of the north-east of China is occupied by the great plain which extends from the Great Wall to the junction of the Yang-tse-kiang with the Han-kiang. Through this plain has been cut the Imperial or Grand Canal which forms, with the great rivers, an extensive line of water communication by which the revenues of all kinds are conveyed to Peking. The Canal is intersected by the Peiho river and by the Yellow river as well as by the Yang-tse-kiang, and an alternative scheme of operations was, as the reader will remember, to proceed to the Yellow Sea and by the Peiho river to Peking itself. We have seen that, from the very

beginning of his command in China, Sir Hugh had regarded the Yang-tse-kiang as the most vulnerable point in the Empire, and he had never ceased to urge the necessity of an advance upon that river. Delays, for which he was in no sense responsible, had rendered it inexpedient to carry out the movement in the preceding year, for the new Plenipotentiary and the Admiral arrived too late in the season to undertake any operations beyond the attacks on Amoy, Chusan, and Chinhai. It will be remembered that, in July, 1841, Sir Hugh had advised Lord Auckland against a movement on the Peiho (cf. p. 204). Later in the year, while Sir Hugh Gough was resident at Ningpo, an important communication arrived, in which Lord Auckland reverted to his alternative course of an expedition to Peking by the Peiho river. The Commander-in-Chief agreed to this suggestion, stipulating that he should receive certain reinforcements. He still preferred his own suggestion of the Yang-tse-kiang, but he was ready to adopt the course pointed out by the Indian Government, provided they supplied him with an efficient force. The spring of 1842 found the arrival of reinforcements still in the distance, and Sir Hugh, under the impression that the movement on Peking had been sanctioned by the Home Government, was in some perplexity about his duty in the matter. He could not regard with equanimity the consequences, to his men, of postponing operations till the hot season, and he therefore suggested to Sir Henry Pottinger that

every available man should be sent to join him in the end of March, merely leaving sufficient garrisons for Hong-Kong, Kulangsu, Chusan, and the joss-house above Chinhai, and evacuating Ningpo; if necessary, Kulangsu could also be abandoned. With the men thus concentrated under his own command, he proposed to proceed up the Yang-tse-kiang, interrupt the trade of the Imperial Canal, and capture Nanking, and then, on the arrival of reinforcements, to proceed to the Peiho. This plan was formed with the view of combining his own scheme of operations with that of the Government, and negotiations with the Plenipotentiary were in progress when on March 6 a communication arrived from Lord Ellenborough which altered materially the whole situation.

The Duke of Wellington had, in the preceding autumn, approved of the Yang-tse-kiang project, being guided by a memorandum drawn up by Lord Colchester when the question of sending a land force was under consideration. Lord Colchester had reported that the Yang-tse-kiang alone afforded facilities for the operations, and had suggested the island of Kinshan as a basis; it was, of course, an objection that Kinshan was some hundreds of miles from the capital, but the interruption of internal commerce and the stoppage of tribute both in kind and in money were deemed sufficient to affect the Court; and, in any case, there seemed no choice.

But on the receipt of Lord Auckland's suggestion,

in the beginning of 1842, the Duke of Wellington had an interview with Sir George Cockburn, who informed him of the existence of an anchorage in the Gulf of Pechili, near the mouth of the Peiho river, and of the possibility of the passage of steamers and smaller ships-of-war up the river. This conversation changed the views of the Duke of Wellington, and, while he did not insist upon the adoption of this course, he urged it upon Lord Ellenborough. The new Governor-General felt that this scheme involved the risk of the loss of communication between the army and the fleet, for no one could tell what obstructions might interfere with the course even of the never-failing *Nemesis*; that the long march up the river or an exposure to the sun in open boats might be possible while the troops were fresh, but that the return journey, after two or three months of a Chinese summer, would be a matter of great difficulty; and that the whole operation involved many chances of sudden attack and would ultimately result in a conflict with the whole military force of China, gathered together to defend the Emperor. The Duke, in estimating the depth of water in the Peiho river, had forgotten that the river banks are higher than the surrounding plain, and that, by simply cutting them the Chinese could indefinitely reduce the draught of the river. In these circumstances, Lord Ellenborough left the final decision to the military and naval Commander-in-Chief. 'I entertain so strong an opinion,' he

wrote[1] to Sir Hugh Gough, 'of the extreme danger of the proposed advance of the troops entrusted to Your Excellency, by the Peiho river, that in the event of Your Excellency concurring in that opinion and requiring the support of the authority with which the letter of Lord Stanley leaves me invested, I do not hesitate at once to direct Your Excellency not to undertake that operation.'

Sir Hugh had imagined that Lord Auckland's suggestion of the Peiho had already been fully sanctioned, and it was a welcome surprise to him to find that a choice was still open. He had no hesitation about the question. His judgement was perfectly clear in favour of Lord Ellenborough's position and against that of the Duke. The Admiral declared himself of the same mind, and it was decided that the great attempt should be made on the Yang-tse-kiang. It was impossible, at such a distance, to obtain Wellington's sanction for this departure from his expressed views, and, after the course adopted had proved successful beyond expectation, Lord Ellenborough informed the Duke that he was 'satisfied . . . that, had the army, in pursuance of Lord Stanley's instructions, gone to the Gulf of Petchelee, it would have been utterly lost, and perhaps the fleet too[2].' If the original conception of a movement upon the Yang-tse-kiang cannot be ascribed to the Governor-General, he deserves,

[1] Lord Ellenborough to Sir Hugh Gough, March 25, 1842.
[2] *Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough*, p. 297.

at all events, the credit of having supported and sanctioned it, in spite of the opinion of an authority to which every British soldier was accustomed to yield.

Before the expedition actually proceeded to the Yang-tse-kiang, it was necessary, for the safety of the small garrisons left in the captured towns, to attack a large Chinese force which had been assembled near the town of Chapoo, the port of Hang-chow, situated in the Han estuary. On May 7 the British forces afforded their enemy the delight of a fresh 'victory' by the evacuation of Ningpo[1]. The city of Chinhai was abandoned on the same day, but a small number of men were left in the joss-house overlooking the city. On the 17th the fleet anchored close to the Han estuary, and near the city of Chapoo. The currents were very strong and very treacherous, and the Chinese relied upon the difficulty of landing any considerable force from so uncertain a river. On the evening of the 16th, Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William Parker had made a reconnaissance and agreed upon the plan of attack. The city of Chapoo was found to be situated on a promontory running from east to west, and some five miles in length. It

[1] At Ningpo, Sir Hugh had adopted measures which had been impracticable at Amoy, and had actually organized a staff of Chinese police to protect private property. But the Chinese attack had thrown everything into confusion, and by the end of April, Ningpo was a wilderness. 'When I look at this place,' wrote Sir Hugh, 'I am sick of war.'

occupied a position at the western end, protected by a series of heights which cover the larger portion of the promontory. These hills extended eastwards for about three miles, and in them the Chinese had prepared several defences, including breast-works, earthen redoubts and joss-houses. Towards the shore they had prepared a series of batteries, to resist any attempt to force a landing directly opposite the town. The city itself was walled and contained a separate cantonment for a large body of Tartar troops, who lived apart from the Chinese.

Sir Hugh Gough's intention was to disembark early in the morning of the 18th at the eastern end of the promontory, and to turn the heights so as to cut off the troops posted there from a retreat to the city. The men at his disposal were still few in number, for the reinforcements could not arrive for another month, and considerations of climate rendered it imperative that operations should be undertaken as soon as possible. He divided his forces into three columns [1]—right, under Lieutenant-Colonel Morris, the centre (Artillery) under Lieutenant-Colonel Montgomerie, and the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Schoedde, who had distinguished himself in the defence of Ningpo two

		Officers	Ranks
[1] Right column :	18th Royal Irish . .	22	470
„	49th Regiment . . .	25	426
„	Sappers	1	25
		48	921

months earlier. Sir Hugh himself accompanied the right column. It landed first, at a point selected by the two leaders on the 16th, and occupied, without opposition, a height which covered the disembarkation. To the left column, accompanied by the artillery, Sir Hugh assigned the task of moving rapidly round the base of the heights, getting in rear of the enemy, and cutting their communications with Chapoo. This movement was successfully accomplished, while the right wing advanced upon the heights themselves, taking, in turn, the various defences. The Sepoys maintained the communications between the two columns, and simultaneously with these operations, the steamers commenced to shell the breastworks which were within range. The enemy were completely taken by surprise; as usual, they were unprepared for anything except a frontal attack. They gave way on all sides and took to flight, with the exception

Centre column:	Det. Royal Artillery . .	2	35
„	Madras Artillery . . .	8	164
„	Sappers	2	74
„	Rifle Co. 36th Madras N. I. .	3	100
		15	373
Left column:	26th Regiment . . .	27	521
„	55th Regiment . . .	15	274
„	Sappers	1	25
		43	820

The total force of all ranks thus amounted to 2,220.

of a body of some 300 Tartar troops who seized a small joss-house, and held it with indomitable pluck and perseverance. Assault after assault was required to capture it, and, when, at last, it fell, there were only some fifty survivors, and most of these were wounded. A large proportion of the British casualties arose from the attack on this joss-house, and several lives were lost by rash and premature attempts, while the arrival of artillery was being awaited[1]. In the end it was set on fire by our rockets and breached by some powder-bags, which were placed in position at great risk by Captain Pears, the chief Field Engineer.

While the attack on the joss-house was still in progress, Sir Hugh moved with the left wing upon the city wall, supported by a number of guns. The bridge over the canal outside the wall had been broken down, and a little delay was the result, but some boats were found, with which the Grenadier company of the 55th, and a number of Sappers, crossed over and scaled the wall. The whole attack had occupied only four hours; the process of disembarkation was completed at eight o'clock in the morning, and by noon Sir Hugh was on the city walls. He was immediately joined by Sir William Parker with marines and seamen, and, after each of the gates had been secured, the city was occupied.

The numbers of the Chinese were estimated at

[1] *The Nemesis*, vol. ii. pp. 326–328.

about 8,000 regulars (including 1,700 Tartars), and their losses at from 1,200 to 1,500. The British lost, in killed, two officers and eleven rank and file, and, in wounded, six officers and forty-six rank and file. Both the officers who were killed (Colonel Tomlinson of the 18th Royal Irish, and Captain Campbell of the 55th Regiment), received their wounds in the attack on the joss-house, as also did the Deputy-Adjutant-General, Colonel Mountain, whose very severe injuries incapacitated him for some weeks, and deprived the Commander-in-Chief of his invaluable services. Sir Hugh Gough did not propose to occupy the town longer than was necessary for destroying the arsenals and a gunpowder manufactory. Great kindness was shown towards the population, but many of the inhabitants of the Tartar city, preferring death to dishonour, destroyed their wives and children and themselves committed suicide. The proud Tartar race, living apart and as conquerors, had only now met the barbarians and experienced the ignominy of defeat. The Chinese were less scrupulous, and gladly availed themselves of the attention of our medical officers. It was remarked, indeed, that the capture of Chapoo was followed by an entire change in the attitude of the people. Cases of kidnapping had never been more frequent than in the preceding winter, and many prisoners thus taken had been tortured and murdered. It seemed at one time as if the Chinese regarded these captures of single individuals as the only offensive method

which remained for them. But after the capture of Chapoo, the General and the Admiral were thanked for their humanity by the veteran Elepoo, one of the most distinguished and of the most honourable of the advisers of Taoukwang, and thereafter the Chinese authorities followed the practice of civilized nations in their treatment of any of the barbarians who were unfortunate enough to fall into their hands. Sixteen kidnapped soldiers were returned by Elepoo to Sir Hugh Gough in recognition of his courtesy in releasing the Chinese captured at Chapoo.

Chapoo was held for only a very few days; its arsenals were destroyed, and its ordnance captured, but private property was, as far as possible, protected from the Chinese robbers. On May 27, the British evacuated Chapoo, and proceeded round the headland into the mouth of the great river which they had so long desired to see. The first operation in the Yang-tse-kiang was an attack upon the small towns of Woosung and Paoushan, situated at the mouth of the Woosung river, a tributary of the Yang-tse-kiang, on its right bank. The operations against Woosung are fully detailed in the *Voyages of the Nemesis*, and they belong to naval, not to military history. On the night of June 13, the fleet reached the anchorage of Woosung, and, next day, the General and the Admiral made a reconnaissance, which, although it afforded much valuable information, failed to establish the practicability of landing so as to turn the defences. One

CAPTURE OF CHAPOO.



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point alone seemed practicable, and it was agreed to examine the locality during the night; should they be disappointed in their expectation of landing, they must trust to the efforts of the ships-of-war to silence the batteries covering the regular landing-place. They were disappointed, and at six o'clock on the morning of June 16, the ships were towed in shore in the face of a fire from the batteries. When all were in their appointed stations, Sir William Parker ordered a cannonade which was soon successful in its object. Meanwhile, the troopships had all run aground, and the whole credit of the occupation of the batteries fell to the navy. The land forces did not disembark till noon, when they marched upon Paoushan only to find it deserted by the enemy, whose retreat was threatened by the movement of one of Sir Hugh's columns.

The capture of Woosung threw open the way to Shanghai, into which the inhabitants of the district were gathering. Shanghai was one of the centres of the internal commerce of China, and was connected by a system of canals with various portions of the Empire. An attack upon Shanghai was arranged for June 19, and preparations were made for the passage of the forces along the fourteen miles which separated it from Woosung. Lieutenant-Colonel Montgomerie was instructed to conduct one column by land, while the remainder were towed up the Woosung river. The ships-of-war had already disposed of some batteries on the river

banks. The progress of the British troops was practically unopposed, and Colonel Montgomerie, who reached the city first, found that it had been evacuated on the preceding night. The wealthier inhabitants had fled with the troops, but the middle classes and most of the shopkeepers remained and brought poultry and vegetables to sell to the invaders. The confidence thus shown in British intentions was not misplaced. 'The only injury done at Shanghai,' says Sir Hugh Gough's dispatch, 'was by the Chinese robbers who had commenced their work of depredation before we entered it. I issued a very strong edict which, before we left, produced, in a great measure the desired effect, and I was enabled to induce many of the most respectable Chinese to take charge of large establishments (principally pawnbrokers), the inhabitants of which had fled, with a promise they would protect them from the rabble.' Any arrangement of this nature, it will be remembered, had been impossible at Amoy, and the change in the attitude of the Chinese was one of the most hopeful indications of the approaching end of the conflict.

Shanghai was almost immediately abandoned, for it was now late in the season, and there remained much to do. Its military stores were destroyed, and a large number of guns (some of them brass and of recent manufacture) were captured both there and at Woosung. But reinforcements were arriving, and 170 miles lay between

Woosung and the objective point of the campaign —the large and populous city of Nanking, situated above the point of intersection of the Imperial Canal with the Yang-tse-kiang. Nanking was known to be strongly fortified, and it was protected by the town of Chinkiangfoo, which commanded the northern entrance to the southern portion of the Canal, close to the two islands of Kinshan and Sungshan (the Golden and Silver islands), the former of which had originally been selected as the probable basis of operations. The large reinforcements which had arrived had nearly trebled the available field force, besides increasing the various garrisons. They included the 98th Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Campbell (afterwards Lord Clyde), and they were accompanied by Major-General Lord Saltoun.

It required no small skill and courage on the part of the Admiral to advance nearly two hundred miles up an unknown river, and preparations of various kinds occupied some days before a movement could be made[1].

[1] While these preparations were in progress there occurred the question of the treatment of the Chinese people, to which reference has already been made. The Plenipotentiary, the General, and the Admiral were agreed that, on the seizure of the Canal, all trade northwards, of any kind, must be stopped, in order to exert the requisite pressure on Peking. But Sir Hugh Gough differed from his colleagues with regard to the amount of interference with the trade of the southern coast province of Chekiang which was necessary or desirable. They

The expedition set sail on the evening of July 6. Ten days were occupied in the passage up the river; the Chinese, who had trusted entirely to the defences of Woosung, offered practically no opposition, but winds and currents were the cause of considerable delay. On the evening of the 16th the General and the Admiral made a reconnaissance of the neighbourhood of Kinshan and Chinkiangfoo; still no opposition was offered, and the inhabitants crowded to the shore to gaze at the steamer. It was not till the night of the 20th that the whole fleet had assembled, and by that time, Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William Parker had agreed upon the method of the assault.

took the view that the southern province should be subjected to the same restriction as the northern. Sir Hugh Gough was opposed to this course. 'I should say,' he wrote, 'that the stoppage of supplies which are common and necessary articles of food to the lower classes in the Coast Provinces will inflict a great amount of suffering without any adequate advantage to be obtained. On the contrary, I conceive that the pressure occasioned by such a stoppage might not improbably drive the people into insurrection against the existing Government (which is precisely what we are told not to encourage), at the same time that it undoubtedly would create a lasting impression of ill-will towards our nation, and that repugnance to future commercial intercourse which the Chinese Government so industriously labours to propagate, and which it is on our part so essential to counteract.' Sir Hugh Gough to the Admiral, June 28, 1842. The speedy conclusion of peace rendered the question of little or no practical importance, and we mention the subject only because of the light it throws on the character of Sir Hugh Gough.

The city of Chinkiangfoo lay in immediate proximity to the Imperial Canal, which flowed beneath its western and southern faces, joining the Yang-tse-kiang near the western angle of the city wall, and thus serving as a moat. On the north and east the city rose to a range of heights, and at some distance away there was a steep hill connected by a narrow ridge with a lower height, both of which commanded the northern angle of the city. On each there was a joss-house. The island of Kin-shan lay little more than a thousand yards from the entrance of the canal and the western suburb of the city. It proved to be a mere rock, not more than a few hundred yards in circumference, and quite useless for military purposes because commanded from the shore; but it was employed by Sir Hugh as a means of observation.

The assault was fixed for the morning of July 21, and as the capture of Woosung had been a purely naval operation, the place of honour was, on this occasion, given to the military forces. A considerable number of Chinese troops had been descried on the northern hills commanding Chinkiangfoo, and three encampments were observed on the slope of the hills south-west of the city. Sir Hugh decided to cut these off, while, at the same time, an assault was being directed against the western wall. For this purpose he divided his troops into three brigades, under Major-General Lord Saltoun, Major-General Schoedde, and Major-General Bartley respectively; in addition to the

Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Montgomerie[1]. The second brigade, under General Schoedde, was entrusted with the attack on the north; the first, under Lord Saltoun, with that on the south-western encampments; and the third, under General Bartley, with the assault on the city walls.

The first and second brigades landed at daylight on the morning of July 21; the latter immediately commenced its movement on the heights, while the former remained to cover the disembarkation of the guns and of the third brigade. Sir Hugh then ordered Lord Saltoun to move on the encampments with the 98th Regiment, nine companies of the Bengal Volunteers, and the flank companies of the 41st Madras Native Infantry, accompanied by three guns and a detachment of Sappers. The remaining companies of the Bengal Volunteers were sent along a path which led them between

[1] First Brigade, under Lord Saltoun: 26th Cameronians, 98th Regiment, Bengal Volunteers, and the flank companies of 41st Madras Native Infantry.

Second Brigade, under Major-General Schoedde: 55th Regiment, 2nd and 6th Madras Native Infantry, and the rifle company of the 36th Madras Native Infantry.

Third Brigade, under Major-General Bartley: 18th Royal Irish, 49th Regiment, 14th Madras Native Infantry.

The first Brigade numbered 83 officers and 2,235 rank and file; the second brigade numbered 60 officers and 1,772 rank and file; the third brigade numbered 68 officers and 2,087 rank and file.

Artillery, under Colonel Montgomerie: European, 26 officers and 318 men; Native, 6 officers and 252 men.

the encampments and the city and enabled them to make an attack upon the enemy's right flank. They were unperceived by the Chinese and had the honour of alone commencing the onslaught: but they were soon supported by Lord Saltoun, who experienced no difficulty in expelling the enemy. Meanwhile the third brigade had been assembled in front of the wall, along with the Cameronians, who had been detached from Lord Saltoun. The guns were in position, and Sir Hugh decided on forcing the west gate. Powder-bags were placed in front of the gate, which was then blown in by Captain Pears. A long archway appeared in front, through which the troops entered. They found themselves in a large outwork, and separated by an inner gate from the town. But, at this moment, the inner gate was seized by General Schoedde, and all further difficulty, in this connexion, was removed.

General Schoedde had been successful in driving the enemy from the northern hills and in destroying their works. He had been further instructed to make a feint upon the north and east walls, but was given discretionary powers to convert his diversion into a real attack, should he deem it advisable. For this purpose, detachments of artillery and sappers had been added to his brigade. He had decided to act upon these powers, had escaladed the walls at the north angle, cleared the ramparts on the western side, and carried, after considerable resistance, the inner gate, where

he met the party which was accompanied by Sir Hugh in person.

The heat was now intolerable, and was telling on the British force, several of whom died from its effects. Sir Hugh was, therefore, anxious to place the men under cover, to await the approach of nightfall before continuing the assault. The Tartar city was yet untouched, and its capture could be safely postponed: but two operations had to be carried through immediately. A body of Tartar troops had been driven, without the possibility of escape, into the western outwork; they refused to surrender, and most of them were shot down or destroyed in the burning houses. It remained to clear the walls and occupy all the gates, and General Bartley's troops, in effecting this object, met with considerable resistance from about 1,000 Tartars, who had obtained cover under some enclosures. Flank attacks from the 48th and 55th Regiments soon dispersed them, and the exhausted men obtained a respite till six o'clock in the evening, when parties were pushed into the Tartar city. They found that the enemy had, as at Woosung, destroyed themselves. The General's house had been burned by his own orders, and he himself had perished in the fire. Sir Hugh's dispatch tells of the horror of the sight—'Dead bodies of Tartars in every house we entered, principally women and children thrown into wells or otherwise murdered by their own people. A great number of those who escaped our fire

CAPTURE OF CHINKEANGFOO.


A Landing place of 2nd Brigade.
B Landing place of 1st and 3rd Brigades.
C Point of escalading by 2nd Brigade.
D Gate of western outwork, blown open.
E Tartar troops encountering H.M. 18th and 49th Regiments.
F Chinese entrenched position attacked by 1st Brigade.
G Mouth of Grand Canal.
CITY OF CHIN-KEANG
Suburbs
Golden Id
Yang-tse-keang River
Scale of One Mile

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committed suicide after destroying their families; the loss of life has been appalling, and it may be said that the Manchu race in this city is extinct.' It was little wonder that Sir Hugh again wrote home, 'I am sick at heart of war and its fearful consequences.' The frightful heat rendered it impossible to take any systematic measures to prevent the Chinese robbers from plundering the town, and the only redeeming feature of the scene was the hope that it would bring about the conclusion of the war.

The British casualties were 144 in all; among whom three officers and thirty-one rank and file were killed. About a seventh of the casualties occurred from the effects of the intense heat of the sun.


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VI

THE TREATY OF NANKING

WHILE the military forces under Sir Hugh Gough were performing their last exploit in China, the naval portion of the expedition was engaged in effecting the main purpose of the movement in the Yang-tse-kiang—the blockade of the Imperial Canal. The channel which we have described as passing immediately under the walls of Chinkiang-foo was only one of three communications between the great river and the southern branch of the canal, while the communications with the northern branch were so numerous as to form 'a network of watercourses.' It was, therefore, no easy task to carry out the design, but by a skilful employment of the ships this object was effected, and, although large quantities of supplies had been conveyed to Peking before the arrival of the Expeditionary Force, yet so large a number of junks, laden with cargoes of all kinds, were prevented from proceeding up the canal, that a considerable impression must have been made at Peking. Signs that the Emperor at last realized the situation were not wanting when, early in August, arrangements were made for the advance upon Nanking, the ancient capital of the Empire.

The time spent by the troops at Chinkiangfoo, short as it was, proved to be disastrous in its effects. The number of dead bodies in the Tartar town rendered it impossible to attempt to bury them in the intense heat which prevailed, and, although the men were quickly withdrawn to the heights above the city, the army suffered some losses from cholera. Apart from the effect of a forward movement upon the mind of the Emperor, it was, therefore, advisable to proceed without delay to Nanking, and the force embarked on July 29, leaving Major-General Schoedde and a small garrison on the heights which commanded both the city and the mouth of the canal. The prevalence of contrary winds delayed the arrival of the whole expedition till August 9, but Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William Parker anchored off Nanking some days before, and concerted measures for an assault, should the Chinese persist in refusing to come to terms. So desirous were they of avoiding the scenes of death and desolation that they had witnessed at Chinkiangfoo, that they offered to spare the city on payment of a ransom. The offer referred to operations against the city alone: the war must be vigorously prosecuted in other directions until the Government sent duly authorized persons to discuss terms with Her Majesty's representative. The brave Tartar troops within the town were ready to die, but unprepared to yield without a struggle, and Sir Hugh, therefore, organized a demonstration of British superiority in arms.

Nanking was a town of vast area; its walls are said to have been, before the coming of the Tartars, some thirty-five miles in circumference, and the Chinese were wont to relate with pride (although the boast may prove more than the length of the walls), how two horsemen, starting at sunrise from the same point and galloping in opposite directions round the walls, would not meet till sunset. At the date of Sir Hugh's attack, the circumference was estimated at twenty miles, and the difficulty of defending such an extent of wall was increased by the nature of the ground and by the fact that the city was commanded by hills. More especially was this the case on the eastern side, where Sir Hugh at once selected, as a base of operations for his artillery, Chungshan, a precipitous mountain overlooking the whole country. 'It was evident,' he says in his dispatch, 'that I could take the city whenever I pleased, by threatening it at such distant points as to prevent the concentration of a large opposing force—the very difficulties of approach affording the means of detaching small parties with impunity to create diversions—but I was well aware that the stand would be made in the Tartar city.' An attempt of this kind would inevitably end in an assault on the Tartar quarter (which, as elsewhere, was separated by a wall from the Chinese city), and in the self-destruction of numberless Tartar soldiers. The Commander-in-Chief therefore resolved to adopt tactics which would be of more value as a demonstration, and

not less effective should it be necessary to proceed to extremities.

The northern angle of Nanking reached to within seven hundred paces of the river, and afforded the only opportunity for a conjoint attack. It was, accordingly, agreed that the ships should be placed in position to attack the north-east corner, while Sir Hugh's attack was made upon the three gates on the eastern side. His intention was to threaten the two flank gates, and to make the real attack upon the central or Taiping gate, which was situated within a few hundred yards of the base of Chung-shan, and to which there was an excellent approach. The attacking party would be covered by the concentrated fire of the artillery from the hill, and 'this point forced,' says the dispatch, 'the Tartar city would virtually be taken, as my guns, introduced by the Taiping gate, could immediately be placed upon an eminence, perfectly commanding the inner wall and town, at a distance of a few hundred yards, whilst the bulk of my force, by a rapid advance on the tower in the centre of the Chinese city, might cut off the troops defending the North and East faces.'

These plans were destined never to be carried out, and we have accordingly described them only in outline. 'Although,' says the historian of China, 'they exhibit the tactical skill of the commander, and no officer was more skilful than Sir Hugh Gough in drawing up a plan of action, their interest and importance have long departed. Suffice it to

say that the battle of Nanking, admirably as it was arranged for us as a complete English victory, was never fought, and, although the great demonstration before this second city of the Empire had much to do with the promptitude with which the terms of peace were agreed upon and ratified, the last operation of the war of 1841–2 was performed without the shedding of blood on the one side or the other[1].'

There is evidence of the existence of a 'peace party' in the councils of the Emperor for some time before the conclusion of the war. As early as June 1, Elepoo had written to Sir Hugh Gough an eloquent letter on the horrors of war, but Elepoo had no authority to enter into negotiations. He had been sent, along with the Emperor's uncle, Keying, to prosecute the war, and it is doubtful if Keying would have approved of negotiations had not the fall of Chapoo brought him to a sense of the danger in which the Empire stood. Elepoo's letter was, however, useful in affording Sir Henry Pottinger an opportunity of stating, in outline, the demands of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and of insisting, in the first place, upon the appointment of Chinese plenipotentiaries. Before the expeditionary force left Chinkeangfoo, informal indications had been given that the Emperor desired to make concessions, and the arrival at Nanking of an Imperial Commission, including

[1] Boulger's *History of China*, vol. ii. p. 132.

Keying and Elepoo, on August 12, gave fresh reason for hope. By that date Sir Hugh was ready to strike his great blow, but he withheld his hand while the preliminaries were being arranged. The Commissioners hesitated to produce the document which conferred upon them powers to conclude peace. They were told that, early on the morning of the 15th, the attack would commence. All was in readiness, and it seemed as if Chinese pride were again to be followed by deplorable consequences, when, at midnight on the 14th, they promised to produce the all-important paper. On the 17th August, came the long-expected instructions from Sir Henry Pottinger, requesting the suspension of hostilities.

The demands of Her Majesty's Government included the cession of the island of Hong-Kong, the payment of a total indemnity of twenty-one million dollars, the opening to foreign trade of Canton, Amoy, Foochoofoo, Ningpo, and Shanghai, and the establishment of perfect equality between the Chinese and British representatives in the conduct of official correspondence. They also included the immediate release of all British subjects, and an amnesty for all Chinamen who had acknowledged the invaders. The Emperor empowered the Commissioners to signify his general adhesion to these conditions, and the actual discussion took place in Nanking, while the armaments of Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William Parker were ready, at a moment's notice, to open fire upon

the town. There was, accordingly, no opportunity for trifling, and by August 20, when the Imperial Commissioners paid a formal visit to Sir Henry Pottinger on board the *Cornwallis*, peace was no longer doubtful. On August 26 Sir Henry Pottinger had a conference with the Commissioners within the walls of Nanking, and, on the 29th, the treaty was signed on board the *Cornwallis*, in the presence of the Plenipotentiary, the General, and the Admiral. China had given way on all points, and there were some suspicions that a new trick was contemplated; but the Treaty was immediately ratified by the Emperor.

The nature of the agreement is, like the character of the war itself, foreign to our purpose, but we are, perhaps, justified in pointing out that it left the opium question precisely where it was. Of the twenty-one million dollars which were paid by the Chinese, twelve constituted the war indemnity, three represented lawful debts owed to British subjects, and six were the compensation for the stores of opium destroyed at Canton. But the claim for compensation was based, not upon the legality of the opium trade, but upon the circumstances of its destruction, and Sir Henry Pottinger made no effort to secure any official sanction for the traffic. It might have been wiser if he had done so, for the Chinese failed to understand the attitude of the British Government, which while making no defence of the opium traders, left their suppression entirely to the Chinese Government.

It was a course which may have been in accordance with Western diplomacy, but it left in the minds of the Chinese a constant suspicion of our good faith, which produced grave consequences in the not distant future. But this is the only respect in which the agreement is open to serious criticism. The advantages which had been gained in regard to commerce were freely shared with other nations, without the exertion of any pressure from European Governments. The clause which insisted upon equality between the agents of Her Britannic Majesty and those of the Emperor of China involved, in the view of at least one impartial observer, the real origin of the conflict. At the very beginning of hostilities, the great American Senator, John Quincy Adams, whose word had the combined weight of the opinion of a distinguished jurist and of a statesman who had held the highest office in his country's gift, had defended, in no doubtful language, the justness of the British case. 'The cause of the war,' he said, 'is the Kotow!—the arrogant and insupportable pretensions of China that she will hold commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of the relation between lord and vassal[1].'

No words are required to emphasize the practical value of the treaty—the importance of the cession

[1] Quoted in the *Chinese Repository* for 1842, pp. 274–89.

of Hong-Kong and the opening of the Treaty ports. The complete submission of China was the result of the complete success with which Sir Hugh Gough and Sir William Parker had prosecuted the war, and whatever controversy may rage over the opium question, there can be none as to the wisdom of the policy which had been pursued by the military and naval commanders, the effect of whose joint action had never been diminished by any difference of opinion, and who entertained for each other the deepest respect and affection.

There can be no doubt (said the Duke of Wellington, in proposing a vote of thanks, in the House of Lords, to the Army and the Navy) that the operations of this war were exceedingly difficult. Little was known of China except its enormous population, its great extent, and its immense resources; we knew nothing of the social life of that country; we knew nothing more of its communications than a scanty acquaintance with its rivers and canals; and whether their roads ran along rivers, or in any other way, nobody in this country could give any information, nor could any be acquired. We felt, as everybody must have felt, that it was absolutely necessary, after so many years of negotiation, to carry the war into the heart of the country, in order to make an impression on a people who had manifested so little disposition to render justice, and to come to reasonable terms of peace. The question was as to the mode of doing it; and, considering the complete ignorance which we and all mankind were in with respect to the communications of the country, the difficulties, natural and artificial, which we had to contend with, besides the immense distance from our country

at which the operations must be carried on—we naturally look to the results; and, I must say, there is no individual, however sanguine, who could have expected such success as has been produced by the cordial co-operation of the admiral commanding the fleet and the general commanding the army, and (following their example) of the officers and men in both services.

The usual list of rewards and promotions followed the China war. Resolutions were passed in both Houses of Parliament; a medal and twelve months' batta were (after considerable correspondence) granted both to the military and to the naval forces employed. The Admiral was raised to the dignity of G.C.B. That honour had already been conferred upon Sir Hugh Gough after the assault in Canton (although it was only after the conclusion of the Treaty that he was invested with it by the Plenipotentiary), and he was made a Baronet of the United Kingdom.

Sir Hugh Gough's services in China were not quite over, for he had still to spend some months in making the necessary arrangements for carrying out the provisions of the treaty. As soon as it was formally ratified by the Emperor, and the first instalment of the indemnity was paid, the Expeditionary Force retired from the Yang-tse-kiang and from Chinhai, but garrisons were to be retained in the islands of Chusan and Kulangsu until the indemnity was fully paid, and the Chinese had opened the ports to foreign trade. Sir Hugh left Nanking in the end of September, and, after spending

some time at Chusan and Kulangsu, he reached Hong Kong in the end of November. When all was ready for his departure, an outburst of violence among the mob of Canton threatened the safety of the British merchants, and, towards the middle of December, he found it necessary once again to proceed up the Canton river. It seemed at first a critical moment, but it soon became clear that the outbreak was popular and not countenanced by the authorities, and Sir Hugh was at liberty to return. The merchants were much alarmed by the prospect of the disappearance from Canton of the *Proserpine*, the steamer in which the General had come, and Sir Hugh at once offered to leave the *Proserpine* to remain near the factories, and to make his own journey in a schooner. 'The Commander-in-Chief of the land forces,' says Colonel Mountain[1], 'was two days on board the schooner, huddled with nine other officers into a small cabin, where the littlest fellow amongst us could not stand, and on mighty short commons to boot.' On December 20 Sir Hugh sailed from Hong-Kong to Singapore, where he broke up the Expeditionary Force, and himself returned to Calcutta.

The selection of Calcutta instead of Madras for his arrival in India was the result of a communication on the subject of the command at Madras, to which, it will be remembered, Sir Hugh Gough had been appointed. It so happened that the post

[1] *Memoirs*, p. 214.

of Governor of Madras was also vacant, and a soldier, Lord Tweeddale, was selected to fill it. The Government now thought it expedient to unite the two commands, and the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, Lord Hill, had the unpleasant task of informing the victorious commander of the expedition to China that it had been decided that he should be deprived of the office to which he had been nominated. Sir Hugh was not a rich man: to a poor younger son, as he himself remarked, there were attractions in India. But it may be said of him, without any affectation, that he never placed his own claims in opposition to an arrangement which was clearly beneficial to the public service, and the letter in which he expressed his acquiescence in the decision of the Government is characteristic of his general attitude. We print it in full, for it was destined to be read to the House of Commons by Sir Robert Peel[1]:—

HEAD QUARTERS, Ship *Marion*, off Nanking,
September 15, 1842.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 30th of April. However mortifying it may be to me to find myself deprived of the appointment to which I had been so graciously nominated, I beg to assure your Lordship that I bow, without repining, to any measure that may be considered beneficial to the interests of my country. To serve that country in the higher walks of a profession which I entered

[1] Cf. vol. ii. p. 111.

as a child, I came to India, and especially to China, and I trust your Lordship will believe that, while my Sovereign considered my services useful, they were, as they ever shall be, freely and, I hope, energetically rendered; but when they are no longer required, or when the public exigencies in such an important portion of our foreign possessions as Madras are deemed to clash with my individual advantage, I hope I may say that I am one of the last men in the army who would not readily sacrifice self-interest. My gracious Sovereign's unsolicited nomination of me to the chief command at Madras was received by me with thankfulness; and whenever, for the furtherance of Her Majesty's service, it became expedient to place another in that situation, whether in a single or conjoint capacity, I should not have wished my private interests to stand in the way of the public good. That I feel rather disappointed, I cannot deny; but I am not the less grateful to my Sovereign for her gracious kindness towards me; or the less sincerely and warmly thankful to your Lordship for the renewed proof of kind consideration which your letter conveys. With the earnest and anxious prayer that the union of the civil government and military command at Madras may fully meet the expectations of the Government.

I have, &c.,
H. Gough, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Expeditionary Land Force.

The Rt. Honble.
General Lord Hill, G.C.B.,
Commanding the Army in Chief,
Horse Guards,
London.

His private correspondence shows that this high tone was not adopted for official letters only, and

he was becoming reconciled to the prospect of leaving India, although he still entertained some expectation of the offer of an appointment of some kind when he reached Calcutta. This hope was destined to be fulfilled. Sir Hugh reached Government House on February 7, and received, along with Lord Ellenborough's letter of congratulation, a private intimation that he was to be nominated to succeed Sir Jasper Nicolls in the early autumn. The position of Commander-in-Chief in India represented Sir Hugh's highest ambition, and he could rejoice in it for other besides professional reasons, for he and Lady Gough could look forward to summers spent in cool hill stations, and it was probable that the nature of his work would leave him little time to be spent in the heat of Calcutta. An official announcement could not arrive for some time, but, meanwhile, he had sufficient to occupy his attention in the enthusiasm of his reception at Calcutta:—

Do not be surprised (he writes to Lady Gough[1]) to see me walk in upon my head, for in truth I am capsized, as you will see. All the feasting and flummery I have had here has quite turned my head. Yesterday was the grand fête by the inhabitants of Calcutta. Plain folk as we are cannot find ourselves at home, being all at once jumped up to all the honours usually paid to the Governor-General in the height of his greatest popularity. Upwards of 1,000 people were assembled at the Town Hall, Sir Lawrence Peel, Chief Justice, in the

[1] February 17, 1843.

Chair, and an excellent Chairman he made. There were four Toasts—the Queen, Sir H. Gough, the conqueror and pacificator of China, Sir William Parker, and the Army of Afghanistan—each proposed by complimentary speeches. That touching me was the most complimentary and flattering I ever received. I attempted to return thanks, John [Col. J. B. Gough] says I did so admirably. I feel I did not, for, tho' gratified and flattered, I did not witness those approving faces I could have wished and which always made praise so grateful. . . . I am a great favourite with the Ladies here. Think of one actually asking me to dance last night, and think of me being fool enough to comply. You see dotage creeps on apace. But I am determined not to be old when I get to Bangalore amongst those dear ones so loved.

From balls, illuminations, and public dinners, Sir Hugh Gough was glad to escape to that family reunion to which he had looked forward through his two years in China. His eldest son, George, had accompanied him through a portion of the campaign, had exhibited personal courage worthy of his father's son, and had been of much assistance to the General, until failure of health forced him to return home, as a similar cause had necessitated the departure from China of Colonel Haines, Sir Hugh's son-in-law. His nephew, Colonel J. B. Gough, had also been constantly at his side, and for his devoted service and that of Colonel Mountain, the old soldier owed and expressed sincere gratitude. He had, therefore, not been quite alone, but his letters are full of references to the meeting with

Lady Gough at Bangalore, and he deplored the necessity of remaining to be fêted at Calcutta, and the consequent postponement of his home-coming. He was worried, too, by the difficulties which invariably oppress the mind of a successful general—the recommendations which follow a campaign. 'Do not for a moment believe,' he writes, 'that I shall be annoyed at becoming a walking gentleman[1]. Never was there a man would with greater ease throw off the pomp and vanities of war. God knows there is not much real satisfaction in attempting to do justice with the whole bent of your soul, and to find your task only half accomplished.'

Sir Hugh reached Madras on March 6, and found numerous letters of congratulation awaiting him, and a popular reception which compelled him to remain there somewhat longer than he wished. 'The whole of the inhabitants wishing to give a grand Ball and Supper to the China officers,' he wrote, 'I will not forsake my friends in the hour of need.' His few days' residence in Madras were spent at the house of his son-in-law, Mr. Arbuthnot, where he was rejoiced by the company of his daughter and of a bevy of grandchildren, about whom he writes enthusiastically. On March 18, he reached Bangalore and Lady Gough.

Sir Hugh's intention, on hearing that he was not to have the command at Madras, had been to return

[1] This letter was written before Sir Hugh had heard of the probability of his becoming Commander-in-Chief.

to England, after spending two months' leave at Bangalore, but the receipt of a letter from the Governor-General had necessitated a change in his plans even before the possibility of the command of the Bengal army had been suggested. On hearing of the tumult at Canton in December, 1842, Lord Ellenborough considered the state of China so unsettled that he wrote: 'I should with much regret see your Excellency leave India for England at a period when your services may still be required in China, where the knowledge of your presence would be worth Battalions in the pacific settlement of all unadjusted questions; and I should hope that your Excellency would find it convenient to remain at Bangalore, or at some place where the Government can easily communicate with you. If there should arise in China a state of affairs indicating a probable renewal of hostilities, or the expediency of making a demonstration of Force, your Excellency has full authority at once to return and to resume your command[1].' It was impossible to refuse such a request, and the private announcement made on the General's reaching Calcutta was a scarcely more decisive reason for remaining in India. A week after his arrival at Bangalore, Sir Hugh received a semi-official letter from the Duke of Wellington, confirming Lord Ellenborough's promise. In making the announcement, the Duke of Wellington wrote:—

[1] Lord Ellenborough to Sir Hugh Gough, January 20, 1843.

STRATFIELDSAYE,
5th January, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

As I am writing to you upon other subjects, I cannot omit to congratulate you upon the compleat success of the service in which you have been lately employed, so much to your own Honour and the publick benefit.

It has given me great pleasure to have had it in my power to suggest, and that the Government should have so readily attended to my suggestion, that you should be appointed Commander-in-Chief in India.

This is one of the highest, if not the highest situation which an officer in Her Majesty's service can hold, and I do not doubt that you will equally as heretofore in other situations perform its duties with Honour to your own Character, and to the publick Advantage.

You may rely upon my affording you every assistance in my power.

Believe me,
Ever yours most faithfully,
WELLINGTON.

Almost immediately after receiving this letter, Sir Hugh was prostrated by an attack of China fever, which rendered essential a change of air. It was decided that he should go to the town of Mekara, in Coorg, in the southern uplands on the borders of Mysore. At Mekara he received, in the beginning of May, an official announcement of his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of all Her Majesty's forces serving in the East Indies, with the local rank of General. He was, at the same time, nominated a member of the Governor-General's

Council. He was naturally anxious to proceed at once to his command, and to take up the important duties that had fallen to him, but the attacks of fever proved persistent and recurrent, and through the early summer of 1843 he was condemned to an inactive life at Mekara. It was his last experience of leisure for six years to come.

BOOK IV

INDIA: THE MAHRATTAS AND THE SIKHS

Introductory

1. The Gwalior Campaign
2. The Army Policy of Sir Hugh Gough
3. The Sikhs and the Indian Government
4. Moodkee and Ferozeshah
5. Sobraon and the end of the First Sikh War
6. The Results of the Sutlej Campaign
7. The Outbreak at Multan
8. The Government and the Commander-in-Chief
9. The Army of the Punjab
10. Ramnuggur and the Chenab
11. Chillianwalla
12. Multan and the Irregular Warfare
13. Gujerat
14. After Gujerat

INTRODUCTORY

THE story of Sir Hugh Gough's life and work in India covers a period of less than seven years, but it forms so important an episode in his career that we must devote to it many pages. It is with India that he is most closely associated, and the event which his name most readily recalls to mind is the conquest of the Punjab. The years from 1843 to 1849 are the most strenuous of his strenuous life, and they form a great epoch in the history of our Indian Empire. They were years of storm and stress; of danger and detraction and of triumph and fame; and they have left a record which bears the mark of these vicissitudes. Controversies and disputes of many kinds have raged round the names of the men who, during these years, brought about the extension, and wellnigh the completion, of British dominion in India; and with these difficulties and controversies our thoughts will be largely occupied. Two pitfalls await him who would write of such things. In his eagerness to place before the reader facts and explanations of facts which have never seen the light, and the absence of which has resulted in an unfair general estimate of men and of events, he may forget what is fair to the memory of others, and he is also likely to confuse his readers with the superabundance of his material. Both

these dangers have been ever before the eyes of the present writer, and the attempt to avoid the second has been not the least difficult portion of his task. Indian history is so intricate, and it is in places so familiar, that elucidatory notes seem now inadequate and now superfluous. It may, however, be convenient to devote, in the first place, a few paragraphs to the constitutional and political condition of India in 1843.

When Sir Hugh Gough was appointed Commander-in-Chief in India, that country was still governed in accordance with the system of double control established by Pitt's India Act of 1785, subject to modifications made at various times, and especially on the occasion of the renewals of the Company's Charter in 1813 and 1833 [1]. The Court of Proprietors had been deprived of its privileges in 1785, and the Government was placed in the hands of the Court of Directors and the body of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, generally known as the Board of Control. In 1833 the Company lost its commercial character, but it remained an important factor in administration. Its powers were exercised through the Court of Directors, which enjoyed a right of patronage extending to all Indian appointments; but nominations to great offices such as those of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief had to receive the consent of the Crown,

[1] For details on this subject the reader is referred to Sir Courtenay Ilbert's historical introduction to his work on 'The Government of India.'

and less important nominations were sanctioned by the Board of Control. The duties of this latter body were largely performed by its President, who corresponded to a modern Secretary of State for India. The Board of Control received all minutes and orders of the Court of Directors, had power of approval, disapproval or modification, and so could overrule any decision of the Company. In cases where secrecy was necessary, the Board of Control communicated, not with the Court of Directors, but with three of their number who formed a Secret Committee.

In India, the supreme authority rested with the Governor-General, who was also Governor of the Presidency of Bengal. In normal circumstances, this authority was exercised by the Governor-General of India in Council, but, in case of emergency, the Governor-General could act without consulting his Council, and, when there was a serious difference of opinion, could take steps in accordance with his own judgement, even in opposition to a majority of the Council. The office of Governor-General might also be held in conjunction with that of Commander-in-Chief. The Council numbered three members, with the addition of a fourth for purposes of legislation. While the Governor-General in Council exercised ultimate control, each of the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras had a Governor and Council of its own, although these Councils had no independent legislative authority. More important, for our purpose, than the existence of separate Councils was the arrangement by which each Presidency had a separate

army system. The head of the army in the Bengal Presidency was always the General Commanding-in-Chief in the East Indies; but only the Bengal troops were under his immediate direction. The 'general control' which he possessed over the Madras army and the Bombay army was limited not merely by the powers which, legally or by military etiquette, were exercised by the local Commander-in-Chief, but also by the administrative functions of the Governor of the Presidency and his Council. We shall see that this division of authority seriously hampered Sir Hugh Gough at an important crisis; it frequently proved most inconvenient, but it was not abolished till 1894.

The political horizon in 1843 was greatly troubled. The years of peace which India had enjoyed under Lord William Bentinck had left an unavoidable heritage of unsolved problems for his successor. To the difficulties which were forced upon him, Lord Auckland added the most troublesome of all—that of hostile relations with Afghanistan. In circumstances which it is difficult to regard as necessitating such action, he determined to intervene in the domestic affairs of that unruly people, and to reinstate at Kabul a deposed and exiled Afghan ruler, Shah Sujah. In the beginning of 1839, Lord Auckland sent an army to traverse the immense distance that separated Afghanistan from British India. It was at first successful, and, in the month of August, Shah Sujah was restored. A garrison of 10,000 men was left in Afghanistan, stationed chiefly

at Kabul and Kandahar. For two years, Afghan discontent smouldered, and the policy of intervention seemed to be justified. But in November, 1841, a general insurrection broke out; the British General was old and unfit to cope with the situation, and he finally was forced to make peace with the enemy and to evacuate Kabul. On its way, the Afghans attacked the retreating force, and literally cut it to pieces. Of the men who left Kabul on the 6th of January, 1842, one single survivor reached Jellalabad, where (and at Kandahar) a British garrison held out. When the news reached Agra, a Brigade was sent to relieve Jellalabad, but, in spite of nominal aid[1] rendered by the Maharajah of Lahore, Shere Singh, it was unable to proceed beyond Peshawur. Several months elapsed before the disgrace was in any sense removed, and it was not till the middle of September that the British reoccupied Kabul. Even when a British army was again in possession of the country, it was clearly impossible to maintain the attitude we had adopted in 1839. The rival candidate for the Throne, Dost Mahommed, was permitted to return and to take the place of Shah Sujah, who had been murdered. Lord Ellenborough, who had succeeded Lord Auckland as Governor-General, was forced to content himself with the destruction of some public buildings, with the seizure of the gates of the temple at Somnath (which had been carried off from India centuries before),

[1] Cf. infra, pp. 370–1.

and with a triumphal march from Kabul to the Sutlej, where a great review was held to impress the princes of India with the power of the British army, whose invincibility they had begun to doubt. Respect for the British arms (combined with distrust of British intentions) was the result of the next important event of Lord Ellenborough's reign—the quarrel with the Amirs of Sindh which led, in February, 1843, to the defeat of the Beloochee army at Meanee, by Sir Charles Napier, and to the annexation of the province of Sindh.

Three difficult questions remained to be settled, and on them depended the stability of British rule in India. Two of these were connected with our relations with independent native states. The Mahrattas at Gwalior and the Sikhs in the Punjab were alike possessed of strong and well disciplined forces, armed and trained on European principles and by European officers. Alike at Gwalior and at Lahore, internal factions threatened the Indian Government with a sudden invasion from one or both of these armies. The third problem related to the condition of the Indian army and the signs of insubordination and mutiny which were causing grave anxiety to the authorities. When Sir Hugh Gough sailed from India, in January, 1850, two of these menaces to the preservation of British supremacy had disappeared; the third remained to place that supremacy in the greatest peril that the British have known in India. To each of them in turn we must devote our attention.

I

THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN

MACAULAY'S Essay on Lord Clive has rendered familiar the ancient terror of the Mahratta name. 'The highlands which bordered on the western sea-coast of India,' he wrote in a memorable paragraph, 'poured forth . . . a race which was long the terror of every native power and which, after many desperate and doubtful struggles, yielded only to the fortune and genius of England. It was under the reign of Aurungzebe [1658–1707] that this wild clan of plunderers first descended from their mountains; and soon after his death, every corner of his wide empire learned to tremble at the mighty name of the Mahrattas. Many fertile viceroyalties were entirely subdued by them. Their dominions stretched across the peninsula from sea to sea. Mahratta captains reigned at Poonah, at Gwalior, in Guzerat[1], in Berar, and in Tanjore. Nor did they, though they had become great sovereigns, therefore cease to be freebooters. . . . Every region which was not subject to their rule was wasted by their incursions. Wherever their kettledrums were heard, the peasant threw his bag of rice on his

[1] Not the fort of Gujerat in the Punjab, the scene of Lord Gough's victory in 1849, but the large province north of Bombay.

shoulder, hid his small savings in his girdle, and fled with his wife and children to the mountains or the jungles, to the milder neighbourhood of the hyaena and the tiger. . . . Even the European factors trembled for their magazines. Less than a hundred years ago[1] it was thought necessary to fortify Calcutta against the horsemen of Berar, and the name of the Mahratta ditch still preserves the memory of the danger.' The genius of Clive and Hastings had deprived the Mahrattas of their opportunity of succeeding to the dominion of the Great Mogul, but the decisive conflict between them and the British power was reserved for the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the brilliant campaign of 1803, Lake inflicted on the Mahrattas the severe defeat of Alighur, and gave Delhi and Agra to the British, and by the final victory of Laswari, snatched from the enemy all their possessions in Hindostan proper[2]. Further to the south, simultaneously with Lake's operations, a still greater soldier was engaged in the same task :—

> 'This is he that far away
> Against the myriads of Assaye
> Clashed with his fiery few and won.'

Wellington's last blow was struck at Argaon on November the 28th, and, ere the close of this year, peace had been made on terms which deprived the Mahrattas of the great imperial cities and left the

[1] Macaulay's Essay on Clive was first published in 1840.

[2] i. e. India north of the Nerbadda, with the exception of the Punjab, Bengal, and Behar.

British with no independent state between Calcutta and the Carnatic. Fourteen years later, in the war of 1817–18, the minor Mahratta princes were subdued, and Sindhia, the Maharajah of Gwalior, would probably have shared their fate had not the pressure of our armies upon his dominions prevented him from entering into the contest. When Daulat Rao Sindhia died in 1827, the state of Gwalior extended from the Chumbul to the Tapti. But the districts actually ruled by the Rajah of Gwalior were scattered over this great area to such an extent as to draw from Bishop Heber the remark that 'not even Swabia or the Palatinate can offer a more checkered picture of interlaced sovereignties. . . . In the heart of this territory which on our English maps bears Sindhia's colour, are many extensive districts belonging to Holkar, Ameer Khân, the Rajah of Kotah, &c., and here scarcely any two villages together belong to the same sovereign. Sindhia, however, though all this is usually reckoned beyond his boundary, has the lion's share[1].' To control this large and scattered kingdom Daulat Rao Sindhia had maintained a large army, which had been estimated[2] as numbering 20,000 infantry, about 15,000 cavalry, and 250 guns. His capital, Gwalior, was situated between the Chumbul and the Sind; since it had become the royal residence (after the loss of Delhi and Agra) a large town had grown up round the

[1] *Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India*, 1824–5, by Bishop Heber (1828), vol. ii. pp. 68–9.

[2] Cf. *The Asiatic Journal*, May, 1840.

ancient fort, believed to be impregnable until its capture by Popham and Bruce in 1780. Daulat Rao Sindhia was succeeded by his kinsman Jankoji, who had been adopted by the widow of the late Rajah and who remained under her control till 1833, when, in spite of Lord William Bentinck's intervention, he banished her from the Gwalior territory. Jankoji was a man of worthless character, and his administration was feeble and extravagant. He died unregretted in 1843, leaving no heir. His widow, the Rani Tara Bai, following the example of her predecessor, adopted a boy nearly related to her husband; she herself was about twelve years of age and the new Rajah, Jeeahjee Rao Singh, was four years younger. The dominions of Gwalior were in such close contact with British territories and with principalities under British protection that Lord Ellenborough, on hearing of the death of the Maharajah, proceeded to Agra, to watch the progress of events[1]. The immediate result was satisfactory; the Rani conducted the Government in conjunction with a maternal uncle of the late Rajah, known as the Mama Sahib; and the Governor-General was able to report to the Queen on March 21st, that his 'movement' to Agra has apparently had the desired effect of establishing, without contest, a strong government at Gwalior in the person of Mama Sahib, who feels that the support which has been given to him by the British representative has practically given to him the regency.

[1] *Lord Ellenborough's Indian Administration*, pp. 66–7.

It is to be hoped that the settlement which has been made at Gwalior will ultimately lead to some improvement in the condition of that ill-governed country; and immediately to the adoption of decisive measures for the suppression of plunderers upon the frontier[1].' Three months later, he had to describe a very different situation. 'Until the 20th of May, everything at Gwalior wore a favourable appearance, and the authority of the Regent never appeared to have a stronger foundation than the day before the intrigue commenced which has ended in his downfall. . . . Whatever the cause, her Highness [the Rani] gave her whole support to the faction hostile to the Regent[2].' That faction was headed by a minister of the late Rajah, the Dada Khasjee, and the two rivals are known as the Mama and the Dada—Indian names which, for once, have the advantage of familiarity, if also something of grotesqueness, to European ears. The Mama had married his niece to the Rajah, and it is possible that the Rani feared that he would now be strong enough to act without her. She placed at the disposal of the Dada funds for the payment of his rebellious troops. Lord Ellenborough did not interfere, beyond advising the Mama to retire from Gwalior, and promising him personal protection; he still hoped that there might be 'no outrage which would render necessary the bringing together of

[1] *Lord Ellenborough's Indian Administration*, pp. 72-3.

[2] Lord Ellenborough to the Queen, June 8, 1843, ibid. p. 81.

troops for the vindication of the honour of the British Government.' He further ordered the British Resident (Lieut.-Colonel Spiers) to remove from Gwalior to Dholpur, outside Sindhia's territory. The Dada took some steps offensive to the Indian Government by replacing, 'in situations from which they had been removed by the late Maharajah on the representation of the British Resident, many persons notorious for their hostility to British interests, and for their connexion with plunderers upon our frontier[1].' There had been a considerable amount of riot and bloodshed at Gwalior, and the power of the Dada really depended upon the army, from which all European and half-caste officers had been dismissed. In these circumstances, Lord Ellenborough decided, in the middle of August, to form at Agra an Army of Observation, numbering about 12,000 men, besides artillery[2]. The threatening aspect of affairs in the Punjab and the encouragement given to untrustworthy tributaries, such as Holkar, by the successful defiance of the British at Gwalior, combined with disturbances on the borders to force the Governor-General to take this step. 'Your Majesty,' he wrote in defending his policy, 'will readily perceive that the continued existence of a hostile Government at Gwalior would be inconsistent with the continuance of our permanent influence in India, by which alone its peace is preserved. It would be inconsistent with the character

[1] *Lord Ellenborough's Indian Administration*, p. 91.
[2] Ibid. p. 92.

of our Government in a country wherein, more than any other, character is strength. Its result would be, at no distant time, a combination against us of chiefs and princes impatient of all restraint, and humiliated by our supremacy as now exhibited to them.' He was well aware of the serious nature of the step which he had taken, although he still hoped that it would not be 'necessary to move a man across the frontier[1].'

Matters were in this condition when the new Commander-in-Chief reached Calcutta in the beginning of August. On his arrival the Governor-General wrote to him thus: 'I am delighted to hear that you have arrived. We want you very much. You can have but little rest in Calcutta, for the state of affairs at Gwalior makes it necessary that your own Camp should be formed at Cawnpore on the 15th of October, and a large Camp of Exercise and Observation (if not for operations in the field) in the vicinity of Agra by the 1st November. If you did not go up then, I should be obliged to go myself[2].' On the 12th of September, Sir Hugh Gough started from Calcutta. Ere he could reach Cawnpore a great danger had arisen and had been averted. The Dada threatened to send troops into British territory to seize the person of the Mama, but he was restrained from carrying out his purpose, and peace was maintained. The murder of Shere Singh at Lahore, on the 15th of

[1] *Lord Ellenborough's Indian Administration*, p. 92.

[2] Lord Ellenborough to Sir Hugh Gough, August 8, 1843.

September, turned the attention of the Government to the Punjab, and involved the strengthening of the troops on the Sutlej frontier. When the situation became known to Sir Hugh, who had meanwhile been engaged in an inquiry into the nature of the localities and the provisions for defence, he, on the 4th of October, recommended to Lord Ellenborough the formation of a second Army of Observation to watch the Sutlej frontier (cf. pp. 365 et seq.). This army was, meanwhile, placed under the command of Sir Robert Dick, until some change in our relations with Gwalior should set the Commander-in-Chief free to take charge of operations in the north-west.

The military problem at Gwalior was no less difficult than the political. 'To assemble an army in India,' writes Sir Harry Smith, 'requires much arrangement and consideration. There are various points at which the maintenance of an armed force is indispensable; the extent of country in our occupation entails in all concentrations particularly long and tedious marches; lastly, the season of the year must be rigidly attended to, for such is the fickleness of disease and its awful ravages, that it would need an excess of folly to leave it out of account[1].' Sir Hugh Gough wished to collect about 20,000 men for operations against Gwalior. This army he proposed not to concentrate at Agra, but to divide into two portions, the right wing to operate from Agra, and the left (under Sir John

[1] *Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith*, vol. ii. p. 124.

Grey) from Bundelcund. 'According to the rules of strategy and correct principles of combination,' says Sir Harry Smith, 'this division of the threatening or invading forces may with great reason be questioned, when we reflect that the army of Gwalior consisted of 22,000 veteran troops, and for years had been disciplined by European officers and well supplied with artillery, and thus an overwhelming force might have been precipitated on Grey, and his army destroyed, for he was perfectly isolated and dependent on his own resources alone. This, however,' adds Sir Harry, 'had not escaped the observation and due consideration of the Commander-in-Chief[1].' This criticism, which Sir Harry Smith proceeds to answer, has frequently been made upon Sir Hugh Gough's strategy. It is applicable only to this extent—that the strength of the enemy was not sufficiently appreciated. The Commander-in-Chief was a stranger to the intricacies of Indian politics, and he was misled by the political officers. 'The Politicals,' he says in a private letter written after the campaign, 'entirely deceived me. I thought I should have a mob without leaders, with the heads at variance. I found a well-disciplined, well-organized army, well led and truly gallant[2].' But even if the resources of the enemy had been accurately known, the knowledge would have modified Sir Hugh's scheme in detail only. The reasons for his strategy he explained to

[1] *Autobiography*, vol. ii. pp. 125–6.

[2] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, January 20, 1844.

the Duke of Wellington, as soon as his proposals had received the final sanction of the Governor-General.

Your Grace will not, I trust, consider that I have decided on an injudicious movement by advancing from such opposite points, and leaving to an enemy the option of attacking either Wing, when no support could be afforded it by the other. But I feel perfectly confident that either Wing would be amply sufficient not only to repel, but to overthrow the whole Mahratta force in the field, while, by such a movement, the attacking force would be cut off from the Capital and stronghold of Gwalior, together with what the Mahrattas place so much reliance on, their immoveable park of 300 Guns, by a rapid march of the other Wing. On the other hand, I shall place their Army between two powerful bodies capable of taking in reverse, or of turning the flank of, any position they may take up. It will also enable me, in a great measure, to prevent what I have so long apprehended, the dispersion of their force into bodies of armed men, who would assuredly become bands of Robbers, and make incursions into our territories[1]

These sentences may be taken as the key to Sir Hugh Gough's policy in all his Indian wars. One single decisive blow, sufficient to satisfy the enemy that he had much to learn from the European in the art of war, and that, man for man, the British soldier was the superior of even the Mahratta or the Sikh; no prolongation of hostilities into dangerous seasons, and no long pursuits over

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to the Duke of Wellington, December 17, 1843.

difficult ground—these were the objects which the Commander-in-Chief kept always before him. In the present instance there were additional reasons for the division of the army. Symptoms of restlessness had been observed in Bundelcund, and in the Gwalior possessions in Malwa, and if these districts were left in undisturbed communication with Gwalior, the result might be a revolt over a large area, while the presence of a British force in the regions south of Gwalior would be a check upon any such tendency.

A still further danger was involved in any prolongation of hostilities at Gwalior, for it will be remembered that at this time our relations with the Punjab were most critical, and any weakness or hesitation either in the political negotiations or in the military measures of the British would have exposed the Government to the grave danger of a combination of Sikh and Mahratta. The necessities of the case, therefore, amply justified the decision of the Commander-in-Chief to secure an immediate result, even at the risk of a division of his army which would have been impossible in the case of a European enemy. 'As we calculate on the power of an enemy,' says Sir Harry Smith, 'so may we estimate what, according to his system of operations, he is likely to attempt. On this occasion it was considered that if the enemy made a descent on Grey, his division was of sufficient force to defend itself, while our main army would have rapidly moved on Gwalior and conquered it without

a struggle through the absence of the chief part of its army, (for strategy is totally unknown to a native army, which usually posts itself on a well-chosen position and awaits an attack)[1].'

The Commander-in-Chief arrived at a decision on this important question early in the month of October, and he at once proceeded to arrange for the composition and movements of the two wings of the Army of Exercise. Many incidental difficulties arose to interfere with the arrangements he made, and, as the autumn advanced, fresh complications brought about considerable changes in detail. Unacquainted as he was with the topography of the country, he had some difficulty in coming to a conclusion with regard to the precise locality where the wings might assemble. Political negotiations moved slowly, and military arrangements could not be allowed to advance beyond them. But Sir Hugh's time was fully occupied in directing the formation of his own army, in giving orders for the reinforcements for the Punjab frontier, and in mastering the geographical conditions both on the Chumbul and on the Sutlej.

The fort of Gwalior stands upon an isolated rock resembling the situation of the Castle of Edinburgh or of Stirling. It is of great natural strength and, with proper artillery, was capable of considerable resistance. The town of Gwalior lay on the east side of the fort, with which it communicated by means of a stairway, cut in the rock, so gradual that

[1] *Autobiography*, vol. ii. p. 126.



THE FORT OF GWALIOR, 1843

elephants could be made to ascend it. The fort had already been twice in British possession (in 1779 and 1803), but had been restored to the Maharajah. The town and fort of Gwalior could be approached by the British in the two ways to which we have already referred. It was situated in the northernmost part of Sindhia's scattered dominions, at a distance of about sixty-five miles from the city of Agra. The British districts of Agra and Etawah bounded the Gwalior state on the north-east; the protected states of Dholpore and Rajputana were coterminous with it on the north-west. Along the whole of these frontiers, the boundary line was the river Chumbul; the north-eastern corner of Gwalior extends almost to the point where the united waters of the Chumbul and the Jumna are joined by a smaller tributary known as the Sind, which separated Gwalior from the British districts and protected states of Bundelcund. Further to the south, the eastern boundaries were the British territories of Saugor and Nerbudda. On the south and west, Gwalior was bounded by native states more or less under the protection of the Governor-General, but with these we are not directly concerned. The boundaries which Sir Hugh's Army of Exercise was formed to threaten were the Chumbul and the Sind; the right wing of the army, marching from Agra, must, in case of necessity, cross the Chumbul, and the left wing, assembling in the Bundelcund province of Jhansi, would find the Sind between it and Gwalior territory.

Early in November, the Commander-in-Chief in-

stituted a series of inquiries into the number and locality of the fords on these rivers. He at once decided that a bridge of boats must be established at Dholpore, in order to maintain communications with the magazine at Agra; but he desired that, if possible, the actual crossing point of the right wing should be nearer that of the left. This, however, proved, on subsequent investigation, to be impracticable, and Sir Hugh had to resolve upon crossing at Dholpore. In the beginning of December, the right wing assembled at Agra. It consisted of two regiments of European and six of native infantry, one regiment of European cavalry and four of native cavalry, with horse and field artillery and a battering train. The left wing was ordered to assemble in two divisions—one at Jhansi and the other at Koonch; both to hold themselves in readiness to march to a prearranged position in order to cross the Sind. These instructions were given both for the purpose of preventing unnecessary marching, and in order to maintain a more complete check upon disaffected districts, and the plan had the further advantage of rendering the enemy uncertain from what direction the wing was to approach Gwalior. The point finally chosen for the passage of the Sind was Chandpore, about thirty-eight miles south-east of Gwalior, where the ford was, in the dry season, less than two feet in depth. Sir Hugh forbade General Grey to divide his force when actually crossing. On the junction of its two parts, Grey was to take command of the whole force. But, meanwhile, all such arrangements

THE STATE OF GWALIOR



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were only provisional; the decision of the Governor-General remained to be made.

Lord Ellenborough reached Agra on the 11th of December. He had come up to the front in the hope that his presence would aid in the maintenance of peace. The situation at Gwalior had been modified, in the beginning of November, by a counter-revolution, which resulted in the imprisonment of the Dada. The Governor-General hoped that a demonstration of the effective power of the British army might be sufficient to secure all that he desired at Gwalior, and on the day of his arrival, Sir Hugh Gough gave directions for the march of the two wings upon the Chumbul and the Sind respectively. The whole of the right wing was to be at Dholpore on the 20th of December, and to be ready to cross on the 22nd; the brigades of the left wing were ordered to unite at Chandpore on the same day. It seemed at first as if Lord Ellenborough's hopes were to be realized. The first brigade moved from Agra on the 12th, and the presence of the Governor-General, together with the alarming military situation, brought the Durbar to a sense of its danger. Lord Ellenborough based his right to interfere upon the long-neglected Treaty of Burhampur (1804), by which the British Government agreed to aid the Maharajah in maintaining a settled government. He was now able to point to the Dada as the cause of the recent disorder, and the offending minister was immediately given up by the Durbar. On the 18th of December, the Dada was a prisoner in the

hands of Lord Ellenborough, who was now approaching Dholpore. This removed the immediate difficulty, but the Governor-General considered himself justified in insisting upon the reduction of the Gwalior army. 'It is a matter of great moment,' he told Queen Victoria, 'to reduce the strength of the army maintained by the Gwalior State. It has long been the real master of the State. It is in amount wholly disproportioned to its revenues and wants; and it never can be otherwise than a subject of disquietude to have an army of thirty thousand men within a few days' march of Agra. The existence of an army of such strength in that position must very seriously embarrass the disposition of troops we might be desirous of making to meet a coming danger from the Sutlej [1].' The late Maharajah had placed a small force of some fourteen hundred men under British officers, and Lord Ellenborough proposed an increase of this force, and asked the consent of the Gwalior Government to the British administration of certain districts whose revenues should be assigned to the maintenance of this force. It was intended to select the districts bordering on the disturbed frontiers of Bundelcund and Saugor. 'This,' said Lord Ellenborough, 'is no new arrangement. It is only the extension of one long established with the ready concurrence of the Gwalior State [2].'

The Governor-General was under the impression

[1] *Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough*, pp. 105–6.
[2] Ibid.

that many of the Gwalior chiefs would willingly acquiesce in the reduction of the army, but that they would require active aid from the British or, at least, the support of a British force within their territories. With this in view, he took the grave responsibility of ordering the advance. Upon the wisdom or the justice of this decision, it is unnecessary to offer any opinion. Lord Ellenborough himself gave the most unqualified assurance that his object was the maintenance of peace, and that his aim was a settlement by mutual agreement, not annexation. In order to avoid creating undue alarm at Gwalior, he requested the Commander-in-Chief to leave behind, at Agra, his battering-train, with the exception of ten guns; but he seems to have underestimated the natural effect of the advance of two armies, from opposite directions, into the Gwalior territory. On the 22nd of December, the advanced Brigade of Infantry crossed the Chumbul at Dholpore, and on the 25th, the whole of the right wing had assembled near Hingonah, on the river Kohari, where the Governor-General hoped to have an interview with the Rani on December the 26th. On the 24th, the left wing crossed the Sind, and, in accordance with Sir Hugh's orders, took up a position clear of the ravines close to that river, and one day's march within the Gwalior territory.

So confident was the Governor-General of the maintenance of peace that he invited Sir Hugh and Lady Gough to dine with him at Hingonah

on Christmas Day, and the Commander-in-Chief was, accordingly, accompanied into the enemy's country by his wife and his youngest daughter. The wife of General Harry Smith was also present with her husband. Although no serious resistance was now anticipated, all proper precautions were taken by the Commander-in-Chief. 'I beg you to have a very strict discipline observed,' he wrote in his instructions to General Grey, 'to act as though you were in the front of an enemy, and to be always prepared[1].' A private letter from the Deputy Adjutant-General of the army, Major Patrick Grant, describes the precautions observed in Sir Hugh's own army: 'It may be a mere military promenade, but our progress will be attended with every precaution and vigilance necessary in marching through an enemy's country, and that will give it some degree of interest[2].' On the 20th of December, Sir John Littler wrote in his journal[3]: 'His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief made a reconnaissance militaire yesterday evening. He was accompanied by all his Staff together with ten Divisional and Brigade Commanders. We started at half-past three p.m. and went to the Chumbul, which was forded. We did not get back to our tents until eight o'clock, after having gone over

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to Major-General Grey, November 27, 1843.

[2] Major (afterwards Field-Marshal Sir Patrick) Grant to his mother, December 18, 1843.

[3] Extracts from the journal were kindly sent by Sir John Littler to the late Hon. Lady Grant.

a space of twenty miles. Reports in camp,' he adds, 'that everything is to be settled at Gwalior, but that the army will go there to hasten the arrangement.'

That these hopes were false became known on Christmas Day, when the Governor-General heard, at Hingonah, that the Rani would not, or, owing to the opposition of the troops, could not, go out to meet him. War was now inevitable, and, on the same day, Sir Hugh sent final instructions to General Grey. He desired, if possible, to secure the co-operation of the two columns, and indicated to Grey the point selected for that purpose. The most direct route from Grey's position to Gwalior lay through the Antri Ghat, a narrow rocky ravine which it was quite evident the Mahrattas would defend: Sir Hugh therefore directed General Grey to leave this pass on his right and 'to cut in on the high road from Nurwur [in Bhopal] to Gwalior.' This road led to a strong hill fort called Himutgarh, which stood at the entrance of a narrow pass leading to Punniar, and Grey was instructed to leave this fort either to his right or to his left, and so make his way to Punniar. He was expected to reach Punniar on the 30th, by which time he would find a reinforcement, consisting of a contingent which had been stationed at Sipri to prevent any unrest there. These orders were, as we shall see, carried out by General Grey, but a movement on the part of the enemy prevented any attempt at co-operation, and the two wings fought separate battles with different bodies of the enemy.

We turn our attention first to the right wing, under the immediate command of Sir Hugh Gough. The Commander-in-Chief was aware, on the 25th of December, that a large force of the enemy, accompanied by guns, had marched out to Dhunela, a small town about eleven miles from Gwalior. On the 26th, they advanced seven miles further, to the strong position of Chonda, on the river Asun. The British army remained at Hingonah (six miles distant), and Sir Hugh had the Mahratta position carefully reconnoitred. He found that the enemy had wisely chosen their ground, which was protected on both sides by dangerous ravines, but that their flank could be turned by a march on a point where the Asun bends circuitously. On the evening of the 28th of December, Sir Hugh issued his instructions to officers commanding divisions and brigades. The difficulty of the ground involved the separation of the army into three columns; not only was it necessary to arrange for a speedy passage of the Kohari, but the country was very rough and intersected by deep ravines, only made practicable by the labours of the sappers. The routes for each column had been carefully chosen, and an officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department accompanied each column.

The right column was placed under the command of Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell. It was composed of a brigade of cavalry and the Governor-General's Bodyguard, supported by horse artillery. The central column, under Major-General Valiant,

consisted of a brigade of infantry, and the left, of a brigade of cavalry, two of infantry, along with horse artillery and two field batteries; the cavalry under Brigadier Scott, and the infantry under Major General Dennis and Major-General Littler[1]. Colonel Tennant commanded the artillery. It was the intention of Sir Hugh to turn the enemy's left flank with Cureton's Cavalry Brigade, co-operating with Valiant's infantry, to threaten their right flank with Scott's Cavalry Brigade, and to attack their centre with Dennis's Division, supported by Littler.

The left column started half an hour before daybreak; the centre and right when day dawned. So well directed were their movements that, in spite of a march over what Sir Harry Smith describes as 'ground on the banks of rivulets most peculiarly intersected by numerous and deep small ravines, the pigmy model of a chain of mountains,

[1] *Right Column*: Cureton's Cavalry Brigade, H.M.'s 16th Lancers, Governor-General's Bodyguard, 1st Regiment of Light Cavalry, 4th Irregular Cavalry; supported by Major Lane's and Major Alexander's troops of horse artillery under Brigadier Gowan. The whole under Thackwell. *Central Column*: H.M.'s 40th Foot, 2nd and 16th Native Grenadiers; the whole under Valiant. *Left Column*: 2nd Division of infantry, under Dennis; 14th and 31st Native Infantry, and 43rd Light Infantry, under Brigadier Stacey, supported by Captain Browne's Light Field Battery. 3rd Division of infantry, under Littler. H.M.'s 39th Foot, and 56th Native Infantry, under Brigadier Wright, supported by Major Sander's Light Field Battery. Scott's Brigade of Cavalry. 4th and 10th Bengal Light Cavalry, supported by Captain Grant's troop of horse artillery.


PART OF
CENTRAL INDIA
to illustrate the
LIFE OF GENERAL DALY
Names underlined in blue are mentioned in the book
MALWA
MANDORE
BUNDELCUND AGENCY
INDORE
Scale of English Miles
London: John Murray.
Stanford's Geog.l Estabt London.

but even more impassable,' all three columns arrived in excellent time about a mile in front of Maharajpore, a village a mile and a half nearer them than Chonda. The soil was richly cultivated. Now it was covered with standing corn, now the corn had been cut and gathered into stacks, and here and there the crop had been removed, and the ground was soft with recent ploughing. As they approached, they found the village strongly occupied by the enemy, who opened guns upon them. This was no surprise; Sir Hugh had never doubted that the enemy would have to occupy Maharajpore as an outpost, and, in point of fact, Major-General Churchill, the Quartermaster-General of Her Majesty's troops, had been fired at from Maharajpore on the previous day. Nor did the preliminary cannonade disconcert the British troops. Most of them, in fact, had not come up; Littler's Division, which had arrived, advanced about 500 yards beyond its appointed station at Jowra and so came within distant range; but so distant that the 39th Regiment piled arms, and sat down and breakfasted while the firing was going on. For an hour before either Valiant or the cavalry arrived, the Commander-in-Chief reconnoitred the position, walking within 300 paces of the enemy's sentries, allowing only one of his staff to approach him at a time, in order to avoid drawing the enemy's fire[1].

[1] Many of the details of the battle of Maharajpore are derived from private letters written by Sir Hugh Gough to his son after the battle. The member of his staff who

The result of these investigations was to alter considerably Sir Hugh Gough's plan of attack. 'I was surprized,' he says, 'and most agreeably surprized to see that they had pushed forward, into a plain open for all arms, so large a body of their force.' His intention, in these circumstances, was to destroy the force at Maharajpore, and so to divert the fighting, as far as possible, from the strong position of Chonda. Accordingly, he gave orders to Littler to make a direct attack upon Maharajpore, while Valiant's Brigade took it in reverse, Major-General Dennis's Division acting as a support to both Littler and Valiant, along with Thackwell's Cavalry Division, which was specially directed to follow up any advantage secured by the infantry. When the army came up, Sir Hugh at once brought the field-guns (thirty in all) into action, to cover the advance of the divisions to which they were attached; and he sent orders to Colonel Tennant to bring up four 8-inch howitzers. As the enemy had opened fire, it would have been disastrous to withdraw, and the artillery responded to the enemy's challenge. The work of the artillery in the opening of the contest has been thus described by an eye-witness: 'Horse Artillery

accompanied him to reconnoitre (his nephew and A.D.C., Captain Frend) was accustomed to relate that Sir Hugh was unarmed while making this examination of the ground. For further details we are indebted to General Sir J. Luther Vaughan, who was acting A.D.C. to General Littler at Maharajpore, and who has been good enough to lend the writer a contemporary account of the battle written by himself in a letter to England.

commanded by Captain Grant, at full gallop, rode directly at the Gwalior Battery, opened fire upon it with crushing effect, and within the space of a few minutes reduced it to silence. Having done so, away again at full gallop, Captain Grant led his battery against one on the left of the former, that had meanwhile opened upon us, our infantry columns plodding their way, slowly but steadily, against its line of fire. Very soon that battery also was silenced[1].' Littler now made his frontal attack. When Wright's Brigade (Her Majesty's 39th Foot and the 56th Native Infantry) came within three or four hundred yards of the village, the order was given to deploy into line. While this was being done, a round shot fell among the 56th Native Infantry and killed three men, causing the regiment to hang back for a moment. This was at once perceived by the Chief himself, who rode up and said: 'For shame, men; look at your gallant comrades' (the 39th). The formation was at once completed and both regiments advanced upon the enemy's guns. The Mahratta gunners now commenced firing grape, canister-shot, and even old horse-shoes, anything, in short, that could be crammed in; but the brigade persevered, and soon came upon the guns, which were about twelve or fifteen yards apart and manned by ten or twelve men each. With a final rush, they captured them, bayoneting the gunners, who stuck nobly to their posts. Behind

[1] *Recollections of Thirty-nine Years in the Army*, by Sir C. A. Gordon, K.C.B., p. 27.

the guns stood the Mahratta Infantry, armed with matchlock and sword. After the matchlocks had been discharged, they engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict. In so sternly contested a field, there could not but be considerable losses, especially in the British regiment which led the brigade, but, ere long, Valiant made his presence felt on the enemy's left and rear, and Scott's Brigade, with Grant's troop of horse artillery, operated on their right and dispersed a body of cavalry. Valiant, like Littler, met with a determined resistance; the conflict raged mercilessly, and very few of the enemy escaped from among the defenders of this position. All their guns (thirty in number) were captured. So quickly was this result achieved that Tennant was unable (in spite of two further messages from the Chief) to bring up the howitzers. Within half an hour after the first shot was fired into Valiant's column, the village of Maharajpore was in flames, its guns were taken, and the four regiments which had defended it were cut to pieces. Difficulties of ground made it impossible for Scott's Cavalry to prevent some of the enemy from escaping to the village of Shirkapore, which lay to the east of the direct route from Maharajpore to Chonda. The escape of these men necessitated Valiant's crossing by the rear of Littler to pursue them, and his instructions were, after taking Shirkapore, to attack the right of the enemy's position at Chonda, on which Littler was ordered to advance. Littler's Infantry Brigade was supported by the 1st Regiment

of Light Cavalry and by the never-failing troop of horse artillery under Grant. As they approached. the enemy opened fire, to which our guns replied, The position was carried as before, by a rush of Wright's Brigade, in which the leader of the 39th Foot was very severely wounded; a number of men were killed by shots from Mahratta soldiers concealed by the stacks of corn through which the division was advancing, and it became necessary to leave no stack in the rear without putting the bayonet in first. The Mahrattas made a last stand in defence of a small work of four guns on their left, which was finally carried by Captain Campbell and the grenadiers of the 39th. Here the enemy did not await the final charge, but took refuge in the ravines behind their batteries, abandoning their camp. Not less severe fighting fell to the lot of Valiant's column. Near Shirkapore, Valiant had to take (in the words of the dispatch) 'three strong entrenched positions, where the enemy defended their guns with frantic desperation; Her Majesty's 40th Regiment losing two successive commanding officers (Major Stopford and Captain Coddington, who fell wounded at the very muzzles of the guns) and capturing four regimental standards.' The 40th Regiment was supported by the 2nd and the 16th Native Grenadiers, and ere long the enemy were driven back in headlong flight, having lost all their guns and making no attempt to defend the strong position afforded by the ravines at Chonda.

The simultaneous success of Valiant and Littler

had now resulted in the capture of the whole of the Mahratta artillery, and they had been driven from every position with enormous loss. Complete as was the victory, it would have been even more overwhelming, had not Thackwell's Cavalry Brigade, which had charged in support of the infantry, as occasion offered, been led too far to the right in its pursuit of the enemy when they finally broke and fled. It was, in consequence, stopped by a ravine, which prevented further pursuit. The Chief had ordered this brigade to form up close to Valiant, and had they done so, they would have 'been one mile clear of any ravine, with a level country in their front, and might have swept that country in line between Maharajpore and Chonda[1].' The error (which was that of a Staff Officer) was really unimportant, for the defeat of the Gwalior army was complete.

Meanwhile, the success of General Grey was equally satisfactory. While Grey marched from Himutgarh to Punniar, a large body of Mahrattas, who had been ready to dispute with him the Antri Ghat, made a march parallel to that of Grey himself, and when the British army reached Punniar they found that the enemy had occupied a strong position at Mangore, on a neighbouring hill. They opened fire upon his baggage, and Grey sent a force of cavalry and horse artillery to defend it. Brigadier Harriott, who was in command of the cavalry, found that the nature of the ground prohibited his

[1] Sir H. Gough to his son, November 13, 1844.

attacking the enemy, and he was forced to return to Grey, who was preparing to take the offensive. Grey detached Her Majesty's 3rd Buffs, and five companies of the 39th Native Infantry with a company of sappers and miners, to take up a position on an opposite ridge and attack the enemy. The Buffs and sappers charged the enemy's centre and captured their guns, while the wing of the 39th Native Infantry gained the crest of a hill commanding the enemy's left, and after pouring on him a severe fire, charged and carried the battery opposed to them. These regiments were well led by Colonel Clunie of the Buffs and Brigadier Yates who commanded the 39th Native Infantry, but they were exposed to a heavy fire and suffered severely. The remainder of Grey's force (Her Majesty's 50th Foot and the 50th and 58th Native Infantry) now came up and attacked the enemy's left, and put an end to the action, totally defeating the Mahrattas and forcing them to abandon their guns, 24 in number. The losses in General Grey's force were 35 killed and 182 wounded.

The Gwalior campaign was of only forty-eight hours' duration, for the double victory put an end to all resistance. It had been purchased at considerable cost; the enemy had shown gallantry and devotion, and they had great advantages in numbers and artillery, and in the nature of the ground. The British forces at Maharajpore numbered[1]

[1] These figures represent the numbers actually brought into the field, and are taken from a letter of the Commander-in-

4,810 infantry, with 350 artillery and 30 field guns, and supported by 1,340 cavalry. The British loss was—killed, 6 officers and 100 men; wounded, 34 officers and 650 men. Total casualties, 790 killed and wounded[1]. The most serious losses were incurred in Valiant's and Littler's attacks upon the batteries at Maharajpore, Shirkapore, and Chonda. In Her Majesty's 40th Foot, which played so gallant a part at Shirkapore, 24 of all ranks were killed, and 160 wounded; and the casualties of the 16th Native Grenadiers, which accompanied it, numbered 179. Similarly, Her Majesty's 39th Foot, which behaved as nobly under Littler, lost 30 of all ranks killed, and 196 wounded. The stress of the fighting fell, as always in Indian warfare of this date, upon the European troops. The three native regiments which formed Dennis's Division were employed only as a reserve, and their total casualties amounted to one man killed and six wounded. The most distinguished officers killed included Major-General Churchill and Colonel Sanders,

Chief. The full strength of the eight infantry regiments represented (two European and six Native) was (on paper) 8,800. This explains the discrepancy between this statement and the ordinary estimate of the whole Army of Exercise (including both wings) at about 20,000 men. The fact that these figures include only men actually in the field must be kept in mind in any estimate of the proportion of casualties.

[1] A certain amount of the loss was incurred after the fighting was over, for, until nightfall, mines which the enemy had made all over the ground occupied by their guns continued to explode and seriously wounded many men and some officers.

Deputy-Secretary to the Government Military Department. General Valiant was severely wounded, and amongst those slightly injured were General Littler and Colonel McLaran, who were afterwards to play an important part in the First Sikh War.

The army defeated at Maharajpore amounted, according to Sir Hugh Gough's estimate, to fourteen regiments of about 800 men each, a total infantry force of 11,200 men. Four of these regiments defended the battery at Maharajpore, three the position between that village and Skirkapore, and the remaining seven the main position in front of Chonda. Fifty-six guns were captured, and it was calculated that the Mahratta cavalry numbered about 3,000. The proportion of combatants was thus very much greater on the Mahratta side; their guns were also more numerous and more powerful, for among the captured ordnance were an 18-pounder and two 12-pounder howitzers, and a 12-pounder gun.

When the news of the victory reached England the attention of the country was fully occupied with the Corn Law struggles and with the trial of O'Connell, and so the announcement of the conquest of Gwalior received little popular applause. More valuable to the Commander-in-Chief than the praise of the newspaper press was the receipt of a letter from the Duke of Wellington. It was not the custom of the Duke to use many laudatory expressions, and Sir Hugh was much gratified by his words: 'I sincerely congratulate you on the Battle of Maharajpore. I have perused the details thereof

BATTLE OF MAHARAJPORE, Dec. 29, 1843.

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with the greatest satisfaction, they are highly creditable to the officers and troops engaged as well as to yourself.' Others, who had less authentic information and who gave credence to the wild rumours that followed every important Indian action, found something to censure in the conduct of the battle. Criticism on the battle of Maharajpore has been concerned with three points. In the first place, the strategy of the Commander-in-Chief has been condemned on the ground that the Mahrattas might have dealt with his force in detail. We have already seen that Sir Hugh Gough was aware of this danger, but that he decided that, with such an enemy as he had to face, other considerations might be allowed to outweigh it. He deemed it a risk that might safely be taken, and events justified him in that belief. In the second place, he was severely censured by English journals, and especially by the *Spectator* for 'his great rashness in sending back the heavy guns and mortars, and taking only pop-guns to the field.' The only guns which were not taken to the field were those of the siege-train. The reader will remember that part of that train was left behind at Agra, by desire of the Governor-General. In point of fact, Sir Hugh had consulted Colonel Tennant as to the possibility of bringing such guns of the battering-train as had been brought to Dholpore, into action against the entrenched position at Chonda, although they were not suited for field engagements. The reply was that as these guns had to be placed, in order to traverse

these difficult roads, 'on travelling carriages, with their trunnions not in their proper place,' they could not be brought into action for twenty-four hours. When the action commenced it was evident that the attack on Chonda would be less serious a part of the engagement than had been anticipated, and the absence of the battering-train was not regretted. The only guns which might have done good service were the 8-inch howitzers, and the Commander-in-Chief spared no exertion to have them brought up, but so swift was the action that they arrived only in time to see the enemy run.

It may be asked: Why not delay the action until the guns had been brought up? There were two reasons why this course was impossible. In the first place, the enemy had offered battle, and to withdraw the troops would have involved a moral effect that could not be discounted in Indian warfare, and, in the second place, it was essential to destroy the force at Maharajpore before it could be strengthened or supported from Chonda. 'What Lord Ellenborough and the non-military set by whom he was surrounded wanted to have seen,' wrote Sir Hugh, a year later[1], 'was a Field-day—guns and cavalry, with a host of skirmishers to have galloped about, to be well peppered by the Mahratta guns, and then to have fallen back behind the infantry; all this time enabling the enemy to bring up his support from Chonda, only a mile and a half distant, and giving confidence to the foe. This might have been all

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, December 31, 1844.

very pretty if both parties were to fire blank cartridge, but would have been murderous in the face of such an artillery. I took the shorter way of at once subdividing their force, and if the cavalry had acted according to my order, not a man from Maharajpore would ever have got to Gwalior; as it was, within half an hour their retreat was completely intercepted by Valiant's Brigade.' Why the howitzers did not come up, (Sir Hugh mentions in his private letters,) was not quite clear, and he was unable to acquit Colonel Tennant of all responsibility[1]; but it would have been disastrous to wait for them, and the short action which followed, while it involved some severe fighting, was in the end, he believed, a great economy of life.

Lastly, it has frequently been said that the army was surprised at Maharajpore. The course of our narrative will have made it clear that there was no surprise in the ordinary sense of the term. We have seen that the Commander-in-Chief knew that Maharajpore was held by the enemy the day previous to the battle, and that he made a personal reconnaissance for over half an hour before the action commenced. He expected to find it held as an outpost, but he had not anticipated that the enemy would play into his hands so far as to occupy it in

[1] In a letter to his son, Sir Hugh says that he had discovered that the howitzers *were* brought up, but did not open fire because they had received no fresh order to do so, 'as if,' says Sir Hugh, 'I had sent them three staff messages to come up and be fired at.'

force. It was this fact, and not the mere occupation of the village, that caused the change in his plans, a change whose object was to take full advantage of the enemy's error in diverting the fighting from their strong position at Chonda. To do so involved the necessity of precipitating the action, a necessity which carried with it some disadvantages; but this precipitation was the result of Sir Hugh Gough's personal inspection of the ground, not of an unexpected assault by the enemy. The Commander-in-Chief was not surprised at Maharajpore.

The legend of a surprise owes its existence to two incidents of the battle. Littler's division, it will be remembered, had been drawn up a little beyond the point prescribed, and they had been under a harmless fire, just within distant range, while the Chief made his reconnaissance. Vague reports of this trivial incident gave rise, not unnaturally, to an impression of a surprise. In the second place, the presence in the field of the Governor-General and a party of ladies had a similar effect. Lord Ellenborough had been asked by Sir Hugh Gough to take up a position in the rear of the reserve battery, whence he might watch the fighting. When the Commander-in-Chief suddenly altered his plans for the battle, he omitted to send fresh information to the Governor-General; the reserve battery was that attached to Littler's force, and, as Littler now made the frontal attack, it came at once into action. It was suggested to Lord Ellenborough that he should retire to a safer position, a suggestion which, as Sir

Henry Durand mentions, originated with a staff officer[1]. He did so, but found himself exposed to the fire of a Mahratta battery, whose gunners observed that he was a person of importance. 'Once in it,' says Durand, 'he thoroughly enjoyed it, and seemed utterly regardless as to danger[2].' From this position he could observe the attack of Littler, supported by Dennis, upon the battery of Maharajpore, but that

[1] Durand's *Life of Sir Henry Durand*, vol. i. pp. 74–6.

[2] The ladies present (Lady Gough, Mrs. Harry Smith, Miss F. Gough, and Mrs. Curtis, wife of the Commissary-General) had a still more exciting experience. Their presence, mounted as they were on elephants, and so towering over the low roofs of the village, early attracted the notice of the enemy, and they came, almost at once, under fire. With their small escort they went to meet the troops as they marched up to Maharajpore, and kept behind them until they were actually engaged, when they looked out for any other regiment coming up, and followed them until they also were under fire. Towards the close of the day, their elephants, frightened by the explosion of a powder-magazine, ran away with them; and their ignorance of the fortunes of the battle added to the anxiety of their position. Major Grant was the first to reassure them with tidings of victory, and he conducted them back to Sir Hugh's camp. The excitement of the day was not yet over, for no sooner had they gained a much-needed rest in a tent on the ground held by the enemy at the beginning of the day, than (just as tea was being prepared) they were suddenly seized by British soldiers and carried out. Immediately afterwards a mine exploded, and the tent was blown to pieces. Lord Ellenborough presented each of these ladies with a medal commemorative of the occasion, similar in design to that conferred on the troops. This footnote is derived from memoranda left by Sir Patrick and Lady Grant (the Major Grant and Miss Gough of the story).

village prevented his witnessing any other part of the fighting. In his General Orders, issued on the 5th of January, Lord Ellenborough cordially congratulated the Commander-in-Chief 'on the success of his able combinations,' and offered to him and to the army the grateful thanks of the Government and people of India. He announced that the Government would present, as a decoration for the campaign, an Indian star of bronze made out of the captured guns, to be worn with uniforms, and that a triumphal monument, bearing the names of all who fell, would be erected at Calcutta[1].

It is necessary to advert here to a statement current at the time with regard to the battle of Maharajpore, because it had an important effect upon the relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Indian press. It is well known to readers of Indian history of the period that one of the great difficulties of the Government lay in the lack of self-restraint which led officers of the Indian army to supply the public with information, accurate or inaccurate, which should not have been divulged. One notable instance of this kind called down upon a distinguished officer, of high rank, the severest censure of the Duke of Wellington. In published books, or in communications to newspapers, English or Indian, these statements 'upon good authority'

[1] This monument was also erected out of the gun-metal of the captured ordnance. It is interesting to note that the next star awarded by the Government of India was for the Afghan campaign of 1880.

brought irresponsible accusations against the enemies of the writer, and caused endless vexation and annoyance. In India, the objection to these disclosures was still more grave. The native press was eager to print any calumny against the Government, and, true or false, these stories found hundreds of believers. There was also a section of the English Press in India which boasted of its charity towards all races but its own, and which took a ghoulish delight in exposing the real or supposed injustice or incompetence of the English rulers of India. 'The Press in this country,' wrote the Commander-in-Chief, 'have a correspondent in every Regiment, who panders for the public by abusing his superiors. Such is the bilious appetite here that they must have either fulsome praise or slanderous abuse; the latter goes down with much the greatest gusto, and therefore is that most generally used[1].' Immediately on his arrival in India Sir Hugh Gough had made known his determination to enforce military discipline by treating such conduct with the utmost severity. The first instance to occur was connected with this battle of Maharajpore. One officer contributed to the *Delhi Gazette* a statement that Sir Hugh's Quartermaster-General (Colonel Garden) had misled him with regard to the locality, mistaking the position of Maharajpore and Chonda. This statement was widely copied and it ultimately formed the basis of comments in English papers, and of a serious attack upon the Quartermaster-

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, June 3, 1844.

General in the *Madras United Service Gazette.* Sir Hugh Gough gave it a most emphatic denial[1], and he dismissed the culprit from a situation in the Horse Artillery and placed him in a less important one in the Foot Artillery. The *Delhi Gazette* published a contradiction, which, however, did not attain the publicity of the original falsehood. The new Commander-in-Chief had thus openly declared war on the press, and the press was not slow to take up the challenge. For this, Sir Hugh was quite prepared, and he treated all such attacks with contempt. He did not lack friends who drew his attention to these statements, and he used to reply that he had not seen them. 'I can afford abuse,' he said, 'but I cannot afford to pay for it.' It is impossible to avoid a reference to this topic, for the hostility of the Indian Press to the Commander-in-Chief will be exemplified more than once in the course of this narrative, and it requires an explanation.

Two days after the battle, on the 31st of December, the Rani and the Maharajah arrived in the British camp, and Lord Ellenborough declared his readiness to enter into negotiations, on the basis of the arrangements which he had suggested before the fighting began. On the 4th of January, the two wings of the army united in front of Gwalior, and on the 13th, the Maharajah again appeared in camp,

[1] 'The Quartermaster-General did not mislead me. He told me most accurately the position both of Maharajpore and of Chonda.' Letter to his son, August 7, 1844.

and the treaty was signed. The Gwalior army was, by this agreement, reduced to 8,000 infantry with 12 guns, 200 artillery with 20 guns, and 6,000 cavalry. The contingent of soldiers under British officers was increased to 10,000; the Fort was entrusted to them, and measures were taken to secure their payment by placing the management of the revenue of some frontier districts in British hands. This contingent subsequently produced the most able rebel leader in the Mutiny, Tantia Topi, and, under his command, drove Windham back upon his own lines near Cawnpore, in November, 1857.

The reduction of the army was the main condition of the Treaty, and Lord Ellenborough's moderation, in demanding no more after the victory than before it, was intended to impress native states with the pacific character of the intentions of the Government. To carry out the Treaty, a Council of Regency was appointed, which could not be changed without the consent of the Governor-General. At the request of the Regency, six regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and eighteen guns were left by Sir Hugh Gough at Gwalior till the middle of March. Thus ended the brief Gwalior campaign, and thus there disappeared the gravest danger to British predominance in India in the fifth decade of the nineteenth century—the alliance of Mahratta and Sikh.

II

THE ARMY POLICY OF SIR HUGH GOUGH

THE history of the Indian army before the Mutiny has yet to be written. Its origin is usually traced to the small force of Sepoys, aided by a body of European troops (partially composed of men who had been kidnapped in England), who defended Madras against the French in 1748[1]. The Bengal army is later in date; not until Clive had won the battle of Plassey with Madras troops did an army of Sepoys come into existence at Calcutta. A Bombay army followed, and all three Presidencies found an immediate and rapid increase of their military strength necessary for their protection. When Sir Hugh Gough took command in 1843, nearly a century had elapsed since the first beginnings of the Indian Army, and the Company's troops now consisted of over 240,000 men[2], including 159 regiments of regular infantry, 21 of cavalry,

[1] It is a curious coincidence that this little army was commanded by the possessor of a name which was to be famous in Indian annals, Major Lawrence.

[2]

Regular Infantry (European)	5,600
„ „ (Native)	184,000
Cavalry (Native)	10,200
Artillery (European)	5,600
„ (Native)	4,600
Sappers and Miners (Native)	2,500
Irregular Corps (Native)	30,000

five brigades of horse artillery, 14 battalions of foot artillery, and three regiments of sappers and miners, in addition to about 40 corps of irregular cavalry and infantry. These figures[1] represent the numbers of the forces employed by the East India Company throughout the three Presidencies. But it must not be forgotten that, in the words of an Irish member of Parliament, 'the red coat of the British soldier is the backbone of the Indian army.' As early as 1754 a regiment of British infantry (H.M.'s 39th Foot) was sent to Madras, and it shared in the glories of Plassey. By the middle of the nineteenth century, it had become usual to maintain nearly thirty regiments of regular cavalry and infantry in India, and these must be carefully distinguished from the European regiments in the service of the Company.

These numbers seem large to those who are accustomed to think of the men at Wellington's disposal in the Peninsula, or of the armies which British generals have elsewhere commanded. But the Indian army had, after Sir Charles Napier's conquest of Sindh, to protect a territory of about 1,100,000 square miles, to defend its frontiers, and to exercise control over its one hundred millions

[1] The figures are taken from an essay on the 'Military Defence of our Indian Empire,' written in 1844 for the *Calcutta Review* by Sir Henry Lawrence, and republished in his *Essays*. From that volume and from Sir George Chesney's *Indian Polity* much of the information contained in this chapter is derived.

of native population. The dangers of the time were twofold, the necessity of preparing to meet foreign aggression, and the uncertain loyalty of the Sepoys to their western rulers. The first theme has been already treated in connexion with the State of Gwalior, and the greater portion of this book will be concerned with the Punjab. We do not, therefore, propose to say anything here with reference to the defence of the Sutlej frontier, reserving it for the following chapter. But one somewhat more general question of defence may be fitly discussed before we proceed to deal with the internal discipline of the Indian army.

The military security of India depended to a large extent upon the magazines at Delhi, Agra, and Cawnpore, and the position of the Delhi magazine had for some time been occupying the attention of the Indian Government. The citadel at Delhi was occupied by the Mogul, and it was a cardinal object of Indian policy not to incur the odium of removing the Mogul and his family. The magazine was situated in the town and was commanded from the Palace. The Duke of Wellington, writing to Lord Ellenborough in September, 1842, expressed the opinion that the 'interior wall, surrounding the Residency and the magazine, ought to be perfected, so as to render it impregnable as a citadel, excepting by regular attacks by good troops well supplied with ordnance, ammunition, and the material for a siege[1].' In this way, he hoped that the

[1] *Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough*, p. 503.

magazine might now command the citadel. The suggestion was carefully considered by Lord Ellenborough, and it was one of the subjects suggested to Sir Hugh Gough on his arrival in India. The Gwalior campaign delayed further action in the matter, but, as soon as it was over, the Commander-in-Chief undertook a survey of the whole of our frontier defences, excluding the actual line of the Sutlej, in order not to rouse suspicion at Lahore. On the 22nd of February, 1844, he wrote to the Governor-General from Delhi: 'I had a very minute inspection of the magazine this morning. That it could not be worse placed is quite evident, that it cannot be made secure on its present site is equally evident, except at an enormous outlay. Many subjects of much difficulty will have to be weighed before a correct opinion could be given.' Five weeks later he stated the conclusion at which he had arrived. In a letter to Lord Ellenborough, he carefully separated the question from that of a possible Sikh incursion. He thought the magazine at Delhi insecure, but not because of any danger from the Sikhs, and he showed how any such movement, even if practicable, would be 'an act of madness in the Sikhs—to push forward to Delhi leaving in their rear 15,000 men and going to meet at or before it 9,000 men.' The Commander-in-Chief was, therefore, 'under no apprehension as to a Sikh force destroying Delhi whilst we remain unshackled; but everything,' he told Lord Ellenborough[1], 'is

[1] Sir H. Gough to Lord Ellenborough, March 28, 1844.

to be apprehended from the insecure state of the magazine in the event of any internal outbreaks.' In these circumstances, he recommended the transference of the magazine from Delhi to Meerut and the use of the Ganges instead of the Jumna as the great waterway to the north-west:—'The sale of the present building and ground at Delhi would go far to cover the difference of building a magazine at Meerut to be in lieu of strengthening the present one at Delhi, with the great advantage of a great improvement in the water carriage.' The Ganges, of course, does not flow past Meerut, but there was an excellent road between that station and the nearest point on the river (Gurmuktesar Ghat) a distance of thirty miles. The recall of Lord Ellenborough in the ensuing summer prevented the Government from taking any action, and Sir Hugh Gough pressed the subject upon the attention of the new Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge. Longer experience of India had led to a change of opinion on one point, but Sir Hugh still considered the magazine at Delhi to be 'in a state of fearful insecurity.' On the 4th of September, 1844, he addressed a memorandum on the subject to the Governor-General: 'The insecurity of the Delhi magazine, situated within the city, three miles from the military cantonment, and defended only by a plain brick wall of no strength has been long noticed, and measures have from time to time been under consideration for rendering it secure against any assault which the population, under any cause

of excitement, might be induced to make upon it. All the measures yet proposed to attain this desirable end would, however, be attended with such an enormous expense that no steps have yet been taken to carry any of them into effect.' A more complete knowledge of the situation on the Sutlej frontier led him to recommend that the magazine be placed at Umballa instead of at Meerut. He had himself pressed upon Lord Ellenborough the wisdom of establishing a considerable force at Umballa, and his reasons for choosing it as the proper alternative to Delhi were based upon his knowledge of the exposed situation of Ferozepore and Ludhiana. Both Ferozepore and Ludhiana he thought too near the frontier for the purpose (cf. pp. 364–6). He considered the arrival of Sir Henry Hardinge to be a suitable occasion for the change, and he placed before him a scheme for the conveyance of stores to Umballa. This, he thought, could be accomplished without much additional expense, if Meerut and similar stations were supplied from Agra or Cawnpore instead of from Delhi. The reply of the Governor-General to this communication is not among the Gough MSS., but it is certain that no step was taken towards carrying the scheme into effect. Had a commencement been made at once, Umballa would have been more useful as a support when the Sikh war broke out in the end of the following year.

On the close of the Sutlej campaign, Sir Henry Hardinge prepared a minute on the subject. He

admitted that the 'magazine at Delhi is in a very objectionable position, placed in the midst of a large and populous city, without adequate protection,' and that it 'ought to be gradually abolished.' He then proceeded to discuss its suggested removal to Umballa. Confident that no danger was to be anticipated from the Punjab after 'the utter annihilation of the Seikh army for aggressive purposes,' he came to the conclusion that the reasons for the choice of Umballa had disappeared. Ferozepore and Ludhiana were now, he said, no longer frontier out-posts[1] requiring a support, but were themselves supports for Lahore, and 'as the British army is to occupy Lahore for seven and a half years, the question of building a magazine protected by a military work, in addition to the Fort of Philour[2], may be suspended for four or five years.' This memorandum is dated 2nd of February, 1847, and although its hopes of continued peace were to be rudely dispelled within fifteen months, there seemed, at the time, no reason to doubt that, as far as the safety of the frontier was concerned, a decision might be deferred for some years. But

[1] The Governor-General, writing after the cession of territory by the Sikhs (described infra, vol. ii. p. 81), was able to suggest a magazine, on British soil, beyond Umballa, as a possible future solution. The positions of Ferozepore, Ludhiana, and Umballa are shown in the map of the Punjab, and the reader will find in the next chapter an account of the Sutlej frontier.

[2] Philour was a small fort near the Sutlej, eight miles NNW. of Ludhiana.

the Governor-General seems to have forgotten that the Commander-in-Chief, in his memorandum of September, 1844, had based his application for immediate action not merely on the conditions upon the frontier, but on the urgent necessity for a change from 'this position of fearful insecurity' at Delhi itself. The decision of the Governor-General was final, and the Commander-in-Chief could do no more till the arrival of Lord Dalhousie as Hardinge's successor. In the month of June, 1848, he urged the same course upon Lord Dalhousie, who had been impressed by the insecurity of Delhi; but the outbreak of the second Sikh war interrupted the discussion of the subject; and almost immediately on the close of the war Lord Gough ceased to be Commander-in-Chief. He had thus pressed upon three Governors-General in succession the extreme danger of the magazine at Delhi, a danger which had been observed by Lord Auckland and Lord Ellenborough before Sir Hugh Gough took command in India, and which was fully admitted by both Lord Hardinge and Lord Dalhousie. Yet the simple remedy he proposed—to remove it to Umballa, a situation at once more healthy and more convenient—was rejected by all three, and when, on the 11th of May, 1857, the rebels approached the city of Delhi, the historic seat of the Mogul Empire, they found that its possession would not only rally round them Indian sentiment, but would be of incomparable practical advantage. The inhabitants of the city rose in revolt against the British garrison. It is true

that the noble deed of a British officer deprived the mutineers of part of this advantage by blowing up a portion of the magazine. But it was only a portion, and the rest of the ammunition fell into their hands, while the British army was deprived of its proper supplies. Soldiers who fought in India in those troublous times will bear ample evidence to the effect which the removal of the magazine to Umballa would, in all probability, have produced upon the history of the Mutiny. It would not have prevented the seizure of Delhi, but it would have made the success of the rebels less important and the subsequent siege much less costly. Nearly fourteen years had elapsed since Lord Gough had asked Lord Ellenborough to sanction that removal, and nine since he had suggested it to Lord Dalhousie. On the Commander-in-Chief who was in office from 1843 to 1849 no responsibility can be said to rest, if the Commander-in-Chief who was in office in 1857 found his task unnecessarily dangerous and perplexing.

It has been necessary, in this account of Sir Hugh Gough's military views, to anticipate the course of events in the Punjab, but the narrative of the Sikh wars will gain, correspondingly, in clearness. The other questions with which we wish to deal will also carry us beyond the period of Lord Ellenborough's administration, but it will be well also to remove them from our path. These questions are connected with the third problem which we mentioned as facing the Indian Government in 1843—the discipline and loyalty of the Native Army. Before any

symptoms of disaffection had appeared, Sir Hugh Gough had indicated his sense of the necessity of improving the Indian Army. Not only was the artillery weak, and the proportion of European regiments too slight, but the native regiments were much in want of capable European officers. The custom of employing soldiers for political and other civilian service was a measure of economy for the Indian Exchequer, but it denuded the native regiments of officers of standing and experience, 'leaving companies to be commanded by mere boys.' An additional Captain to each regiment, and a Lieutenant to each company, Sir Hugh regarded as the least that should be done in 'justice to a very fine army[1].' That this want of European officers had already led to deplorable results soon became apparent. Throughout the winter of 1843–4 there occurred two separate series of mutinies—among Sir Charles Napier's troops in Sindh, and at Ferozepore, on the Sutlej frontier. In both these cases there were special explanations of the rebellions. In Sindh, the pay of the Bengal Sepoys was reduced when that province ceased to be a foreign station; at Ferozepore, the Sepoys were corrupted by Sikh emissaries. But these special explanations could not serve to conceal the existence of some real ground for alarm, and the Commander-in-Chief perceived that the whole subject of the treatment of the Sepoy must be considered.

[1] Sir H. Gough to the Earl of Ripon (President of the Board of Control), January 19, 1844.

Meanwhile, however, there was the immediate necessity of suppressing the mutinies. Into this we have not deemed it necessary to enter, especially as any detailed account would involve an unnecessary narrative of a controversy between Sir Charles Napier and Sir Hugh Gough. Both were agreed on the general principle of suppressing the rebels with a firm hand, but they differed as to the measures which it was wise to take. Although this difference of opinion continued for some months, it did not interfere with their personal friendship; even when Sir Charles Napier most resented the actions of the Commander-in-Chief, he could still speak of Sir Hugh Gough as 'fair and honest as the day.' The mutinies at Ferozepore also involved Sir Hugh in a controversy, for Lord Ellenborough, in consequence of them, removed Sir Robert Dick from the command of the troops on the Sutlej frontier, while the Commander-in-Chief regarded the punishment as too severe for the error of judgement which was, in his eyes, Dick's sole offence. Any statement of these controversies would be long, tedious, and disagreeable, and we propose to omit all consideration of them. The policy of the Commander-in-Chief was 'punishment for those that resist, reward for those who redeem their error by submission'; but absolute submission must precede any mention of improved treatment. In some cases he was forced to take the extreme step of disbanding the regiment.

The difficulty of Sir Hugh's position was his con-

viction that, while 'forbearance would shake the discipline of the army, the soldier had some shadow of excuse' for his conduct. He was under no misapprehension as to the nature of the claims of the British Government upon its native troops. In a letter to his son, dated June 30, 1844, he stated his view that the mercenary character of the native army was the key to the whole problem: 'They look upon us as their conquerors, and only serve us from interested motives; whilst we pay them better than our neighbours and treat them justly, they will serve us. But if we, as we did in Scinde, strike off a great part of their allowance, . . . when at the very moment the Sikh army in their immediate neighbourhood was receiving 12 Rupees, while ours only had, at the most, eight and a half, it was not to be wondered at that the Sepoys hesitated. I strongly remonstrated against the striking off the allowances, before the disaffection took place; when it did, I gave it as my opinion, no concession should be made by the Govt. until obedience was manifested. In neither point did the Govt. uphold me. . . . But I am glad to find that the Court of Directors has taken my views of the case. They disapprove of the retrenchment, and they approve of the means I took to put down what, if not very delicately handled, might have raised a flame which would have shaken discipline to its base.'

In the summer of 1844, Lord Ellenborough was recalled, and Sir Henry Hardinge arrived in Calcutta as his successor. Sir Hugh had not hoped to con-

vert Lord Ellenborough to his views, but he at once entered into a long series of negotiations with Sir Henry Hardinge which resulted in the preparation of a new series of Articles of War, which embodied a policy on which the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were agreed. The measures of which Sir Hugh approved, related to increase of pay, and the restoration to the Sepoy of certain privileges of which he had been deprived. He had possessed a right of precedence in Civil Courts and of submitting petitions on unstamped paper, and he had been protected against the summary disposal of his property by the Omlah or native establishment in Civil Courts ('the most prejudiced and the most venal of all native officials,' adds Sir Hugh). The gradual removal of these rights, combined with a loss of pay, 'as compared with what the Sepoys might receive in native services, seemed to Sir Hugh to be legitimate grievances. The division of the army into the three Presidencies was also the cause of an inequality of treatment which produced discontent, and Sir Hugh proposed that the Bengal and the Bombay Sepoy should be treated alike. In some respects he went so far as to claim for the Sepoy equal consideration with the British private. He suggested to the Governor-General that 'a just proportion of the European and Sepoy's kits be carried free of expense in the field. . . . I would strongly advocate the placing the Sepoy upon the same footing as the European. I do not see upon what just grounds one should have a greatcoat

given him free of expense, whilst the other, with infinitely smaller pay, should be forced to pay for it.' The closing sentence of this paragraph reveals a liberality of view somewhat surprising in one who was not a 'Company's soldier': 'Since the Service in Afghanistan, the soldiers of the two services have been drawn much closer together, and the more this is encouraged the better[1].' Holding these opinions, it was natural for him to differ from some other military authorities in supporting the continuance of native officers, deeming it necessary to offer the Sepoy some reward for constant loyalty and faithful service.

But while the Commander-in-Chief was prepared to make these liberal concessions, he was at once firm in suppressing any existing discontent, and ready to take measures to supply the Government with more efficient means of stamping out any future tendency to mutiny. On this ground he approved of the re-introduction[2] of corporal punishment. Sir Hugh had been educated in this tradition, and it was by the lash that he had begun to introduce order into the 87th Regiment when he was first placed in charge of it. He was sensible of the many objections to its use, but he believed that the important concessions we have enumerated would render it 'rather a boon than an act of coercion, as it will, from the fear of its infliction, deter the evil-disposed

[1] Sir H. Gough to Sir H. Hardinge, April 14, 1845.

[2] The number of lashes was soon afterwards reduced to fifty, but flogging was not abolished till 1881.

and bad characters from entering the Service[1].' The new Articles of War which were published in 1845 embodied most of these suggestions, and Sir Hugh Gough was able to congratulate the Governor-General[2] upon taking 'such just and enlarged views on our Military Policy, views that, when carried into effect, will rest on the popularity of the military profession, banish every embryo seed of discontent, and make the Indian Army as loyal as they have ever proved themselves brave.' The words may have been unduly optimistic; other seeds of discontent were, ere long, to make their presence felt; but Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough may fairly claim the credit of having pacified the Indian Army eighteen months before the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej. The narrative of the two Punjab campaigns, on which we are about to enter, will suffice to show how important for the Indian Empire was the loyalty of the native army during the struggles on which such grave issues depended; and that loyalty must be largely attributed to the wise statesmanship of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief.

It must, at the same time, be remembered, in telling the story of the Sikh Wars, that the Indian Army of the forties was a very different force from the Indian Army of to-day. The Indian Army is now composed mainly of the northern races and largely of Mohammedans; different castes and different religions serve together, and find a bond of

[1] Sir H. Gough to Sir H. Hardinge, April 14, 1845.
[2] Ibid.

union solely in loyalty to the British Government. Sixty years ago, the army which Sir Hugh Gough commanded consisted chiefly of Bengal Sepoys, incapable of the fatigues which the Goorkhas or the Sikhs can readily endure, and representing a type rarely found in Lord Kitchener's Bengal regiments. These Bengalese were almost all Brahmins, and the difficulty of keeping ceremonial requirements in the cooking and eating of food detracted largely from their value as a fighting force. Sir Hugh Gough cannot be accused of belonging to the kind of workman who quarrels with his tools, and it will be seen that he trusted and was trusted by his native troops, but in estimating the force at his disposal it is fair to take into account the differences between these troops as he knew them and as they are to-day.

III

THE SIKHS AND THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT

THE richly watered region of India known as the Punjab is most frequently described as part of a great triangle formed by the river Indus and its tributaries. The windings of the Indus shape themselves into two of the sides, and the base is provided by the Sutlej. The north-eastern corner of this triangle is occupied by the mountains of Kashmir, while, in the north-west, the Punjab territory extends across the Indus into the mountains that divide India from Afghanistan. The interior of the triangle is intersected by the rivers that make the Punjab the land of the five waters[1]. South of the Indus flows the Jhelum, which pours itself into the Chenab, the next of the series. Further southwards, the Chenab receives the Ravi, and forms a junction with the Sutlej about a hundred miles above the point at which the Indus absorbs the whole of the waters of the Punjab. Several hundreds of miles from its union with the Chenab, the Sutlej is enlarged by a tributary known as the Beas. The lands lying between these rivers are called Doabs. Between the Indus and the Jhelum is the

[1] The Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas.


AFGHANISTAN
KABUL
Jelalabad
Kabul R.
Ghuznee
PESHAWUR
Attok
Hurree Pore
Kohat
R. Indus
R. Indus
R. Indus
R. Indus
Bunnoo
Dera Ismail Khan
Dera Futteh Khan
Munchera
Leia
Mangrota
Dera Deen Punnah
Dera Ghazi Khan
MULTAN
Shujabad
Mylsee
Khanger
Kineyree
BHAWALPORE
Mithenkote
BELOOCH-ISTAN
SCINDE
Shikarpore
R. INDUS
BHAWALPORE
RAJPUTANA
Sindh Sagur Doab
Jetch Doab
Rechna Doab
Bari Doab
Hazara
R. Jhelum
R. Jhelum
R. Chenab
R. Chenab
R. Ravi
R. Sutlej
R. Sutlej
KASHMIR
KASHMIR
R. Chenab
Russoor
Chillianwalla
Gujerat
Sadulapore
Wazirabad
Ramnuggur
Gujeranwala
JAMMU
Sealkote
Nurpur
Kangra
MAANJHA
Sheikupore
LAHORE
Amritsir
Jalandar Doab
Jalandar
Sobraon
Ferozepore
Ferozeshah
Aliwal
Ludhiana
Budhowal
Moodkee
Simla
Kasauli
Sirhind
MALWA
Umbala
Dhera Doon
Meerut
DELHI
R. Jumna
THE PUNJAB
AND
SURROUNDING DISTRICTS.
Scale, 70 Miles to an Inch.
London: Stanford's Geogl. Estabt.

Sind Sagur Doab; between the Jhelum and the Chenab, the Jetch Doab; between the Chenab and the Ravi, the Rechna Doab; between the Ravi and the Sutlej, the Bari Doab; and between the Beas and the Sutlej, the Jullundur Doab. The scene of the First Sikh War is near the junction of the Beas and the Sutlej, the scene of the second is in the north of the Jetch Doab, between the Jhelum and the Chenab. An appreciation of the geography of the Punjab is impossible without constant reference to the map, but comparatively easy with that aid. The nature of the land itself may be best illustrated by applying to it the phrase invented by a mediaeval Scottish king to describe the 'Kingdom of Fife.' The Doabs are a series of beggars' mantles fringed with gold. Near the river channels are, as a rule, beds of rich alluvial soil, whence twice a year the peasant reaps his harvest of maize and sugar-cane or of cotton and indigo. The interiors are frequently wastes of grass and thornbush and tamarisk, where, at best, the camel and the buffalo might find a grazing-ground or the goatherd eke out a scanty livelihood.

The inhabitants of this varied country are generally described as Sikhs, although that term possesses no racial significance. Racially, the Punjab has no single definite description; it is inhabited both by Iranic-speaking Pathans or Afghans and by peoples of Aryan ancestry, known as Jats and Rajputs. The general religious division is of the ordinary Indian type—Hindu and Mussulman. The Pathan population are followers of the Prophet,

while the Jats and Rajputs are mainly Hindu. The religion of the Hindu population has been modified in two ways. The creed of Islam has claimed a considerable number of Rajput converts, and Hinduism itself has become largely associated with the Sikh name. The Sikhs, in short, are a religious sect, the followers of a fifteenth-century teacher, by name Nanuk. His teaching had been that of all religious reformers—a reaction against conventional religious formulas and religious forms fast becoming meaningless, and an appeal to the ideal of relationship between man and man, and to the human conscience as the judge of right and wrong. The cry of Micah: 'He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly and to love mercy?' was the burden of the prophet Nanuk. Such teaching, at such an epoch, never returns void to the teacher. Nanuk gathered round him a body of 'sons of the prophets,' who spread his doctrines and were known as Sikhs or Disciples, under the leadership of a Guru or Prophet. Time passed, and the followers of Nanuk became sons of the sword. A seventeenth-century rebellion against the bigoted Mohammedan rule of the Moguls led to the formation of the Khalsa. The religious brotherhood had become the Army of the Free, an army which, like that led by Moses of old, based its sense of unity upon ceremonial observances. The Singhs, or lions, as they were called, wore blue garments and took upon themselves the vow of the Nazarite. Through many vicissitudes,

and in spite of much evil fortune, the Khalsa continued to exist, and, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, we can trace its development from a loose confederacy of tribes into the compact nation with which the Indian Army was to measure its strength. By that time, the Mogul dominion had been broken, and Afghan influence was predominant in the Punjab. The famous Sikh leader, Ranjit Singh, threw off the Afghan yoke, allied himself with the British, and organized his great army on European models and with the aid of French officers. In rapid succession he added to his dominions Multan, in the Bari Doab, Kashmir, and Peshawur (1818–37). While he ruled the large non-Sikh districts of Kashmir and Peshawur, his respect for the power of the British prevented him from attempting to add to his subjects the Sikh inhabitants of the Malwa, the land immediately south of the Sutlej, who were directly under British protection and never formed part of the great Sikh State.

Ranjit Singh died in 1839, and his death was followed by the usual difficulties that compass an Oriental succession. His imbecile son, Kharak Singh, reigned for one year. During the first part of that period he was under the influence of a favourite, and, on the murder of that favourite, the chief power passed to the hands of the heir, Nao Nihal Singh, son of Kharak Singh. This youth ruled till his father's death, supported by the two most powerful men of the country, Dhian Singh and Gholab Singh, two foreigners whom Ranjit

Singh had made joint Rajahs of Jammu, and who, for convenience' sake, are usually described as the Jammu brothers. On the death of Kharak Singh, the new Maharajah, Nao Nihal, was immediately murdered by the Jammu brothers. This, at least, was the popular belief; all that can be certainly known is that he met with an accident[1], and was killed. He was succeeded by Shir (or as it usually occurs in our documents, Shere) Singh (1840–3), a reputed son of the great Ranjit Singh, who employed Dhian Singh as his chief minister. Shere Singh maintained cordial relations with the Indian Government, in spite of the two events to which we have already referred as shaking general confidence in the British. The first of these was the unfortunate interference of Lord Auckland's government in Afghanistan, resulting in the Kabul disaster of January, 1842, and in our withdrawal, after we had reoccupied Kabul and when British supremacy seemed (to ourselves) to have been sufficiently vindicated. While the Indian belief in the invincibility of British arms was thus lessened, Indian confidence in our pacific intentions likewise received a shock from our quarrel with Sindh and the annexation of that country by Sir Charles Napier. It seemed to the Sikhs that we were gradually surrounding their country, and that the annexation of

[1] The accident was similar to that which caused the lamented death of Sir Henry Durand in 1870; his elephant attempted a passage too low or too narrow for the safety of its rider.

the Punjab was not far off. Notwithstanding these suspicions and the indignation they aroused in the Khalsa, Shere Singh maintained the policy of his great father. The attitude of the Khalsa was the difficulty of the future, and the danger it represented was of a kind which it was difficult for the Indian Government to appreciate. The Khalsa was an army constituted on democratic principles. While it was organized and drilled in accordance with European methods, its officers were the servants of elected committees, analogous to the authorities of village communities. It did not, however, carry its principles of individual action into the sphere of military operations. Its instructors received implicit obedience, and its strange constitution never interfered with its appreciation of discipline in the field. But to British eyes it seemed an army of mutineers, accustomed to treat its officers with contumely, and little likely to be able to attain cohesion and unity in the face of the foe. Our agents thoroughly understood the possibility of a military revolution; but they did not always appreciate the fact that the Khalsa was fit for more than civil war.

In September, 1843, Shere Singh was murdered by his minister, Dhian Singh, who was immediately assassinated in turn. Finally a boy Dhulīp Singh, another reputed son of Ranjit Singh, became Maharajah, and his Vizier was Hīra Singh, a son of Dhian Singh. This revolution was accomplished by Hīra Singh, through the help of the Khalsa, now thoroughly anti-British. Hīra Singh was thus pre-

cluded from obtaining British assistance in his attempts to check the growing power of the army, and his position was further endangered by the plots of the Maharajah's mother, a young and beautiful woman, known as the Rani Jindan, who conspired with her brother Jawahir Singh and her paramour Lal Singh, against the Vizier. Both parties had to keep, as a main object, the support of the Khalsa, which was fully aware of the power it exercised. On hearing of the murders, both Lord Ellenborough and Sir Hugh Gough immediately took steps to strengthen the frontier. Its line was sufficiently indicated by the course of the Sutlej, and the situation will be easily intelligible after a careful study of the map. An army marching from Lahore would most naturally attempt to cross by a ferry at Ferozepore, where we had an open cantonment, and where, in the event of an attack, an immediate concentration would probably be necessary. Eighty miles to the east, and ten miles from the banks of the river, we held a small fort at Ludhiana. These two outposts were within the territory of the Sikh states under British protection. Some eighty miles from Ludhiana, and about twice that distance from Ferozepore, was the military station of Umballa, on British soil, and a hundred and thirty miles farther south was the larger station of Meerut. Any massing of troops in the north-west could not fail to rouse the jealousy of the Sikhs, and might precipitate a conflict, but, by good fortune, the relief of the troops in Sindh was known to have been ordered,

and Sir Hugh at once sent instructions to halt these troops on their way to Sindh, and to employ them to reinforce the garrisons at Ferozepore, Ludhiana, and Umballa. More than this he could not recommend without further consideration, for he was necessarily not yet fully conversant with the circumstances and the locality, but, on the 4th of October, he submitted to the Governor-General a scheme which the latter accepted almost in its entirety. It involved, as the reader will recollect, the formation of two armies, one to watch the progress of affairs at Gwalior, and the other to be prepared to resist a Sikh incursion. With the first of these we have already dealt; the arrangements for the latter we shall now indicate. Sir Hugh Gough proposed to place under the immediate charge of Sir Robert Dick, as his second in command, a body of about 16,500 men. The frontier outposts of Ferozepore and Ludhiana first demanded attention, and the Commander-in-Chief decided to increase the garrisons at these stations to 3,500 men each. Both garrisons included a European regiment. Between Ferozepore and Ludhiana he suggested placing in camp a Light Cavalry Brigade, under Brigadier Cureton, to maintain communications and to repress any signs of restlessness on the part of the inhabitants of the protected states. This brigade, which numbered 2,000 men and included the 16th Lancers, could support either Ferozepore or Ludhiana in case of need, and could be supported from either. In addition to the cavalry, he stationed on the hills two British regiments (about 1,500 in all). The

remainder of the force (6,000 men) he placed at Umballa, the importance of which, as a reserve, he strongly emphasized. The support at Umballa included a regiment of European cavalry, two regiments of European infantry, and horse and foot artillery.

These arrangements were never fully carried into effect. Hīra Singh showed some political ability; he understood the difficulties of a conflict with the British power, and it became clear that he was not inclined towards a policy of wanton aggression. There remained the danger of his being driven into such a policy by the Khalsa, but he possessed, meanwhile, the means of paying them and was, therefore, capable of resisting, to some extent, any pressure the soldiers might put upon the Government. The immediate danger was soon over, and caution demanded that the Sikhs should be given no cause for alarm. The suggestion of a cavalry brigade was, therefore, abandoned; forage was a matter of great difficulty if the troops were not to approach too near to the Sutlej, and the army at Agra was much in need of cavalry. Provision was, however, made for a pontoon train at Ferozepore; the fort there and also that at Ludhiana were strengthened; and Sir Hugh Gough urged upon the Governor-General the necessity of increasing barrack accommodation at Umballa, and of providing cover for European regiments at Ferozepore and Ludhiana. At Ferozepore, barracks had been in course of erection in 1842, but the order had been countermanded by

Lord Ellenborough, who regarded Ferozepore 'as a position in the air.' Sir Hugh Gough, on the contrary, was strongly convinced of its importance; but the improvement in the affairs of the Punjab prevented the Governor-General from sanctioning his earnestly and frequently expressed wish.

The Indian Government continued to hope against hope. Even after the success of Sir Hugh Gough's Gwalior campaign had removed the most threatening danger from the situation—an alliance of the Sikhs and the Mahrattas—the task remained very formidable. 'I am fully aware,' wrote Lord Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington, in the beginning of 1844, 'of the great magnitude of the operations in which we should embark, if we ever should cross the Sutlej. I know it would be of a protracted character[1].' The peril was greatly increased by the series of mutinies in the Indian army at Ferozepore[2], to which we have referred in the preceding chapter. Lord Ellenborough was so deeply alarmed by these outbreaks, close to the Sikh frontier, that he considered the example of successful mutiny, afforded by the Khalsa, 'more dangerous than would be its declared hostility.' Sir Hugh Gough, as we have seen, took a less serious view, and promptly put an end to the danger by depriving the Sepoys of their grievances.

When Sir Henry Hardinge arrived at Calcutta,

[1] *Lord Ellenborough's Indian Administration*, p. 425.

[2] These mutinies led to Lord Ellenborough's replacing Sir Robert Dick by Major-General Walter Gilbert (cf. p. 352).

the Ferozepore mutinies had been suppressed, but the state of the Punjab occasioned the gravest anxiety. Sir Henry was himself a distinguished soldier; he had won a great reputation in the Peninsula and in the Waterloo campaign; since 1815 he had seen no fighting, but he had been Secretary of State for War from 1828–30, and again from 1841–4. In 1842 he had refused the appointment now held by Sir Hugh Gough. The Commander-in-Chief was rejoiced to welcome his old comrade in arms to India, and he expressed great satisfaction at the appointment of a soldier as Governor-General. The years of Hardinge's rule in India were destined to be rendered memorable by a great war, but it is not possible to doubt his pacific intentions. He was honestly desirous of avoiding interference in the Punjab; he had been sent to India as a protest against the forward policy of Lord Ellenborough; and he was loyally anxious to carry out the instructions given him. 'When Lord Ellenborough left Calcutta,' Sir Henry wrote to Sir Hugh on August 13, 1844, 'the probability of offensive operations in the Punjaub had almost subsided into a conviction that the case of necessity compelling us to interfere by arms would not arise. On the other hand, such is the distracted state of that country, with a large army clamouring for pay and plunder, that we may be forced to act, and this necessity may be unavoidable at a very short notice. It is therefore not advisable, however strong the conviction that the case of necessity will never arise,

to relax in any of our military preparations.' With this general view Sir Hugh was in hearty agreement, but the more difficult question as to the amount of preparation which was advisable remained for settlement.

The military necessities were certainly not to be ignored. The strength of the Khalsa has been variously estimated from 40,000 to 100,000; the lower of these figures is much below the mark. The regulars alone included 35,000 infantry, divided into 35 regiments; 15,000 Ghorchurras or cavalry; and a force of artillery which could produce 200 powerful guns. A long period of training under such European officers as Allard, Ventura, and Avitabile had rendered this army an efficient force whose strength was not fully realized even by so careful and competent an observer as Major Broadfoot, although it was evident that a contest with the Sikh army would be no trivial matter. The Governor-General was in a somewhat delicate position. It might be essential to aid the Sikh Government against its own soldiery, or we might be called upon to defend our own frontier. Only one thing was certain about either of these events—if any such necessity were to arise, it would unquestionably be sudden. There could be no time for preparation. On the other hand, any attempt at preparation on the part of the British Government might precipitate a conflict which it was Sir Henry's object to avoid. Two small incidents increased the perplexities of the Governor-General. Suchet Singh, an uncle of

the Vizier, Hīra Singh, had incited a revolt against his nephew, and two chiefs were allowed to pass through British territory on their way to join the rebel forces. The Lahore Government was, very reasonably, indignant, and the bad feeling thus aroused rendered the Sikhs suspicious of the intentions of the British with regard to some treasure of Suchet Singh which, on the suppression of his rebellion, was claimed by the Sikh Government. This treasure was left in the Sikh states on the British side of the Sutlej, and was therefore in the Governor-General's charge. Hīra Singh claimed the money, and the British authorities declined to give it him unless assured that the widow of Suchet Singh and his brother Gholab Singh acquiesced in this demand[1].

In his first letter to the new Governor-General, Sir Hugh Gough strongly urged upon him the necessity for more adequate preparation. 'Whilst a disorganized Army,' he wrote, '. . . remains on our Frontier, the greater part within four Marches of our own Territory, and the Navigation of the boundary river in their hands, every precaution is called for—the more especially when that army claims (what they certainly have no possible right to) the credit of assisting us in getting out of our difficulties in Cabul; and be assured the whole tone of the Sikh Durbar and Army has been greatly changed since our unfortunate disaster in that

[1] Sir Henry Hardinge to Sir Hugh Gough, August 13, 1844.

country.' Sir Hugh told Sir Henry that he had informed Lord Ellenborough, in the preceding summer, that a force of 40,000 men would be necessary for offensive operations against the Sikhs, and that he had advocated 'that the Horse Artillery should have nine instead of six pounders, that the Field Batteries should be Horsed, and that the Bullocks should be turned over to two new twelve Pounder Batteries, and that a Mountain Train should be formed[1].' Lord Ellenborough had left India without giving orders for the execution of these arrangements, and Sir Hugh felt that Sir Henry might reasonably hesitate to take a step so likely to alarm the enemy. 'I am particularly anxious,' he wrote, 'to avoid any military preparations that might excite remark.' He therefore suggested a much smaller force[2], for purely defensive purposes, which,

[1] The suggested force of 40,000 men was to be composed as follows:—

10 Troops of Horse Artillery,	7 Regts. of Light Cavalry,
10 Field Batteries,	5 Regts. of Irregular Cavalry,
7 Reserve Companies of Foot Artillery,	10 Regts. of European Infantry,
8 Companies of Sappers, &c.,	28 Regts. of Native Infantry,
3 Regts. of Dragoons,	2 Rifle Corps.

[2] To consist of—

5 Troops of Horse Artillery,	3 Regts. Light Cavalry,
2 Field Batteries,	5 Regts. European Infantry,
1 Regt. of Dragoons,	10 Regts. Native Infantry,
2 Regts. Irregular Cavalry,	2 Companies of Sappers;

together with a reserve of—

3 Troops of Horse Artillery,	1 Regt. of Light Cavalry,
2 Field Batteries,	2 Regts. of European Infantry,
1 Regt. of Dragoons,	5 Regts. of Native Infantry.

he considered, would, when concentrated, be amply sufficient to drive any invading Sikh army before them[1].

But where were these forces to be assembled? The critical point was clearly Ferozepore, but the Sikhs were well aware of the fact, and any addition to our force there would be regarded with extreme jealousy. The Commander-in-Chief proposed to place the reserve force at Meerut and to strengthen the garrisons at Ferozepore, Ludhiana, and Umballa. The most important change which he advocated was the revival of his proposal for the location of a regiment of European infantry at Ferozepore, which Lord Ellenborough had not adopted, in spite of repeated and urgent solicitations. In an official communication, dated August 21, 1844, Sir Hugh warned the new Governor-General that 'the Brigade at that important frontier post is insufficient without a Regiment of Europeans,' and he strongly recommended that 'the Barracks which were commenced there in 1842, and subsequently countermanded, should now be ordered to be completed for the reception of a Regiment.'

Sir Henry Hardinge admitted the expediency, on military grounds, of Sir Hugh's demand, but he was convinced that political considerations debarred him from consenting to the erection of barracks so close to the Sikh frontier. On all other points Sir Henry expressed himself as anxious to meet the require-

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to Sir Henry Hardinge, August 26, 1844.

ments of the Commander-in-Chief. 'It is with regret,' he wrote, 'I abstain from completing the Barracks for an Infantry Regiment at Ferozepore, but I am so firmly resolved to give the Lahore Government no cause for questioning our good faith, or by a hostile attitude to justify their alarm, that I prefer for a time to suffer the inconvenience' of being unable to accommodate an adequate force. He threw out some hope of beginning building operations, 'when the Sikh Government are convinced that our movements of troops in the early part of November is merely the annual relief of a few European regiments[1].' Sir Hugh had to accept this decision, merely reminding Sir Henry that the five European regiments, which they had agreed on as the minimum defensive force, could not be concentrated on the frontier within four days, without the presence of a regiment at Ferozepore. He stated again the number of men essential for offensive and defensive operations, and it was at this date that he recommended the transference of the magazine from Delhi to Umballa, where it would be more easily available for frontier operations. A large magazine at Umballa would render unnecessary the small one already existing at Ferozepore, but ordnance dépôts were, he thought, desirable both there and at Meerut. The close of this interesting letter shows that the Commander-in-Chief had not fallen into the common error of under-

[1] Sir Henry Hardinge to Sir Hugh Gough, September 8, 1844.



London. John Murray.

estimating the strength of the enemy. 'The Sikh Artillery,' he writes, 'are good; they are bringing into the field a much larger force than we are, even as aggressors; if on the defensive, they will treble ours, with much heavier metal. Our advantage will, and ever must be Manœuvre, and the irresistible rush of British Soldiers. Cavalry and Artillery,' he adds, in words which form either the vindication or the condemnation of his whole military policy, 'are excellent arms in aid, but it is Infantry alone can in India decide the fate of every battle[1]. Our six pounders are pop-guns, very well and effective against Infantry, but unequal to cope with the heavy Metal of the Native States, when outnumbered as we shall be. I do not mean by any means to throw a slur on our Artillery; I know them to be almost invariably the élite of the Bengal Army, and that they will ever nobly do their duty; but if we have to go into the Punjab, we may look forward to being opposed by from 250 to 300 Guns in position, many of them of large Calibre.'—The Governor-General, in his letter of September 8, had estimated our available artillery at 8 companies of European artillery and 5 Native companies, 78 guns in all; 'and we have,' he said, 'no possibility of using the European portion of it, in consequence of the scanty accommodation beyond Meerut.'

[1] This was also the view of Sir Henry Lawrence. 'Our infantry,' he says, 'must ever be our mainstay; if it is indifferent, the utmost efficiency in other branches will little avail' (*Essays*, p. 23).

As the autumn advanced, Sir Hugh took two further steps. He placed before the Governor-General a plan for maintaining, in constant readiness, carriage for the baggage of the troops which it might be necessary suddenly to concentrate upon the Sikh frontier; and he made, in person, accompanied by his staff, an inspection of the protected Sikh states and of the line of the river. On the 6th of December, the Commander-in-Chief and his staff made a careful survey of the situation at Ferozepore[1]. The visit to Ferozepore afforded another opportunity for pressing upon the Governor-General the necessity of completing the barracks there. 'Ferozepore,' he wrote, 'is within an hour's march of a river the whole navigation of which is in their [the enemy's] hands, and that river is within twenty-four hours' march of their capital[2].' Should the Lahore Government be unable to pay their troops, a predatory band might at any moment attack the town, and Sir Hugh considered that so dangerous a military situation outweighed the political difficulties which appealed so strongly to Sir Henry. The barracks had been commenced in 1842; the walls had been so far raised and had stood the exposure well; the door-frames had been made; the thatch was ready; and three excellent wells had been sunk. The Lahore Government could not reasonably com-

[1] This fact is incidentally mentioned in a private diary, kept by Lady Gough.

[2] Sir Hugh Gough to Sir Henry Hardinge, December 7, 1844; Gough MSS.

plain of the completion of buildings so far advanced. Following this letter, the Commander-in-Chief sent a very careful description of the existing position. Not only was the garrison, in his opinion, inadequate; the troop of horse artillery was in want of stables; the magazine was a temporary building, not bomb-proof, and situated close to the commissariat buildings; and the defences were much in need of being strengthened. On the whole, Sir Hugh regarded Ferozepore as a convenient dépôt for Kandahar and Kabul, an advantageous position with regard to the navigation of the Sutlej, and, in the event of a Sikh war, 'of vast importance as a dépôt.' As an advanced post on a hostile frontier, he considered it 'essentially faulty, it having no support, and there being at present no position of strength to which the garrison could retire,' in case of necessity. He summed up his recommendations thus[1]:—

'The removal of the Magazine from Ferozepore, the destruction of which would be so great an inducement to an enemy from the north-west to assail the place, the addition of one regiment of European and one of Native Infantry . . . with the existing entrenchment in front of the Cantonment and the proposed wall round the town, with perhaps a couple of Redoubts at intermediate distances, to keep the communication open, would render the place secure, and enable the garrison to hold out against any force, that could be suddenly brought to attack it,

[1] Quartermaster-General to the Military Secretary, December 20, 1844.

for at least a month, and reinforcements from the rear could be sent to relieve it in much less time.' It is doubtful if, even now, the Governor-General would have given definite orders for the resumption of building operations, but for a fresh development in the situation at Lahore, which occurred before he could answer Sir Hugh's communication. But he had now no choice, and, writing on the 4th of January, 1845, he gave permission to proceed with the barracks, to station Her Majesty's 62nd Foot at Ferozepore, and to arrange for the accommodation of two fresh companies of horse artillery and two additional regiments of native infantry[1]. We have gone into some detail on the question of Ferozepore, because it is important in several ways. It exemplifies the care with which the Commander-in-Chief

[1] In his Life of his Father, the second Viscount Hardinge says:—'On the 11th of the same month (November, 1844), confidential orders were sent for the construction of two barracks at Firozpur, to accommodate a regiment of European infantry and two batteries of artillery. The two European regiments at Sabathu and Kassauli were also added to the garrison.' With regard to the barracks, Sir Henry Hardinge, in his letter to Sir Hugh Gough, dated January 4, 1845, says:—'During the last three months orders have been given by the Military Board to collect the necessary materials for that object, and I have now desired the Military Board to lose no time in proceeding with the work, including two troops or Companies of Artillery.' The actual work of completing the barracks was, therefore, not commenced until January, 1845. Only one European regiment was sent to Ferozepore. Both measures were owing to the urgent request of the Commander-in-Chief.

prepared for the war into which he is sometimes represented as wildly rushing, without any forethought; it is an interesting instance of the way in which military considerations had frequently to be subordinated to political expediency; and it affords a proof of the honesty of purpose which characterized all the relations between Sir Henry Hardinge and the Lahore Government[1].

The news from Lahore to which we have referred had, for some time, been expected by the Governor-General. On the 21st of December, 1844, Hīra Singh was murdered by the soldiery, whose emotions had been roused by the Rani. His successor as Vizier was the Rani's brother, Jawahir Singh. He was not installed till the following May, and the months of anarchy which intervened were full of anxiety for the British Government, but Sir Henry Hardinge remained strictly on the defensive, and betrayed no trace of excitement. 'It is desirable,' he wrote, 'that nothing should be done by us to indicate that the internal affairs of the state of Lahore are matter for our concern[2].' The coolness of the Governor-General probably saved the situation, but neither he nor the Commander-in-Chief relaxed his watchfulness. The political agent, Major Broadfoot, gave

[1] This has been generally recognized by historical writers, with the exception of Mr. Cunningham, whose *History of the Sikhs* contains several insinuations which an unprejudiced reader cannot but regard as unfair to Sir Henry Hardinge.

[2] Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief, January 2, 1845.

such accounts of the anarchy at Lahore that preparations to move were unquestionably necessary. Sir Hugh remained at Umballa, and appointed Sir John Littler to the command at Ferozepore, which had just been vacated by Sir Walter Gilbert. Of both these officers Sir Hugh and Sir Henry alike held the highest opinion. Sir John Littler had been recommended for immediate promotion by Sir Hugh immediately on the arrival of the new Governor-General, and in spite of Littler's juniority, Sir Henry fully acquiesced in the appointment. The next step was the transference to the frontier of fifty-six boats which had been built under Lord Ellenborough's direction, and of a pontoon train originally prepared for Sind. There had been some misunderstanding between Sir Hugh and Sir Henry with regard to these boats, the Commander-in-Chief thinking that the Governor-General had countermanded the order as too aggressive; some correspondence on the subject passed between them, with the satisfactory result of the due arrival of the boats.

War was now very near at hand. Through the year 1845, report after report reached the British of the incapacity and debauchery of the Lahore Government. A rebellion in the summer lessened the danger to some extent, but the Sikhs could, in any case, scarcely hope to carry out an invasion till it became possible to cross the Sutlej, in the end of the year. On the 21st of September, the Vizier Jawahir Singh was, like his predecessor, put to death by an enraged soldiery, but with better cause.

Six weeks of anarchy again intervened, and, in the beginning of November, Lal Singh, the paramour of the Rani, became Vizier. A chief of more respectable character, Tej Singh, was at the same time made Commander-in-Chief. The Khalsa was really in power, and it was notoriously anti-British. The Court was not opposed to war; it is possible that the Rani and her party really hoped for a Sikh defeat in order to free themselves of the yoke of the Khalsa. She knew, as the Khalsa could not know, how anxious the British Government was to avoid hostilities, and she may have desired an initial defeat, followed by a speedy submission, and resulting in an increase of the power of the Durbar. Many of the Sirdars or chiefs were well aware that ultimate defeat was certain, but they could not refuse to fight. One, indeed, Gholab Singh, the second of the Jammu brothers, now sole Rajah of Jammu, decided to throw in his lot with the enemy, and in the end of November he informed the British agent that war was inevitable.

When matters reached this crisis, the British force on the frontier numbered over 30,000 men. There were 7,000 efficient troops at Ferozepore, 5,000 at Ludhiana, 10,000 at Umballa, Kassauli, and Subathu, and 9,000 at Meerut[1] This force was

[1] *At Ferozepore* :—European Infantry: H.M.'s 62nd Foot; Native Infantry: 12th, 14th, 27th, 33rd, 44th, 54th, and 63rd Regts.; 8th Native Light Cavalry; 3rd Native Irregular Horse; two troops of Horse Artillery and two light batteries of six guns each.

somewhat larger than the strength which Sir Hugh Gough had stated to the Governor-General on his arrival to be sufficient for purely defensive purposes; but we have seen that his visit to the frontier, in the end of 1844, had revealed fresh deficiencies in our preparations. We must therefore keep in mind the fact that Sir Henry Hardinge, acting on the recommendations of Sir Hugh Gough, had very materially increased the frontier garrison, in spite of the great political difficulties of the situation—difficulties which can only be appreciated after a careful study of Major Broadfoot's correspondence[1]. Some English newspapers of the time circulated a report that neither the Governor-General nor the Commander-in-Chief had given sufficient attention to the work of preparation for a Sikh invasion.

At Ludhiana:—European Infantry: H.M.'s 50th Foot; Native Infantry: 11th, 26th, 42nd, 48th, and 73rd Regts.; Native Cavalry; two troops of Horse Artillery.

At Umballa:—European Infantry: H.M.'s 9th, 31st, and 80th Foot; Native Infantry: 16th, 24th, 41st, 45th, and 47th Regts.; Cavalry: 3rd Light Dragoons; Native Cavalry: 4th and 5th Regts. H.M.'s 29th Foot at Kassauli, and 1st Bengal Eur. Regt. at Subathu.

At Meerut:—Cavalry: 9th and 16th Lancers, 3rd Light Cavalry; Infantry: H.M.'s 10th Foot (except one company) and some regiments of Native Infantry; Artillery: 26 guns, with sappers and miners.

[1] Broadfoot constantly insists upon the factions into which the chiefs were divided, and on the supreme importance of the Khalsa, e. g. 'All are so entirely at the mercy of the soldiery that a movement among the latter causes all differences among the chiefs to be forgotten in the common fear' (Broadfoot to Lord Ellenborough, April 21, 1844).

The truth is that the position on the Sutlej had been the first thought of both alike, and scarcely a week passed without correspondence between them on this subject.

The Indian Government were, then, not unprepared for Major Broadfoot's announcement, that an invasion was imminent. All but the final orders had been given, and the whole of the political difficulty which had troubled the Government was involved in the issue of these orders. Things had been nearly as bad in the beginning of the year, and the calm policy of the Governor-General had secured the maintenance of peace. If now, the troops were actually marched to the Sutlej, war was certainly inevitable. If the orders were delayed, might not peace be preserved? This was the problem which faced Sir Henry Hardinge, and it cannot be denied that he took too optimistic a view. On November 20, Major Broadfoot reported to the Commander-in-Chief that the Sikh plan of campaign had been decided, and that from 40,000 to 60,000 men would be at once sent to the Sutlej. On receipt of this intelligence, Sir Hugh Gough, on his own responsibility, ordered H.M.'s 9th Lancers to move from Meerut to Umballa; two troops of Horse Artillery, H.M.'s 16th Lancers, the 3rd Regiment of Light Cavalry, H.M.'s 10th Foot, save one company, the corps of Sappers and Miners, and all save one of the regiments of Native Infantry, to be held in readiness to move from Meerut to Kurnaul on the shortest notice; the 8th

Regiment of Irregular Cavalry to be prepared to move from Hansi to Kurnaul, the Sirmoor Battalion from Deyrah to Saharunpore, and the 4th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry to be brought up from Bareilly to Meerut. He further asked the Governor-General to arrange for carriage and supplies, and ordered the other corps of all arms in the division to be in readiness to move on the shortest notice. Three days later, Major Broadfoot had changed his opinion. 'The project of marching against us seemed more than ever likely to be set aside,' he told Sir Hugh Gough, and, in view of the diminished chance of an immediate collision, he suggested that the Commander-in-Chief should send these orders to the Governor-General, so that 'you will give him the option of forwarding or withholding them according as the advance of the troops may fall in or not with any plans he may have decided on, with reference to the Lahore movement[1].' Sir Hugh believing, that there was 'no actual necessity for the movement under present circumstances,' accepted the suggestion, but expressed to Major Broadfoot the hope that Sir Henry would not halt the troops, 'as the arrangement is good, whatever may be the finale[2].' The Governor-General, believing that an invasion in force was improbable, and relying on the reports of Sir John Littler and Brigadier Wheeler

[1] Major Broadfoot to Sir Hugh Gough, Nov. 23, 1845. Gough MSS.

[2] Sir Hugh Gough to Major Broadfoot. Same date. Gough MSS.

that Ferozepore and Ludhiana were sufficiently garrisoned, countermanded all the orders, including that for the 9th Lancers, who, therefore, returned to Meerut. On the 26th, the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief met at Kurnaul, and Sir Henry obtained Sir Hugh's acquiescence in these arrangements. In point of fact, Sir Hugh was by no means convinced, but the orders had been countermanded on the 24th, and a fruitless protest would but create difficulties between himself and the Governor-General, than which nothing could be more disastrous at such a crisis. Not only did the Commander-in-Chief acquiesce, but, when, some months afterwards, a gratuitous attack was made on the Governor-General in the *Quarterly Review*[1], he generously shared with Sir Henry the full responsibility. The writer in the *Quarterly* brought against Sir Henry Hardinge a series of charges some of which were unfounded and others much exaggerated. Sir Henry was much perturbed by this attack, and obtained from Sir Hugh a statement that their views had coincided. The reviewer's charge appeared to Sir Henry to be nothing less than that he had 'assisted the enemy in his sudden Invasion of the Frontier,' and it was natural that his old companion in arms should come to his support; the warmth with which he did so is evidence to the generosity of Sir Hugh's nature. But it would be unpardonable in a biographer of Sir Hugh

[1] By the Rev. G. R. Gleig, the biographer of Warren Hastings.

Gough to ignore the fact that, in his private letters to his son, written at the time, the Commander-in-Chief distinctly mentions differences of opinion. Writing from Umballa, on the 2nd of December, he says :—

I moved forward a few Corps as a precautionary measure, not that I think they will dare to cross, but we should be prepared if they did. I greatly pressed the re-inforcing Ferozepore with another European Regiment, this is the only tangible point; it is certainly too far from support, and altho' I have 7,000 men there, still it is 144 miles from this, its nearest support. But the G. G. is indisposed to the expense of building Barrack accommodation. I hope we shall not have to regret it. He joined me this morning. I surprized him by having gone out 50 miles to meet him, and returned the following night[1]. I like him much, and he appeared ready to place every confidence in me. But he is very anxious not to fall into the error of Lord Ellenborough, of making war without ample cause for doing so. This may be all right politically, but it hampers me, so as to give perfect security to all points. He asked me if I intended to fight the whole Sikh army with the force I had here. I said decidedly I would, were they to cross and threaten seriously Ferozepore or Ludhiana. He said I would be greatly abused in England for

[1] A month earlier, Sir Hugh had been anxious for an interview, as he wished 'to point out many things' to the Governor-General, but the latter considered it unnecessary, saying, 'I do not think there is any chance, even with the caprice of a mutinous army, which need hasten my movements.'—Sir Hugh Gough to his son, from Simla, November 2, 1845.

fighting with so few men, when I had so many at my command. I pointed out that it was the Government that should get the blame, not me. If they gave me cover, I saw the expediency of the measure, but without cover I could do nothing. He has provided temporary cover for 5,000 additional natives, but it is Europeans I want to the front. So if I am forced to fight with inadequate means, and thereby lose some men, the onus must not be attached to me. I have proposed the effectual remedy. . . . I can take 10,000 men from this and the hills, 4,000 of which will be Europeans. With such a force, without waiting for my support at Meerut (7,000), I should indeed deserve censure, were I to let either Ferozepore or Ludhiana be hard pressed, and please God I will not, whatever the people at home may say.[1]' Two days later he continues in the same strain. 'We are, as the Governor-General expresses it, maintaining a calm attitude of confidence, perhaps rather too much. But I have a force of Europeans that will carry anything I want. But this security leaves us deficient in many essential points for brilliantly pushing up any chance they may give us, for if they cross, I will decidedly follow them up—further than many calculate on. Still I think they will give me no opportunity, but I am not in possession, nor do I think our politicals are, of the exact force and its details. There has been a great jealousy of my Quartermaster-General's Department acquiring what the politicals are so deficient in, but let the fire once break out in a blaze, and I will act for myself, whatever disadvantages may be occasioned by want of information and a false security. I have just returned from Sir Henry's

[1] Sir Henry Hardinge seems to have been convinced by this argument, and to have abandoned all thought of the alternative policy of leaving Ferozepore and Ludhiana to their fate until a large force could be assembled.

Levee. I dined with him yesterday, and he dines with me to-day. . . . I like him much as a gentlemanly man. But I think I see he is a politician, and will make the most of everything. I have been amused by finding my suggestions almost *verbatim* sent to me a few days after, as coming at once from Government, and asking my opinion of what I originated. The only way I can account for it is that mine goes in a private letter to Sir Henry; he, I take it, copies it, and sends it to the particular department to which it applies, and it then comes back in a Memorandum from that Department for my opinion. So far, altho' I may not have the credit, I find all my views carried—*not all*, I regret to say, as to the location of troops; when the Rupees come into account I find great difficulty.

We quote these, and some of the following letters, because they illustrate more than the particular point at issue. Sir Hugh Gough never offered any defence against the numerous attacks made on him at the time, and since repeated in numberless textbooks. But at this distance of time, there can be no impropriety in revealing his real position, and, since the publication of the Peel correspondence has given to the world the Governor-General's censure of his Commander-in-Chief, it is only fair that the other side should be heard. We desire to speak with all respect of so distinguished a soldier and administrator as Sir Henry Hardinge, to whom India and the Empire owe not a little, but, in view of what has already been published, it would be idle to attempt to ignore the fact that controversies did exist between him and Sir Hugh Gough, and it would be unfair to

the memory of the latter to leave the question exactly where it stood.

On the 2nd of December Sir Hugh Gough wrote to the Governor-General, enclosing a request by Sir John Littler for an additional European regiment at Ferozepore. This letter reached the Governor-General at Umballa on the 3rd[1], and on the 5th Sir Henry Hardinge sanctioned it in the following words: 'My view has always been expressed and recorded that the simplest plan of overcoming the difficulty is to increase the force [at Ferozepore]. I am therefore very glad to have my opinion supported by your Excellency's proposal to have a second European regiment stationed at Ferozepore.' It is unfortunate that the Governor-General did not take this action immediately on receipt of the Commander-in-Chief's letter of the 3rd of December. The actual order for the march of H.M.'s 80th Foot to Ferozepore was given by the Governor-General in a letter dated the 7th of December (after he had left Umballa), with the result that the regiment did not march till the 10th—too late to reach Ferozepore before it was cut off. 'I got the consent of the Governor-General too late,' wrote Sir Hugh, 'as the Sikh army were between me and it before they had even moved[2].'

[1] The dates here differ from those given in Lord Hardinge's *Life*. They are taken from the copy of Lord Hardinge's reply to the *Quarterly Review*, which he sent to Lord Gough. It is dated September 8, 1846, and is initialled by Lord Hardinge.

[2] Sir Hugh Gough to his son, December 13, 1845.

The Governor-General, in his memorandum in answer to the *Quarterly Review*, says that he remained at Umballa till the 6th of December. He advanced thence towards the frontier, and, on the 8th, he was definitely informed by Major Broadfoot that the Sikhs would immediately cross the Sutlej in force. Sending orders to the Commander-in-Chief to meet the emergency, he himself went over, at considerable risk, to Ludhiana to examine into the strength of the garrison. He considered that the Ludhiana troops could be much more usefully employed in protecting the grain dépôt at Bussean from a sudden attack by the Sikhs [1], and he gave

[1] The second Lord Hardinge, in his biography of his father, lays great stress on the importance of this step. 'This movement,' he says, 'was one of the most important in the whole campaign. Had Basian been destroyed by any sudden inroad of plunderers, the army would have been delayed by at least ten days, and Firozpur itself might have been cut off.' He adds in a footnote, 'The Governor-General acted on his own responsibility. The Commander-in-Chief had protested against the evacuation of Ludhiána on the score of its exposure to hostile attacks.' We are thus given to understand that the wisdom of Sir Henry Hardinge saved the army from a dangerous blunder in one of the most important movements of the whole campaign, and did so by acting against the advice of Sir Hugh Gough. It is true that the Commander-in-Chief had, in pursuance of his policy for strengthening the frontier, insisted on the full equipment of Ludhiana. But when the Governor-General consulted the Commander-in-Chief on this particular question, Sir Hugh Gough replied: 'I should greatly deplore the moral effect which the destruction of the Town or Cantonment of Ludhiana would inevitably produce. For, if effected, I should dread a similar catastrophe befalling our other Can-

orders to this effect. On December 11th, the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej. They hoped to be able to cut off Ferozepore from the other British forces, and then to deal separately with the Ludhiana and Umballa troops. The Governor-General had sent final orders to the Commander-in-Chief on the 10th, and, on the same day, Sir Hugh Gough gave orders for the cavalry to move on the 11th of December, and for

tonments in the Division; wherefore much must depend in my opinion on the amount of Force which crossed the Beas and are moving in Ludhiana. This I know nothing of. As to the Fort at Ludhiana, it is untenable against guns of heavy calibre. If it alone is to be defended, 1,500 men are as many as it will contain. It is very doubtful whether the works will stand the force of its own guns for any time. But surely we must be very deficient in information if we cannot ascertain the Force moving on it, on which everything depends. Should the Enemy not be in imposing Force, eight Companies of the 50th Foot, the 26th, 42nd, and 48th Regts., with a troop of Horse Artillery might join us, leaving their depôts . . . with the 11th and 73rd Native Infantry, and the remaining troop of Horse Artillery. But again I repeat that everything depends upon the force it is likely to be assailed by.' The letter closes with the words 'assuming that we may withdraw this Force'; and in the estimate given by Sir Hugh of the troops available for marching on Ferozepore, he includes a total of 3,280 from Ludhiana. Writing as he did, on the 11th of December, before the news of the actual invasion had reached him, a cautious Commander-in-Chief could scarcely have gone farther than this. Sir Henry Hardinge, being on the spot and knowing the circumstances, took the somewhat daring step of relieving practically the whole garrison. The event justified his action: but that action was not taken in spite of the protests of the Commander-in-Chief.

the infantry to march on the 12th. Everything was in readiness for immediate action. 'I shall remain here,' he wrote[1], 'to see the troops march the day after to-morrow, and will then push on and join the advance. I greatly fear the troops from the hills will not get down as soon as you wish.' At the same time he sent orders for the reserve at Meerut to march up. On the 12th of December, while the Governor-General rode over to Ludhiana, the Commander-in-Chief started from Umballa[2] and reached Rajputa that night; next day he was at Sirhind, and on the 14th at Isru. From Isru, he sent a hurried order to Sir Charles Napier to get all possible support, and advance to co-operate with the main army by making a strong demonstration in the Bari Doab[3]. On the 15th, he wrote to his son from Lattala:—

The Sikhs have crossed their whole army, and their outposts skirmished with Littler on the evening of the 13th. The result we have not heard, as the communication is cut off. War, therefore, has been proclaimed in a very temperate proclamation, and the whole of the Sikh property at this side of the Sutlej has been confiscated. We delayed too

[1] Sir Hugh Gough to Sir Henry Hardinge, December 10, 1845; Gough MSS.

[2] Not from Simla, as Colonel Malleson asserts in his *Decisive Battles of India* (p. 379). Sir Hugh had been at Umballa for some time. The assertion that the Commander-in-Chief was at Simla at such a moment amounts to a serious imputation.

[3] Sir Hugh Gough to Sir Charles Napier, December 14, 1845.

long moving, and the troops I put in motion being in part countermanded has crippled us. However, I have ample to cut the Sikhs in pieces, but they are not in hand as they should be. But the object is great—to support Sir John Littler even at some hazard. My fellows are in great spirits. I move to-morrow thirty miles. I shall push on so close that, if they attack me, Littler will fall on their rear; if they attack him, I shall be in the midst of them. I shall not precipitate an action if they do not, but wait for my force moving up within one day's march of me, under Major-General Gilbert. This, by one day's delay, would give me 10,000 fighting men, whilst Littler has at Ferozepore . . . 7,360 fighting men. . . . The G.-G., is now with me, he has placed all at my disposal, and now sees that it would have been better had my proposals been carried before into effect. This good arises from it, that the Sikhs would not have crossed. . . . May God in His infinite mercy help and protect me.

On the 16th December, the Ludhiana force and the advance portion of the Umballa force bivouacked at Wadni, where some slight resistance was made, and, on the 17th, they advanced a short distance to Charrak, to enable the rest of the Umballa troops to combine. On the 18th, the whole force, numbering some 10,000 men, set out for Moodkee. The whole distance from Umballa to Moodkee, about 140 miles, was covered in seven days, and over a country where sand and jungle alternated with ploughed land, where the thick dust obscured the air, and the hot sun beat mercilessly upon the parched frame. Food was scarce till they reached Wadni, where grain was available, and there was neither time nor means to cook

rations of meat. The march was most creditable to the men, and the efforts they made were fully appreciated by the Commander-in-Chief. One of his difficulties was means of carriage; his original request to the Governor-General to arrange for this was among the countermanded orders. 'The great fault is,' he wrote on the 12th December, 'Corps not having their camels handed over sooner. . . . We shall want no ammunition from Ludhiana for this force, but carriage would be a great object, as we have been obliged to substitute hackerries [bullock-carts] for Camels.' The speed of the march was dictated not only by the necessity of Ferozepore, but by anxiety about the Governor-General, who had been rash enough to traverse the whole line of the unprotected frontier, and who might have been captured, on his way to or from Ludhiana, by a sudden rush of the Sikh cavalry. 'I have possibly overworked the advance,' Sir Hugh told Sir Henry, 'but I really do not like your position. It would be a fearful thing to have a Governor-General bagged.'

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